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every nation that allows private exploitation of broadcasting and
other electronic mass media,I some government agency is assigned the
job of regulating those media. That agency's job is to determine who is
to be allowed to speak over the airwaves, who is to be forbidden, and
what those who are allowed to speak may say. In the United States, that
role is played by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In
Japan, it is played by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). In other countries, the gatekeepers have other names.
Governments justify their control over who may broadcast in a variety of ways. Many justifications are based on the idea that the ability to
speak over the electronic mass media is not merely a source of profit or of
N

1. I will use the terms "broadcast," "broadcasting," and speech "over the airwaves" in this
Article to reler to the electronic mass media generally, including media such as cable television that
reach the ultimate consumer through wires rather than spectrum. This usage, while lacking in precision, avoids the mind-numbing effects of repeating the phrase "electronic mass media" every sentence or so.
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gratification; it is a source of power.2 Leaving that right to the market is
seen as allocating that power to those who are already economically favored, and allowing them to use it to shape public views and desires.' I
do not propose to discuss in this Article the justifications for broadcast
regulation, however, or the important constitutional law questions raised
by a government agency parceling out the right to speak over the airwaves to some individuals and not to others.' Nor do I propose to discuss more than fleetingly questions of comparative constitutional law
raised by different countries' reactions to those issues.'
My focus in this Article, rather, is on how contrasting regulatory
approaches and philosophies in two countries - the United States and
Japan - have shaped the doctrines and practices those countries' broadcast regulators have selected.' The basic documents for the governance
2. See, e.g., Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to PurchaseRadio and
Television Time, 57 VA. L. Rnv. 574, 604-06 (1971).
3. Some politicians fear that a "tiny, unelected and elitist" group of broadcasters can set the
agenda of social debate and usurp political authority. R. HOMET, POLIICS, CULTURES AND COMMUNICATION: EUROPEAN VS. AMERICAN APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATIONS POLICYMAKING 54
(1979).
To the extent that broadcast speech is a vehicle of social and political power, it is debatable
whether the ability to engage in it should be distributed according to the prevailing distribution of
wealth. See Weinberg, Questioning BroadcastRegulation, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1272-73 (1988).
The United States system of broadcast regulation, however, is only superficially responsive to that
concern. Under the American approach, in contrast to that of the Japanese, broadcast licenses once
awarded are freely transferable. In fact, Congress acted in 1952 explicitly to disapprove an FCC
policy limiting license transferability. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d), added by Act of July 16, 1952, ch.
879, § 8, 66 Stat. 716; MG-TV Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 408 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (1987). As Professor Tobin has pointed out, distributing the right to a
commodity on an egalitarian basis but allowing that right to be freely transferred in the market is
unlikely to produce an ultimate distribution much different from that which the market would have
produced in the first instance. See Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON.
263 (1970); see also Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 406
(1965) (Lee, Comm'r, concurring).
4. Compare Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1933) (regulator may withdraw license of broadcaster because its words "offend ... religious
sensibilities. . . , inspire political distrust .... or offend youth and innocence"), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 599 (1933), with Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (regulator may not forbid publication
of newspaper notwithstanding that its words are "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory"). See
generally L. PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); I. POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM

(1983); Spitzer, The Constitutionalityof Licensing Broadcasters, 64

N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989).
5. But see infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
6. I shall not discuss one of the most important elements of Japan's broadcasting system: Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK or Japan Broadcasting Corporation), Japan's quasi-govermnental public
broadcaster. The relationships of MPT and other regulators with NHK are very different from their
relationships with private broadcasters, and are beyond the scope of this Article. Any discussion of
Japanese broadcasting that does not mention NHK, however, is seriously skewed; the reader should
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of the electronic media in Japan are based on American models;' they
were drafted by or under the supervision of Americans, during the Occupation period following World War II.8 The two countries, however, are
characterized by fundamentally different regulatory styles. This Article
examines how, starting from similar points, the two systems diverged. It
evaluates the different approaches they have taken, and the degree to
which those differences can be traced to the two countries' respective
regulatory approaches. Finally, the Article attempts to use the two
countries' experiences to draw more general conclusions about the appropriate role of bargaining and negotiation in the administrative process.
The FCC is commonly seen as having performed rather badly in
regulating broadcasting in this country. It has been one of our most criticized agencies: the Landis Report on Regulatory Agencies wrote in 1960

that the FCC
presents a somewhat extraordinary spectacle. Despite considerable excellence on the part of its staff, the Commission has drifted, vacillated and
remember that many of Japan's highest-quality (and most-watched) television programs are not
broadcast on private stations at all. See S. Shimizu, The Changing Face of Japanese Broadcasting:
Toward a Multi-Channel, Multi-Media Era 15-16 (May 1991) (unpublished paper, copy on file with
author) [hereinafter Shimizu 1991]; S. Shimizu, The Challenges to Public-Service Broadcasting:
How NHK Prepares For The Future 12 (paper prepared for the Aspen Institute Conference, Berlin,
June 8-11, 1986, copy on file with author) [hereinafter Shimizu 1986]. NHK, moreover, has played a
crucial role independent of both MPT and the commercial broadcasters in introducing new technology into the mass communications marketplace. See infra notes 477-484 and accompanying text; see
also L. Johnson, Development of High Definition Television: A Study in U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations 7-10 (RAND Center for U.S.-Japan Relations monograph). See generally J. Geller, Japanese
Public Broadcasting: A Promise Fulfilled (1979) (Aspen Institute Program on Communications and
Society monograph); Shimizu 1991, supra; Shimizu 1986, supra; Ishii, The New Media and Public
BroadcastingService, 21 STUD. BROADCASTING 77 (1985); Kabira, Public Broadcasting:The Issues
in Japan, 8 INTERMEDIA 19 (1980). Studies of Broadcastingis published yearly, in English, by the
NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute.
7. These include the Japanese constitution, drafted by General MacArthur's staffin 1946, see E.
REISCHAUER, TH JAPANESE 106 (1977), which guarantees "[freedom of... speech, press, and all
forms of expression." Kenpo (Constitution) art. XXI. They include as well the Broadcast and Radio Laws, Laws No. 131 and 132 of May 2, 1950, which constitute the basic charter of Japanese
broadcast regulation. See generally NIHON SHIMBUN KYOKAI [hereinafter NSK], PRESS LAWS IN
JAPAN 36-41 (1985); Shiono, The Development of the System of TelecommunicationsLaw in Japan,
21 STUD. BROADCASTING 29, 32 (1985) [hereinafter Shiono 1985]; Shiono, The Development of
Broadcasting Technology and Related Issues in Japan, 14 STUD. BROADCASTING 7, 10-11 (1978)
[hereinafter Shiono 1978].
8. Japan before the Second World War had a single, government-controlled broadcast entity.
See infra note 194. After the war, however, American authorities rewrote Japan's broadcast laws,
see generally Uchikawa, Process of Establishment of the New System of Broadcastingin Post-War
Japan, 2 STUD. BROADCASTING 51 (1964), to provide that private, advertiser-supported over-the-air
television and radio broadcasting would coexist with a quasi-governmental Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, or NHK). See supra note 6.
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stalled in almost every major area. It seems incapable of policy planning, of
disposing within a reasonable period of time the business before it, of fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its problems. The available
evidence indicates that it, more than any other agency, has been susceptible
to ex parte presentations, and that it has been subservient, far too subservient, to the9 subcommittees on communications of the Congress and
their members.
Much of the criticism that has been heaped on the FCC over the years is
justified.10
United States observers view the Japanese bureaucracy more approvingly. As American industry lobbies Congress for financial assistance inmeeting the Japanese challenge in high-definition television, it
exploits a general perception that Japanese regulators have succeeded
where their American counterparts failed. American observers, to a
great degree, have viewed Japanese bureaucrats with an "awe bordering
on reverence"; 12 most agree that the Japanese government has played a
remarkable role in what can only be characterized as an economic
13

"miracle.

9. Quoted in E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLrIcs OF BROADCAST REGULATION 34 (3d ed. 1982) (hereinafter E. KRASNOW); see also id. at 33-35; V. Mosco, BROADCASTING
IN THE UNITED STATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLENGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 13-26

(1979).
10. The FCC has adopted an unwieldy, expensive, and largely pointless mechanism for selecting
broadcast licensees. Its allocation policies have sharply and unnecessarily limited the number of
broadcast signals in most areas of the country, and its approach to new technology has overprotected
the status quo and overburdened innovators. See infra notes 167-69, 180-86, 317-35 and accompanying text; see, eg., S. BEsEN, T. KRATrENMAKER, A. METZGER & J. WOODBURY, MISREGULATING
TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC (1984) (hereinafter S.BESEN). But see Cass,
Review, Enforcement and Power under the Communications Act of 1934: Choice and Chance in
Institutional Design, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 90-92
(M. Paglin ed. 1989) ("Compared with other administrative agencies, the FCC has done fairly well"
in fashioning policy; its "work, outside of the notorious quicksand of comparative licensing, has
often been praised.").
11. See L. Johnson, supra note 6, at 38-40.
12. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 923 (1984).
13. See, eg., C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1986) (characterizing the Japanese bureaucracy as farsighted, coherent, and firmly in control). Some scholars take the contrary
view that the governmental role in Japan has on the whole been subordinate to the workings of the
market. See, eg., Trezise, Politics, Government, and Economic Growth in Japan, in ASIA'S NEw
GIANT 753 (H. Rosovsky & H. Patrick eds. 1976). Others emphasize the mutual interaction between politicians, bureaucracy, and industry, eg., T. PEMPEL, POLICY AND POLITICS IN JAPAN:
CREATIVE CONSERVATISM (1982), or stress the "patterned pluralism" formed by a strong state's
institutionalized accommodations with industrial and other elites and less structured interaction
with other elements of society, see Muramatsu & Krauss, The Conservative Policy Line and the
Development of Patterned Pluralism, in 1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: THE DOMESTIC
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Congress, thus, has recently sought to move American administrative law in a more Japanese direction. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 199014 and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 19901 seek
to encourage resolution of public-law disputes through negotiation and
conciliation rather than through the traditional processes of rulemaking
and adjudication. This legislative movement can be traced in part to a
perception that the success of Japanese industry flows from that country's informal regulatory system, relatively unconstricted by process or
rules. 6 Pursuant to those statutes, the FCC is now considering the extent to which it should incorporate arbitration, mediation and negotia17
tion into its own decisionmaking procedures.
The Japanese regulatory model, however, has provided no magic
cure for the problems of choosing broadcast allocation policies, selecting
broadcast licensees, and planning for new electronic mass media technology." Japanese regulators have limited their license awards to entities
that represent coalitions among the powerful and the well-connected,
with the regulator subsequently protecting the market position of the regulated. The Japanese experience has tended to protect the position of old
technology, and to suppress or marginalize the development of new technology. Japanese policymakers have instituted a decisionmaking process
less incoherent and wasteful than our own, but with drawbacks that we
would find unacceptable. Their regulatory approach, in this instance,
would not serve the U.S. well; their experience, however, may provide
some lessons as to where bargaining-oriented regulation is most likely to
succeed or fail.
TRANSFORMATION 516, 537 (K. Yamamura & Y. Yasuba eds. 1987); see also M. AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 258-97 (1988).
14. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990).
15. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2737 (1990).
16. See eg., Regulatory Negotiation:Joint Hearings before the S. Select Comm. on Small Bustdess and the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Taxation of the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 18-19, 28 (1980) (statement of Francis Murray, Director, National Coal
Policy Project); cf. E. VOGEL,, JAPAN As NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 236-37 (1979)
(urging that U.S. regulators "follow the Japanese model and rely on... creating a consensus of
concerned people" in rulemaaking rather than on "legalistic rigidities and adversary relationships").
17. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, 6 F.C.C. Red. 2267 (1991).
18. While Japanese export-oriented industries are commonly highly capital-intensive, efficient,
and productive by U.S. or European standards, the Japanese domestic service sector and infrastructure are commonly labor-intensive and inefficient by international standards, reflecting low levels of
capital investment and an orientation to goals other than economic efficiency. See Davidson, Japanese Telecommunications Policy: New Directions and Old Dilemmas, 11 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POL'Y 147, 147-48 (1987). Japanese broadcast regulators have operated at the intersection of those
two sectors, as the export-oriented telecommunications equipment segment and the domestic mass
communications infrastructure have become increasingly intertwined. Id. at 148.
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Part I of this Article discusses regulatory practice and legal ideology
in the two countries. In United States regulation, important functional
advantages of what I call a "bargaining model" are counterbalanced by
elements of doctrine and ideology pulling towards what I call a "formal
rationality model"; the U.S. system is driven by the tension between
those two forms. In Japan, by contrast, legal ideology and regulatory
practice each reflect a bargaining model and reinforce one another; ruling
legal ideology bolsters the dominant regulatory technique of administrative guidance. After Part II considers some of the problems inherent in a
comparison of different nations' broadcast regulatory systems, Parts III
and IV of the Article examine the consequences of those differences in
regulatory style for the broadcast-law systems of the two countries. In
both systems, broadcast regulators have demonstrated a tendency to develop special relationships with existing industry members and to exclude
outsiders from the bargaining that takes place between the agency and
the regulated. The systems differ crucially, however, in the mechanisms
by which they allow outsiders to challenge those exclusive ties.
Part III disousses the process of license allocation, involving regulatory decisions affecting what broadcast licenses shall be available, to
whom they are awarded, and what standards govern their award. In the
U.S., both allocation policy decisions and decisions concerning the selection of individual recipients for specific contested licenses were initially
made informally through a process incorporating some elements of a bargaining model. Formal-rationality factors emphasized in judicial review,
however, ultimately propelled the regulatory agency to a more formal
mode of decisionmaking. In Japan, by contrast, license allocation decisions have always been made through processes reflecting a pure bargaining model. When different entities file applications for a single license
authorization, for example, the regulator does not engage in a competitive selection process, as it would in the U.S.; rather, it facilitates the
creation of a joint venture representing, to the extent possible, all influential applicants.
These procedural differences have significant consequences for the
substantive policies adopted by each country and for the nature of the
mass media system each creates. The United States allocation system is
seriously flawed. Its formal-rationality roots have led it to incorporate
decisionmaking processes that are, in context, inefficient and largely
pointless. The Japanese system is less wasteful, but manifests flaws more
closely associated with bargaining-oriented regulation. In comparison to
that of the United States, it artificially restricts the number of broadcast
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licensees, centralizes media power, encourages blandness in programming, and fosters political involvement in the licensing process. It places
media power squarely within the establishment consensus of the socially
and politically acceptable, diffusing it through shared authority within
that class, and perpetuating communications power through negotiation
among power-structure groups.
Part IV addresses the advent of cable television in Japan and the
United States and considers the regulatory reaction to the intrusion of
new technology into a broadcast marketplace dominated by the old. In
the United States, the FCC's initial approach to cable was client-oriented. The Commission sought to preserve the market position of overthe-air broadcasters, its long-term clients and the mainstays, until then,
of the electronic mass communications system. Coercive shocks provided by the courts' application of formal-rationality standards, however,
helped break up that system and propel the Commission into a new, deregulated age. In Japan, MPT was similarly initially hostile to cable and
protective of old technologies. Consistent with the pure bargaining
model, however, the interplay leading to the breakup of the old system
was provided not by the judicial system but by interbureaucratic competition from a rival agency. Interbureaucratic interaction served the function undertaken in the U.S. by judicial review. This interaction led MPT
to shift its general policy outlook and to expand its client base to include
a host of new players with a stake in the new technology.
Part V applies the lessons of U.S. and Japanese broadcast administration to draw more general conclusions about bargaining- and formalrationality-oriented regulation. Bargaining-oriented regulation, I conclude, can be problematic. It is least problematic when parties excluded
from the bargaining can successfully turn to some outside actot, such as
the judiciary or a competing agency, with the power to shock the agency
into opening up the bargaining process. In both the United States and
Japan, bargaining-oriented policymaking for new technology ultimately
proved more or less manageable, because institutional interaction in each
system undercut the cliquishness of the old regime. Japan's use of bargaining techniques in license allocation, by contrast, is more problematic,
because no external checks allow politically uninfluential actors entree
into the bargaining process. Japan's pure bargaining system erects a formidable set of barriers to entry into the licensing process, different from
those created by U.S. formal-rationality techniques.
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REGULATORY MODELS AND LEGAL IDEOLOGY

Two Approaches to Regulation

I hope to explain U.S. and Japanese broadcast regulation in this Article, and to illuminate the enterprise of regulation more generally,
through the use of two stylized models to describe day-to-day agency
interaction with regulated parties.19 I refer to these as a "formal rationality" 20 model on the one hand, and a "bargaining" 2 1 model on the other.

They are ideal-types, and oversimplified; most regulation incorporates elements of both.
Under the formal rationality model, regulatory enforcement emphasizes detecting and prosecuting violations of the law, and punishing violators through the imposition of legal sanctions.2 2 The enforcement style
is adversarial, and stresses formal legal process as a routine device. 3 In
the United States, OSHA enforcement has provided the paradigmatic ex-

ample of such an approach to regulation."
Policymaking under this model" emphasizes formal procedures, fo19. For analysis relying on similar stylized regulatory models, see generally ENFORCING REGULATION (K. Hawkins & J.Thomas eds. 1984); P. GRABOWSKY & J. BRAITHWAITE,OF MANNERS
GENTLE: ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 7-8

(1986).
20. I refer here to an approach commonly referred to in the enforcement context as "deterrence" regulation. See Hawkins & Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory Bureaucracies,
in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 3, 13-15; Reiss, Selecting Strategiesof Control Over
OrganizationalLife, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 23, 23; Kagan & Scholz, The
"Criminology of the Corporation" and RegulatoryEnforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 67, 68 (first of three models).
The same approach has been referred to as a "stringency" approach, R. KAGAN, REGULATORY
JUSTICE 9, 44-48 (1978); a "legalistic" approach, Shover, Lynxwiler, Groce & Clelland, Regional
Variation in Regulatory Law Enforcement The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 121, 123; and a "penalty" approach, Veljanovski, The Economies ofRegulatory Enforcement, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 171,
172 (citing A. REISS, JR. & A. BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAW-BREAKING
274-99 (1980)).
21. This model is also commonly referred to as a "compliance" approach. See Hawkins &
Thomas, supra note 20, at 13-15; Reiss, supra note 20, at 23; Veljanovski, supra note 20, at 172; an
"accommodation" approach, see R. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 9, 44-48; and a "conciliatory" approach, see Shover, Lynxwiler, Groce & Cleliand, supra note 20, at 123.
22. See Veljanovski, supra note 20, at 172.
23. See Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 20, at 13.
24. See S. KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 191 (1981).
25. Most observers have discussed these models in connection with enforcement rather than
policymaking (rule formulation). The models seem to me, however, useful in the policymaking context as well. For those who are interested in alternative models for policymaking, a helpful summary
can be found in Arnall & Mead, Decision Making at the FCC, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS: AN IN-
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cusing on the promulgation of rational rules in a clear, objective, and
unbiased manner. The formal rationality approach to enforcement demands that regulated parties be able easily to ascertain the law and to
follow it. Since the regulator does not seek to work informally with regulated parties in the enforcement process - and, indeed, rejects such contacts as inconsistent with fairness and objectivity - informal bargaining
of rules only serves to undermine the values on which the system
depends.
Regulators under the bargaining model, by contrast, hinge their enforcement efforts on low-visibility negotiation, involving "accommodations, threats, and tradeoffs between enforcement official and violator
26
that results in compromises and modifications of the [effective] law."
The process deemphasizes the actual imposition of formal sanctions as
stigmatizing and counterproductive; such sanctions are commonly
threatened but rarely imposed. The agency hopes to induce compliance
by combining flexibility on its own part with threats, education and
exhortation.2 7
Such regulation is characterized by continuing personal contact between regulator and regulated. Close relationships, social and otherwise,
are seen as important to facilitate negotiation and to keep regulators informed of problems and violations. 28 In seeking to achieve effective industry-wide compliance at minimum cost, regulators deal with regulated
parties on a political basis; that is, they reach results based on relative
bargaining power and appeals to shared values.
The bargaining model in policymaking yields a pluralist process,
with policymaking accomplished largely through negotiation among regulators and affected interests. The close contacts intrinsic to informal
rule enforcement foster informal action in the policymaking arena as
well. An administrator oriented towards a bargaining approach to enforcement will pursue the input and agreement of regulated parties for
policymaking, so as to come up with rules that industry members will be
TERDISCIPLINARY TEXT 37 (L. Lewin ed. 1984). See also Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393 (1981-82) (contrasting "incrementalist" model, emphasizing
decentralized, remedial, incremental policymaking intended to meet short-term demands, with
"comprehensive rationality" model, emphasizing synoptic, wide-ranging policy analysis).
26. Veljanovski, supra note 20, at 172.
27. See Kagan & Scholz, supra note 20, at 67.
This, again, is an ideal model, useful for didactic purposes; it assumes regulators who are diligent
and committed to official regulatory goals. That not all government employees can always be so
described is too well-accepted to require citation.
,28. See Hawkins & Thomas, supra note 20, at 13.
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willing to obey.2 9
Bargaining-minded administration tends to merge rulemaking and
enforcement. Where the agency sees itself as enforcing flexible, "realworld" law, rather than mechanically imposing the formal text of official
rules, ongoing policymaking becomes a part of the enforcement
process.3 °
B. Regulation in the United States
It has become a commonplace that regulation in the U.S. follows a
formal rationality model. Formal rationality characterizes much of our
thinking about administrative law, and most of our judicial rulings. Our
bureaucrats sometimes are said to stress formality unduly: to enforce formal rules even when such enforcement is unreasonable, to insist on the
letter of the regulatory law at the cost of common sense. 3 1 That characterization, though, slights the role in our society of bargaining-oriented,
accommodationist approaches. One can observe both modes of regulation by United States agencies;3 2 indeed, informal policymaking and rule
enforcement seem to be the norm, "the 'bread and butter' of the process
'33
of administration.
On examination, this apparent inconsistency begins to resolve itself
as follows: There are important functional pulls in our regulatory
scheme leading agencies to bargaining-oriented regulation. Important elements of ruling doctrine and legal ideology, though, at the same time
pull towards the formal rationality model. Our regulatory system thus
lies to some degree suspended between those two poles.
It should not be surprising that a United States agency would find it
convenient or even necessary to operate informally, interacting with reg29. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
30. See Veljanovski, supranote 20; see, e.g., Anderson, Negotiation and InformalAgency Action:
The Case ofSuperfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261 (discussing EPA's shifting policies regarding the terms

on which it would settle Superfund enforcement actions).
31. See, eg., E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). Ronald Reagan won the Presidency in part on the theme of

getting just such regulation "off our backs." See Safire, Come the Millennium, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
32. See, eg., Shover, Lynxwiler, Groce & Clelland, supra note 20, at 121 (contrasting "conciliatory" surface mining regulation in the Western U.S. with "legalistic" regulation in the Eastern U.S.).
33. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977);
see ATr'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMIN. PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S.

Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-59 (1941); infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text. But see E.
BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 31, at 30-57 (trend in the United States throughout the 1970s
favored a legalistic, deterrence-oriented style).
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ulated parties on an unconstrained, day-to-day basis. Formality is costly;
an agency can attempt to achieve its goals more cheaply through informal procedures. 4 In the policymaking process, an informal approach is
responsive to the administrative agency's greatest policymaking problem:
collecting necessary information.3 5 The agency cannot make intelligent
- or even coherent - policy without a good understanding of feasibility, costs, and competitive impacts. It may lack the technical ability, or
the firm-specific data, to develop the information itself. Outside consultants and consumer groups may be similarly limited. 36 These limitations
commonly leave the agency with little choice other than to rely on industry members for information. It cannot get that information, however, in
a rigidly adversarial posture. 37 Thus, regulators often find it helpful to
meet informally with industry parties, discuss the issues, trade information, and negotiate a standard.3"
Other factors also lead agencies to make policy through a more
political, and less formal, process. 39 As a practical matter, any enforcement system must rely heavily on voluntary compliance. Moreover, judicial review may, as a practical matter, indefinitely suspend the operation
of an agency rule as the cycle of rule-review-remand-rule-review-remand
proceeds.' If the agency can work with regulated parties to devise a
34. Those cost savings carry with them significant disadvantages. See, eg., E. Cox, R.
FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).

My goal here, however, is not to characterize these approaches as good or bad; rather, it is to describe why agencies adopt them.
35. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982); see also Robinson, The Federal
Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 216-24
(1978).
36. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669,
1713-14 (1975).
37. See S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 111:
The adversary process requires the agency to propose a standard; the industry responds
to questions related to the proposed standard. To shift the proposed standard requires a
new set of questions. The more hostile the industry, the more narrowly responsive will
be its answers, the more strictly the questions will be interpreted, and the less likely it is
that the information provided in response to the first set of questions will help when the
agency shifts to the second set. While the adversary process can determine whether a
specific proposed standard is good or bad, it cannot readily show which of the myriad of
unproposed standards is preferable. To use it to test each plausible alternative standard
would take forever.
38. In order to satisfy APA requirements, the negotiated standard can then be set out for public
comment, and adopted after due formalities have thus been complied with. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
39. See S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 107; see also Stewart, supra note 36, at 1686, 1775.
40. This concern is a substantial one; Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William
Ruckelshaus has estimated that more than 80% of all EPA rules are challenged in court. Susskind
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solution that they will be inclined to comply with, and will not be inclined to challenge, it may secure better compliance without delays.4a
Federal Communications Commission policymaking illustrates the
ubiquity of informal ex parte contacts.4 2 In FCC rulemaking, "political
deals and interest group bargaining... are present in considerable degree. 4a3 The Commission has negotiated proposed rules with industry
groups, and has in the rulemaking process adopted the results of bargaining among industry groups.' Indeed, until 1977, AT&T rates were set
not by formal procedures but by negotiated settlements between AT&T
and FCC common carrier staff.'
Pure negotiation, further, is not the only informal tool at the
agency's disposal. In appropriate cases, an agency can use informal techniques in order to deflect the judicial and political weapons that an industry party might otherwise bring to bear against an agency decision. For
example, the FCC successfully applied informal pressure to bring about
the adoption of a "family viewing policy" by the networks and the National Association of Broadcasters, under which programming deemed
inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience was not shown
during certain evening hours.' The FCC used less subtle threats to dissuade radio licensees from playing songs that the Commission might
deem to be "drug-oriented." '4 7 The FCC enforced informal limits on the
amount of time broadcasters devoted to commercials through the technique of granting license or renewal applications routinely by staff action
if the applications represented that the licensee would satisfy the limits,
& McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134
(1985-86).

Agency rules are not automatically stayed simply because someone files a petition for review, but
courts have often been receptive to requests to issue such stays. A rule is, of course, automatically
vacated once a reviewing court finds it to be flawed and remands for further proceedings.
41. See S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 114; see also Stewart, supra note 36, at 1735.
42. See Robinson, supra note 35, at 225.
43. Id. at 201. The author is a former Commissioner of the FCC.
44. Compare Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 307 (1972) (Johnson,
Comm'r, concurring and dissenting) with id. at 287 (Burch, Chairman, concurring); see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 712 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Daytime AM B/C Stations, 99
F.C.C.2d 1087 (1984); AT&T, Offer of Facilities For Use By Other Common Carriers, 52 F.C.C.2d
727 (1975); see generally Brotman, Communications Policymaking at the FCC: PastPractices,Future
Directions, 7 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.. 55 (1988).
45. See Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 816
(1966); Robinson, supra note 35, at 256.
46. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
47. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 914

(1973).
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but subjecting them to significant and expensive processing delays if they
did not.a" In all of these cases, the agency used informal techniques to

avoid either judicial or congressional scrutiny of its policies.4 9

Powerful elements of United States legal ideology, however, significantly check these aspects of regulatory practice, and oblige agencies to
conform more closely to the formal rationality model. That ideology is
embodied in part in a line of cases, beginning around 1970, establishing
what came to be known as "hard look" judicial review.5 0 The cases arose
out of a perception that agencies could not be trusted to rule in the public
interest because they had become "captured" by industry, or at the least,
had come to afford industry members an unacceptably high, and unac48. See E. KRASNow, supra note 9, at 197.
The Commission took a similar approach regarding public affairs and local programming. Setting up required minimum percentages of public affairs or local programming, the Commission declared, would place impermissible restrictions on licensee discretion. See National Black Media
Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Formulation of Policies Relating to the
Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419,
428-29 (1977); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 517 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Allanza Federal
de Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732 (1976). It nonetheless developed unofficial guidelines that were
used as application processing criteria.
The Commission later abandoned both its commercialization and its programming guidelines as
part of a deregulatory effort. See Deregulation of Commercial Television, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984),
on reconsideration,Programming and Commercialization Policies, 104 F.C.C.2d 357 (1986), rev'd in
part,Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), afl'd in part, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
49. The approach has not been limited to the FCC; "[r]egulation through 'raised eyebrow' tech.
niques seems inherent in the structure of most administrative agencies." Consolidated Edison Co. v.
FPC, 512 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See, eg., United States v. Gaubert, 111 S.Ct. 1267
(1991) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board informal pressure regarding banking practices); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 222-23 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Office of Federal
Contract Compliance informal pressure to adopt affirmative action plan); Hercules, Inc. v. FPC, 552
F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1977) (Federal Power Commission informal pressure to impose pipeline
curtailment policies); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (informal pressure to adopt "voluntary [imports] restraints" on steel), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1004 (1975); Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1982) (creating the Council
on Wage and Price Stability).
When Atlanta city officials used informal techniques to require minority set-asides in city-funded
construction while avoiding judicial challenge, city officials referred to it as their "Muhammad Ali"
approach, after that heavyweight champion's motto: "Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee. They
can't hit what they can't see." When the city finally enacted a formal ordinance in 1982 mandating
set-asides, the rule was immediately challenged in court and overturned. Presentation of Alford
Dempsey, Jr., Atlanta Assistant City Attorney, before the AALS Section on Minority Groups, San
Francisco, California (Jan. 1990); see Georgia Branch, Associated General Contractors v. Atlanta,
253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325 (1984).
50. The phrase is from Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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ceptably one-sided, degree of influence in the decisionmaking process."1
Courts responded by tightening their review of agency rulemaking, insisting that agency procedures be transparent, that agency reasoning be
clear, and that agency goals be tightly rooted in what the courts deemed
to be acceptable readings of the underlying statutes.5 2 The courts also
expanded greatly the class of persons who could initiate court proceedings in which agency actions would be measured against those
standards.53
The role of the administrative agency, when subjected to such review, is far from that suggested by the bargaining model: The agency, in
making the decisions that are at the heart of its job, is expected to apply
neutral criteria, in a rational and unbiased manner, to the parties before

it. It is expected to follow a process under which it determines its goals
with reference to its statutory mandate; considers which of various

courses of action will most nearly achieve those goals; and adopts the
course that this analytical process generates.5 4 Moreover, the agency

must structure its processes so as to make its actions amenable to judicial
review, which in turn will test those actions against a rationality standard. Administrative actions that are not fully transparent cannot properly be reviewed, and are inconsistent with "the ideal of reasoned
decisionmaking on the merits which undergirds all of our administrative
law."' 55 Through the enforcement of these rules, the judicial branch is
meant to constrain administrative bodies from wielding unchecked
power.5 6
51. See Stewart, supra note 36, at 1681-88.
52. See Robinson, supra note 35, at 228.
I speak here to judicial intentions, not to results; it is by no means clear that judges are capable of
meaningful review of agency decisions. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracyin American Law, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1276, 1352 (1984); see also infra note 60.
53. See Stewart, supranote 36, at 1711-47. Professor Stewart sees the standing cases as part of
a move towards "administrative law as interest representation," that is, as an injection of a pluralist
participation approach into the administrative process. The cases, though, can also be read simply
as an attempt by the courts to widen the sphere of rationality by making it easier to get review of
agency actions.
54. See, eg., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Professor Diver, contrasts a synoptic approach similar to that described here, which he calls
"comprehensive rationality," with what he calls an "incrementalist" approach, focusing on more
limited policymaking to meet incremental, short-term concerns. See supra note 25. Both approaches, however, emphasize rationality when contrasted with a process that derives policy through
bargaining among affected interests.
55. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
56. Cf. Frug, supra note 52, at 1334-38 (describing "judicial review" model of administrative
and corporations law doctrines).
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Such a requirement of "reasoned decisionmaking," however, is incompatible with a negotiated, political decisionmaking process. A bargaining-oriented process leads the agency to compromise neutrality, by
giving greater weight to the views of those parties with greater bargaining
power. It leads the agency to compromise rationality,57 by choosing the
policy most acceptable to the contending parties rather than the policy

most directly advancing statutory goals.5" The substantive rule most acceptable to the negotiating parties, indeed, may advance goals completely

at odds with those Congress members thought important, and may call
upon the agency to assert authority Congress members did not intend to
give it. 9 Bargaining-oriented proceedings, thus, notwithstanding their

practical merits, are problematic when set up against the formal rationality model's requirements of neutrality, reasoned decisionmaking and
transparency. 6°
57. FCC law for this reason limits the role that negotiation can play in some dispute-resolution
contexts. See, eg., Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 57 F.C.C.2d 42
(1975). The conflict between negotiation and pure rationality erupted in 1972 in one prominent case
when the Commission chose to adopt a negotiated compromise to govern cable TV development,
rather than a somewhat different proposal it had earlier circulated as representing its view of the
public interest. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson wrote in partial dissent that the Commission's decision "trampled on ... the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the philosophical concept of
independent Congressional agencies, and the due process clause of the fifth amendment." Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 315 (1972) (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting). Chairman Burch answered that Johnson's criticism was part of an "incessant barrage of
vilification, willful misrepresentation, and left-handed slander" issuing from one for whom all
"[a]commodation and compromise equal 'sellouts'." Id at 287-88 (Burch, Chairman, concurring).
No party sought judicial review, although the D.C. Circuit later directed the agency to reconsider
the agreement in light of changed circumstances. See Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58. See S. BREYER, supranote 35, at 108. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit warned in one pathbreaking
decision that it found negotiation simply unacceptable; it admonished the FCC that rulemaking "by
compromise among the contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the Communications Act vests in individual commissioners," demonstrates "undue industry influence over Commission proceedings." Home Box Office v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Informal processes, the court continued,
fail to yield the sort of transparent record that is necessary for rationality review: "Even the possibility that there is here one administrative record for the public and this court and another for the
Commission and those 'in the know' is intolerable." Id. at 54. The Home Box Office decision was in
some ways the high-water mark of hard-look thinking; its view that nonrecord contacts between an
agency and outsiders should not be tolerated at all in rulemaking was not accepted by later courts.
See, eg., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The case is,
however, an eloquent and pure exposition of hard-look philosophy.
59. See infra note 71.
60. As at the beginning of this section, I hasten to acknowledge that I oversimplify. Formal
rationality does not reign unchallenged in the world of American administrative law. See Frug,
supra note 52, at 1355-77; see also Stewart, supra note 36. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
agency rulemaking should not be made functionally equivalent to a judicial proceeding, see Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
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The movement towards "regulatory negotiation," culminating in the
recent passage of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,61 illustrates
limits that formal rationality ideology imposes on the regulatory process.
In negotiated rulemaking, an agency generates proposals for rules
through a quasi-public and officially sanctioned process of negotiation
among affected groups.62 The agency is directed to include in the bargaining process representatives of each "interest" that will be affected by
the proposed rule;6 3 these representatives put forth, negotiate, and withdraw proposals and counter-proposals in a give-and-take similar to that
between labor and management in collective bargaining. 4 After the various interests reach consensus on a proposal, the agency promulgates it
for public comment and enacts it without change.6" According to regulaUnited States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), and has instructed courts that
agencies, not courts, are the primary expositors of the statutory law, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Nor has formal rationality posed anywhere near an insuperable bar to informal regulation; judicial review ultimately defeated none of the "raised eyebrow" techniques detailed supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text. In part, this is because courts have not felt themselves able to extend to the
enforcement process the stringent review techniques they have applied in the policymaking arena,
see, eg., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244
(1967); in part, it is because courts have found themselves stymied by the necessary omnipresence of
informal action in day-to-day regulation.
Finally, it has been argued that the procedural requirements enforced by formal-rationality review in fact serve a political function, enforcing the deal through which an agency was created by
giving the parties to that deal an enhanced opportunity to block changes that would disadvantage
them. See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of PoliticalControl, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987).
61. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990).
62. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations:A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982);
Wald, Negotiation of EnvironmentalDisputes A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVmL. L. 1
(1985); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 40; Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before FederalAgencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the UnitedStates, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1625 (1986); Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest, 18 ENvrL. L. 55 (1987); see also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1987 Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and GovernmentalRelations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter, Negotiated Rulemaking Hearings].
63. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, §§ 584, 585, 104 Stat. 4969,
4971-74 (1990).
64. Negotiated Rulemaking Hearings, supra note 62, at 42 (testimony of Marshall Breger,
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States).
65. The agency retains the theoretical right to modify the proposal after public comment, and
for that reason the procedure is seen as consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The
driving force behind the negotiation process, however, is the agency's implicit agreement not to
deviate from the consensus proposal. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, 6 F.C.C. Red.
2267 (1991); S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1989); Negotiated Rulemaking Hearings,
supra note 62, at 34 (testimony of Sen. Levin). Were the agency to modify the proposal after the
comment period, the carefully negotiated balance of concessions and counter-concessions would be
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tory negotiation proponents, the constant requests today for review of
agency decisions demonstrates that the rulemaking process has lost legitimacy; regulatory negotiation, following a pluralist rather than a rationality model, can restore that legitimacy. 6
The debate over negotiated rulemaking proposals demonstrates the
problems that formal rationality ideology poses for negotiation in the
regulatory process. How, after all, should negotiated rules be reviewed in
the courts?6 7 The leading proponents of negotiated rulemaking have argued that courts should not examine the rationality of a negotiated rule
at all; the rule "should be sustained to the extent that it is within the
agency's jurisdiction and actually reflects a consensus among the interested parties." 6 While the Negotiated Rulemaking Act as enacted ultimately rejected that approach,69 the reasons for the argument should be
clear. The legitimacy of negotiated rules does not depend on their rationality, and the distinctions drawn by such rules will not necessarily be
either particularly rational from a pure policy standpoint, 70 or particularly faithful to the legislative direction.7 1 For the bargaining process to
work, the contract binding all affected parties not to seek judicial review
must be maintained.7 2
upset. Cf Litman, Copyright, Compromise, andLegislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 86768 (1987) (negotiated legislation).
66. Susskind & McMahon, supra note 40, at 133.
67. Monroe Price raised this issue long before the current vogue for negotiated rulemaking. See
Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L. REV. 541, 565
(1975).
68. Harter, supra note 62, at 103; see also Harter, The PoliticalLegitimacy and JudicialReview
of ConsensualRules, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 471, 485-89 (1983); Susskind & McMahon, supranote 40, at
164-65.
69. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 590, 104 Stat. 4969, 4976
(1990).
70. Cf.L. Johnson, supra note 6, at 3 n.2 (negotiated technical compatibility standards may not
be socially optimal).
71. Professor Funk provides some examples drawn from the regulatory negotiation concerning
Environmental Protection Agency woodstove emissions standards. The participants incorporated
into the consensus standard a requirement of energy efficiency labels. This requirement had little to
do with EPA's enabling statute or with emissions standards, but it was included because the representative of the Consumer Federation of America, supported by representatives of various states,
was willing and able to bargain for it. The same standards categorize woodstoves as "stationary
sources" within the meaning of § 111 of the Clean Air Act, a rather creative reading, and impose
requirements that can be said to be authorized by § 111 only through an imaginative understanding
of that section. See Funk, supra note 62, at 66-89.
72. I believe that the process that leads to negotiated regulations, and the theory that justifies
them, are troubling in other ways. The legitimacy of the bargaining process as a means of making
government policy must rest on the notion that everyone - or at least everyone who counts - is
present - or at least represented - in the bargaining. Yet, as Professor Litman has demonstrated
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Indeed, that may be the moral of the Radio Conferences of 1922-24,
the very first attempts at American broadcast regulation. At the start of
radio broadcasting in this country, the Federal Communications Commission did not yet exist, and the Secretary of Commerce had no explicit
statutory authority to regulate broadcasting. Secretary Hoover, responding to practical pressures, convened four informal broadcaster conferences to agree on principles by means of which he could control
broadcasting in the interest of avoiding frequency interference.7" Hoover's administrative guidance, however, lasted only so long as the matter
stayed out of the courts. Once the Secretary crossed that threshold and a
federal court ruled on the formal legality of his actions, his entire regulatory edifice came tumbling down.7 4
C.

Regulation in Japan

Japanese administrative practice is consistent with a pure version of
the bargaining model. Regulatory practice and legal ideology do not cut
against each other, as they do in the United States; rather, they reinforce
each other.
in a related context, it is intrinsic to such negotiations that everyone who counts, or who may turn
out later on to have counted, is not represented. See Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275, 299-301, 311-14, 357-58, 359 (1989). Nor, in any event, is a
"representative" of small business or consumers necessarily a meaningful surrogate for individual
small business owners or consumers. See Wald, supranote 62, at 21-22; see also Funk, supranote 62,
at 95 (in the woodstove emissions negotiations, the Consumer Federation of America "may have
represented the interests associated with the mentality of a ConsumerReports reader, but it did not
appear to lobby on behalf of poor, rural folk for whom the rule will provide little benefit and perhaps
significant burden"). In fancier lingo, the "subjective delineation of the 'relevant' groups" and the
"objectification of people's subjective desires" necessary for representation destroys the legitimacy of
the negotiation. Frug, supra note 52, at 1369.
In a bargaining process in which some individuals are more represented than others, inequalities
in bargaining power and the nature of the ground rules of the negotiation may do more to influence
the outcome than "the will of the people" as expressed in the bargaining process. See S. BREYER,
supra note 35, at 178-79, 181; cf Fiss,Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.L 1073 (1984). Against such a
backdrop, I am hesitant to jettison the notion that rationality, and fidelity to such commands as
appear to be embodied in the legislative mandate, should be at least aspirational goals.
73. See generally G. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 (1938), excerpted in D. GNSBURG,
REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS 26-36 (1979).
74. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). Hoover's real failure
was that he was unable to use informal pressure to keep Zenith on its assigned frequency and off of a
frequency assigned by treaty to Canada. In order to uphold United States treaty obligations, Hoover
was forced to go to court against Zenith. See L. POWE, supra note 4, at 59. The court's ruling that
the Secretary had no power to enforce his frequency assignments led to chaos in the radio industry,
rampant interference, and the Radio Act of 1927. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). See generally I. POOL, supra note 4, at 112-16.
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The typical form of regulation in Japan is gyosei shido, or administrative guidance;75 over 80% of Japanese regulatory activity, it is said,
takes that form.7 6 Under the administrative guidance approach, rule enforcement or other agency action is accomplished informally, through
meetings between the regulator and regulated, and in the absence of formal process." Administration is oriented around the notion that "the
formal use of regulatory power is not considered desirable . . . .The
approach preferred in Japan is to create a situation that is acceptable to
both the administrative organs and the other parties through informal
negotiation."7 8 That regulatory mode is justified by Japanese scholars in
tones familiar to American students of the bargaining model: "[R]esort
to authoritative modes of regulation based on 'orders and coercion' [may]
lead to friction in the relationship between the administration and the
public, or it may even lead to negative resistance and law-evading
behavior."7 9
Japanese administrators are well-positioned to engage in bargainingoriented administration.8 0 They commonly have at their disposal both
the implied threat of formal regulatory action relating to the matter at
issue, and the more amorphous (but no less effective) implied threat of
general regulatory displeasure."1 Moreover, regulators traditionally have
75. On administrative guidance, see generally LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN:
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (J. Haley ed. 1988); Young, supra note 12; Shiono, Administrative Guidance, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN 203 (K. Tsuji ed. 1984); Shibaike, Guidelines and
Agreements in Administrative Law, 19 L. IN JAPAN 62 (1986).
76. Young, supra note 12, at 954.
77. Administrative guidance involves, in the characterization of one American scholar, (1) administrative modification of private behavior, through (2) acts with no formal legal effect, leading to
(3) "voluntary" compliance. Young, supra note 12, at 932-34.
78. Shiono, supra note 75, at 208. Professor Shiono has characterized administrative guidance
as regulatory, emphasizing "restrictions on the [regulated] . .. which may be against their selfinterest"; reconciliatory, emphasizing mediation between private actors subject to the agency's supervision; or promotional, emphasizing modernization, research, and planning for the future. Id. at
205-07; see also sources cited in Shibaike, supra note 75, at 72 n.28.
79. Shibaike, supra note 75, at 81. By contrast, "one of the aims of [a particular form of informal administrative action] is to create an all-embracing relationship of trust and cooperation between business and administration and thereby achieve administration objectives." Id. at 82.
80. Professor Haley has argued to the contrary. He takes the position that Japanese regulators
have little bargaining power with industry, because the sanctions available to them are not sufficiently credible or effective. Rather, regulators rely on bargaining and informal sanctions only because their formal powers are even less effective. See Haley, Administrative Guidanceversus Formal
Regulation: Resolving the Paradox of IndustrialPolicy, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 107, 116-20 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1986).
81. See Shiono, supra note 75, at 203-06; id. at 210 ("[Blusiness enterprises are concerned that
their relationships with the administrative organs may be impaired if they do not comply with administrative guidance, because they are subject to various controls by administrative organs in carry-
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had ample opportunity to reward those who follow administratively favored paths.8 2 Administrative guidance techniques allow them to influence private action without having to pay too much attention to the strict
limits of their regulatory authority, or to the nature of their regulatory
83
mandate.
ing out their business activities."); Shibaike, supra note 75, at 74-75; see also K. VAN WOLFEREN,
THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 344 (1989). But see Haley, supra note 80; F. ROSENBLUTH,
FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 22-23 (1989) (regulators prefer to reward those
who comply with guidance, rather than punishing those who do not; the latter course may draw the
agency into conflict with politicians taking up the cause of the injured party).
According to Professor Johnson, Japanese regulators commonly refuse to accept even facially
valid reports or notifications, thereby exercising a veto power over activity that the statutory law
merely makes subject to a reporting requirement. Johnson, MITI, MPTandthe Telecom Wars" How
JapanMakes Policyfor High Technology, in POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVITY: How JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WORKS 53 (C. Johnson, L. Tyson & J. Zysman eds. 1989). Japanese courts,
however, in more than one context have rebuffed attempts by governmental units to treat as "incomplete," and thus ignore, applications that are facially valid under the statutory law. See Upham, Ten
Years of Affirmative Action for JapaneseBurakumin, 13 L. INJAPAN 39, 59-62 & n.63 (1980) (treatment by local government of applications for affirmative action benefits); Young, supra note 12, at
964-65 (treatment by local government of application for construction permit).
82. See Young, supra note 12, at 934. This is not to say that administrative guidance is uniformly successful. See id. at 950-53. For one prominent failure of administrative guidance, see C.
JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 286-88, on Mitsubishi's flouting of an attempt by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to cause Japanese automobile manufacturers to merge into
giant conglomerates led by Nissan and Toyota. Indeed, one observer has concluded that MITI has
difficulty ensuring adherence to administrative guidance except where there exist
(1) a relatively small number of companies in a given industry that have interacted over
a period of time; (2) a clear opinion-leader or market-leader among them; (3) a fairly
high degree of market concentration; (4) a mature stage in the industry's life cycle; (5)
either a cohesive and strong industrial association or effective mechanisms of industrywide consensus formation; (6) a high degree of dependence on MITI, or at least a history
of dependence; [and] (7) common problems of sufficient severity to coax individual companies into cooperating, rather than "cheating," in order to advance collective interests.
D. OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE MARKET: JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH
TECHNOLOGY 94 (1989); see also Okimoto, Regime Characteristicsof JapaneseIndustrialPolicy, in
JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 35
(H. Patrick ed. 1986); Mighty MITI Loses Its Grip, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
83. See Young, supra note 12, at 935-38. The area of broadcast regulation provides one example:The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications decided during the oil crisis of 1973 that energy
conservation called for shorter broadcast hours. MPT, however, issued no formal regulation embodying that policy, perhaps concerned about the constitutional status of a regulation that could be said
to curtail broadcaster editorial discretion. It is unclear whether the Ministry had the authority to
embody such a policy in a formal rule. Compareid. at 936 (MPT "no doubt had the power to issue
regulations regarding conservation of electricity"), with Shiono, supra note 75, at 204 (MPT's ultimate request to curtail broadcast hours "was not based on any statutory authority"). Instead, the
Ministry took the successful approach of informally pressuring broadcasters into cutting short their
late-night broadcasting. See M. ITO, BROADCASTING IN JAPAN 102 (1978); NIPPON Hoso KYOKAI
[NHK], FIFTY YEARS OF JAPANESE BROADCASTING 427 (1977). MPT has similarly exercised administrative guidance to encourage local programming; to supervise network-affiliate relations; and
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As a bargaining model theorist might expect, Japanese bureaucrats
engaging in administrative guidance consult extensively with the parties
they are regulating.8 4 This consultation builds legitimacy for the informal actions the regulator ultimately takes, making it more likely that the
regulated parties will choose to comply with those actions rather than to
fight against the agency pressure."' The likelihood of successful informal
consultation is increased by shared values and backgrounds within the
Japanese administrative and business elites; business leaders and bureaucrats frequently are graduates of the same universities and can draw on
86
common ties.
Consultation and consensus, however, are different things. Consensus is hard to achieve as a routine matter. Whether a regulator can do so
will depend on the extent to which persons likely to cause difficulties are
included in the decisionmaking group, and on the ground rules for managing interaction among the various members of that group. Japanese
regulators have proved adept both at selecting and at managing the
groups with which they consult in the policymaking process.87 Organized labor is generally excluded from the process; 8 so, commonly, are
89
industry members not represented in industry and trade associations,
and so are representatives of what we might call citizen interests (e.g.,
consumer or environmentalist groups). 90 Regulators, moreover, exercise
their power to select "reasonable" representatives of competing groups to
represent those groups in consultation.9 1
Sometimes the regulator formalizes the consultative process, by conto encourage construction of new relay stations and other measures to alleviate reception difficulty
problems. See M. ITO, supra, at 87.
There is considerable debate in the Japanese academic literature whether administrative guidance
must have "legal foundation," see Shibaike, supra note 75, at 72-75, 85; see also Yeomans, Administrative Guidance, 19 L. IN JAPAN 125, 143-58 (1986), but I am aware of no evidence demonstrating

that this debate has had impact on actual administrative practice.
84. See Young, supra note 12, at 938-41; see also J. GELLER, supra note 6, at 5.
85. See Young, supra note 12, at 947-49.
86. See B. KOH, JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELrE 86-94, 167-70 (1989); C. JOHNSON, supra
note 13, at 57-62, 71; J. HIRSCHMEIER & T. YUi, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 314

(2d ed. 1981).
87. See F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE INPOSTWAR JAPAN 210, 226 (1987); Young,
supra note 12, at 947-49.
88. See eg., T. PEMPEL, supra note 13, at 31-32; see also Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note 13,
at 533-34 (labor and citizen/political groups are relatively excluded, although not wholly without
influence). But see M. AOKI, supra note 13, at 262-63 ("[Tlhe interests of labor are duly represented
in the Japanese political economy.").
89. Young, supra note 12, at 947.
90. See F. UPHAM, supra note 87, at 28-77; Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note 13, at 533-34.
91. F. UPHAM, supra note 87, at 226.
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stituting shingikai, or "deliberation councils": official bodies created by a
Ministry, composed largely of non-governmental experts, to discuss Ministry policies and proposals. Shingikai are a useful device to publicize
and legitimate new agency policies, as well as a factor in interbureaucratic warfare. Ministry staff input is substantial, and committee members, who are commonly prominent persons with little time to
devote to committee activities, are often carefully selected in order to
encourage reports consistent with the agency's contemplated action.9 2
Whether the process is formal or informal, the consultative process, in
the interest of achieving consensus, carries with it a degree of systemic
exclusion from the consultations.
The Japanese pattern, under which regulators consult with affected
groups and seek to achieve consensus among them before making and
enforcing policy decisions, nonetheless seems largely congruent with the
approach urged by American advocates of regulatory negotiation. In
some respects the Japanese pattern of consultation could have been
scripted as a regulatory negotiation model for Americans. 93 I argued
earlier, however, that regulatory negotiation places severe strain on
American legal ideology; the approach does not cause similar problems
in Japan.
That pattern can succeed in Japan and fail in the United States in
substantial degree because Japan lacks what the United States has: judicial rationality review. 94 Judicial review of administrative action in Ja92. See Kobayashi, Some Critical Remarks on the New Media Research and Development in
Japan, 18 STUD. BROADCASTING 23, 39-40 (1982); C. JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 47-48; Pempel,
The Bureaucratizationof Policymaking in PostwarJapan, 18 AMER. J. POL. ScI. 647, 658-63 (1974).
Professor Pempel, in a study of seven shingakai advising the Ministry of Education between 1945
and 1970, notes further that while only 10% of the committee members were officials of government
agencies, a substantial number wereformer bureaucrats, and that throughout the period studied over
one third of those holding top committee positions (chairs or vice-chairs) were bureaucrats or exbureaucrats. Pempel identifies the presence of a large number of ex-bureaucrats as a further factor
helping to cement bureaucratic control over the shingakai process. Id, at 660-63.
93. One important way in which the pattern may diverge from the pure pluralist model of
regulatory negotiation lies in the role played by ideology of administrative expertise: the legitimacy
of administrative orders may derive to some degree not from the negotiation process but from respect accorded to public officials as architects of the Japanese economic miracle. See C. JOHNSON,
supra note 13, at 273-74.
94. One could, of course, argue the reverse: because administrative guidance is so successful in
Japan, courts have not seen fit to extend much review. Indeed, the dominance of administrative
guidance in Japan has been attributed to a variety of factors: cultural, political, and historical. See,
eg., Young, supra note 12, at 968 nn.163-65; F. UPHAM, supra note 87, at 202-04. Moreover, administrative guidance as a tool of regulation in general and media policy in particular dates back to
the beginning of the modern Japanese administrative state; it is not tied to the exact legal rules
prevailing in Japan today. See G. KAsZA, THE STATE AND MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN 1918-1945, at 7-
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pan is largely unavailable.95 Administrative law doctrine excludes most
agency decisions from the scope of reviewable agency action.96 Agency

behavior is not subject to judicial review unless it constitutes an "administrative disposition [shobun] or other exercise of public power," that is,

unless it immediately and directly changes private legal rights or obligations. This test excludes from review most administrative acts with general effect. It also excludes any agency actions that can be construed as

mere internal government behavior, not formally altering the specific
legal rights or duties of private citizens. It, of course, excludes from review the informal agency action characteristic of administrative
guidance.

97

Standing doctrine is restrictive as well. The "legal interest" test,
dominant in Japanese law, denies standing to would-be plaintiffs unless
the government action in question invades a specific, individual, and direct interest conferred on the plaintiff by the positive law. 98 Moreover,
10 (1988) (early Meiji period). The unavailability of judicial review, however, has played a major
role in ensuring the dominance of administrative guidance: if rationality review were easily available
to maverick Japanese businesses, they would be in a much better position to upset the administrative
guidance applecart than they are today.
95. In that respect, Japanese administrative law today retains some flavor of its Meiji origins.
The drafters of the 1889 Constitution adopted the German approach that administrative action
should be reviewed only in a special administrative court located within the bureaucracy itself; they
explained that "judicial courts... have no power to annul measures ordered to be carried out by
administrative authorities ....
[Tihe independence of the administrative [branch from] ... the
judicature is just as necessary as that of the judicature itself." H. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (M. Ito trans. 1889), quoted in Haley, JapaneseAdminis.trative Law: An Introduction, 19 L. IN JAPAN 1, 2 (1986). See generally Wada, The Administrative
Court Under the MeUi Constitution, 10 L. IN JAPAN 1 (1977). Moderm Japanese law has abolished
the earlier law's special administrative court, but has retained its hostility to judicial control of
administrative action.
96. See Haley, supra note 95, at 9-11.
97. See F. UPHAM, supra note 87, at 170-71; Upham, After Minimata: Current Prospects and
Problems in Japanese Environmental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 235-39 (1979); see also
Dzuibla, The Impotent Sword ofJapaneseJustice: The Doctrineof Shobunsei as a Barrierto Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 37 (1985).
98. F. UPHAM, supranote 87, at 172-73 and 201 n. 40; Haley, supra note 95, at 10-11; Upham,
supra note 97, at 239-44; see also Shibaike, supra note 75, at 89.
For a comparable approach to standing, see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
The Supreme Court in cases including FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), and
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), found Congress to have
legislatively overruled the Perkins common law. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
The old approach survived in the United States to a small degree in the form of the "zone of interests" test, but the Supreme Court has only very recently indicated that this test should pose a meaningful bar to judicial review. Compare Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. American Postal Workers
Union, 111 S.Ct. 913 (1991), and Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990), with
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
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the remedies available to courts when they do review administrative action are sharply limited,99 and substantive review is highly deferential." 0
In a small class of cases, the Japanese courts have reached the merits

in reviewing administrative guidance, most notably in connection with
construction permits for new development. 10 ' Their treatment of those
cases, however, is instructive: they have not typically adopted a hard
look approach, testing the administrative action for rationality and fidelity to the agency's enabling statute."0 2 Rather, they commonly have

taken precisely the approach advocated by American proponents of regulatory negotiation -

they have upheld the agency action so long as it

constituted a good-faith attempt to encourage and implement negotiation, attempting to resolve conflicts among the various groups that make

up its statutory mandate. 0 3 Japanese law thus eschews rationality review, which would undercut the informal, bargaining-oriented nature of

the administrative system, in favor of review that reinforces that system.
Japanese legal ideology reinforces the administrative guidance system in other ways. Dominant ideology presents government decisions as
reached through an administrative process aimed at consensus and harmony. The idea that administrative guidance is non-adversarial, com-

bined with the process' informal and consultative nature, tends to mask
the choices made in the decisionmaking process: It presents government
decisions as inevitable and natural, rather than as conscious political
choices advantaging some individuals and groups and disadvantaging
99. See Haley, supra note 95, at 13.
100. F. UPHAM, supranote 87, at 173; see also Sonobe, ComparativeAdministrativeLaw: Trends
andFeaturesin AdministrativeLaw Studies (Japan),19 L. iN JAPAN 40, 47 (1986) (Japanese law has
not completely "conver[ted] to the Anglo-American model," in part because it still recognizes "the
principle of deference to the decisions of administrative agencies and self-restraint relating to interference with technical or political decisions... of administrative agencies.").
It should not be too surprising that Japanese administrative law maximizes bureaucratic autonomy. In contrast to American administrative law statutes, which were drafted by politicians, Japanese administrative law statutes were drafted by bureaucrats. See generally Seki, The Drafting
Processfor CabinetBills, 19 L. IN JAPAN 168 (1986).
101. See Young, supra note 12, at 960-78.
102. But see Upham, supra note 97, at 245-46, describing a lawsuit challenging the Ministry of
Construction's approval of a road construction plan in the area of Nikko National Park. The Tokyo
High Court reached the merits and reversed, using analysis strikingly similar to that employed in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), two years earlier.
103. See, eg., Young, supra note 12. at 960-65 (local authorities held justified in declining to
rule on facially valid application for construction permits in order to facilitate compromise between
developer and local residents); see also Upham, supra note 97, at 244 (Japanese courts examining the
merits of environmental-law challenges to administrative action typically consider whether the
agency or developer has adequately consulted with local residents. The plaintiffs in such actions
phrase the question as whether the developer has followed "democratic procedures.").
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This understanding of government choices helps shield those

choices not only from any legal attack that might be mounted, but from
political attack as well. By suggesting that administrative decisions are
"natural" and not the province of the courts, the legal ideology reflected

in the bureaucracy-court interplay helps ensure that the negotiation intrinsic to the regulatory process is not upset by extrinsic attacks. 15
In the United States, day-to-day realities of the administrative sys-

tem encourage agencies to engage in bargaining-oriented regulation, but
the institution of judicial review, enforcing an ideology of objectivity and
rationality, limits the role of bargaining in the regulatory process. In
Japan, by contrast, regulatory practice and legal ideology both emphasize

bargaining-oriented administration, and reinforce one another. Judicial
review does not provide significant external checks on the administrative
guidance system.
II.

STUDYING BROADCAST REGULATION

Before turning to the specifics of broadcast licensing in Japan and
the U.S., it is appropriate to devote a moment to the general goals of
broadcast regulation, and to acknowledge the pitfalls of comparing different societies' broadcast regulatory systems. In today's industrial democracies, the electronic mass media regulators have two key jobs. First,
they stand guard at the point of entry: they decide who shall, and who
shall not, be licensed to speak. Second, they exercise control over what
10 6
those admitted to the broadcast community shall be allowed to say.
Most of the recent debate in the United States over broadcast regulation
has related to content restrictions such as the Fairness Doctrine, involving the latter of those tasks.1 "7 For all the attention paid by U.S. scholars
104. F. UPHAM, supranote 87, at 208; cf. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 4449 (1978) ("estomary" approach to allocation of scarce goods allows those in power to hide the
method of allocation, and avoids social-values costs by pretending that no method has been chosen).
105. F. UPHAm,supranote 87, at 208; see also Kidder & Hostetler, ManagingIdeologies: Harmony as Ideology in Amish and JapaneseSocieties, 24 L. & Soc'Y Rnv. 895, 895-901 (1990).
106. "Those admitted to the broadcast community," in the United States over-the-air context,
are the broadcast stations licensed by the FCC. Individual producers or programmers are not subject to direct FCC control; they speak only at the sufferance of the broadcast stations whose facilities
they seek to use. See, eg., Muir v. Alabama Education Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). Recent FCC deregulatory moves have emphasized licensees' exclusive control over programming. See, eg., infra note 107.
107. The FCC recently intensified that debate when it abolished the Fairness Doctrine, under
which it had asserted authority to ensure that broadcasters devote time to coverage of public issues,
and in so doing provide an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rd. 5043 (1987), rev. denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 717 (1990); In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
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to such restrictions, though, actions enforcing them make up a relatively
small portion of the regulators' output. 0 s In this and in many other
countries, constitutional and quasi-constitutional considerations have
made regulators squeamish about controlling broadcast speech directly.1 1 Many governments have found, moreover, that an appropriate
decision as to who may engage in broadcast speech will obviate any need
to control the speakers. 1
In shaping the essential nature of a country's broadcasting system,
the more basic regulatory job is the earlier one: deciding, directly and
indirectly, who shall be allowed to speak in the broadcast marketplace.I 1
In the United States and Japan, the general issue of broadcast entry resolved itself into two broad questions. First, the regulators had to decide
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). The Commission
declared the doctrine unconstitutional on its face, "disserv[ing] both the public's right to diverse
sources of information and the broadcaster's interest in free expression." Syracuse Peace Council,2
F.C.C. Rd. at 5052.
108. See, e-g., In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 709 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting), affid and rev'd sub
nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
109. Historically, of course, nations have not always been so squeamish about imposing direct
press controls, and most of the world's governments do censor the press in one manner or another.
Those nations that today engage in direct and intrusive censorship of theprint media, however, have
been for the most part reluctant to allow private broadcasting at all. See generally G. GANLEY & 0.
GANLEY, GLOBAL POLITICAL FALLOUT: THE FIsr DECADE OF THE VCR 1976-1985, at 6-8
(1987).
110. Or, as Morris Ernst explained in 1926, "So long as the Department can determine which
individuals shall be endowed with larynxes it does not need additional power to determine what shall
be said." Quoted in I. POOL, supra note 4, at 122.
111. Until recently, most European countries barred private broadcasting entirely. The increasing role of cable television and direct satellite broadcasting in Europe, however, is spurring tremendous movement away from the old models. See EncyclopediaBrittanica,Book ofthe Year 361 (1991)
(satellite-delivered commercial services had a 30% audience share in Europe in 1990). The Swedish
Parliament, for example, agreed to introduce domestic private broadcasting for the first time on
September 15, 1990, the day after the Nordisk commercial satellite began its TV4 direct satellite

broadcast service into the country. Id.; cf J.

TYDEMAN

& E.

KELM, NEW MEDIA IN EUROPE:

VCRs AND VIDEOTEX 37-38 (1986) (previous Swedish regime). Almost all
European countries have similarly moved in recent years to increase opportunities for private broadcasting. See generally id.; Hoffnan-Riem, Law, Politicsand the New Media: Trends in Broadcasting
Regulation, 9 WEsT EUROPEAN PoLrrics 125 (Issue No. 4, Special Issue, 1986). For the tortuous
tale of the advent of private broadcasting in France, see Regulatory Changein Western Europe:From
National Cultural Statecraft to InternationalEconomic Statecraft, in BROADCASTING AND NEW
SATELLrES, CABLE,

MEDIA FoLiCiEs IN WESTERN EUROPE

107-124 (K. Dyson & P. Humphries eds. 1988); for stories

in other countries, see, Spain is Moving to End TVMonopoly ofState, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1989, at
D9, col. 5; Greece Opens the Way to Private Television, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at § 1, p. 48, col.
4. The Netherlands, by contrast, continues to operate a unique system under which governmental
authorities allot television access time, making up the entire broadcast day, to ideological, religious
and other groups in proportion to their public support. See J. TYDEMAN & E. KELM, supra, at 34.
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how to choose the private speakers they would license in the established
communications media. That question has been, in both the United
States and Japan, subtle and complex." 2 It has raised other issues in
turn, such as whether to allow transfer of licenses once awarded -

United States regulators do,1 13 while Japan's do not. Second, the regulators had to decide how to incorporate new technology into a communications marketplace oriented to, and dominated by, established media.1 14

In the absence of regulatory intervention, new technology is often developed and controlled by different actors from those who control the old.

The rise of new technology upsets existing distributions of media power,
threatening to introduce new voices not previously heard. When regulators devise policy affecting the competitive viability of new technology,

they determine who will succeed in the broadcast marketplace, and affect
the distribution of power among media outlets.

15

112. In licensing the electromagnetic spectrum, a regulatory agency must begin by resolving
allocation problems preliminary to actually selecting licensees. These include where to place each
service (such as FM radio, UHF television, and land mobile radio) on the frequency spectrum, and
how wide a portion of the spectrum to allocate to each service. United States broadcasting history
has been shaped by choices such the FCC's 1945 decision to shift FM radio out of the 50 MHz range
to its current position in the 100 MHz range, and its 1952 decision not to shift television entirely into
the UHF band. See V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 54-61, 71-76.
After resolving these allocation questions the regulatory agency faces others: How shall stations
be distributed geographically? How wide a frequency band should be allotted to each individual
station? How much power and antenna height should each station be allowed? All of these decisions crucially affect the manner in which different stations will interfere with one another, and thus
how many can be licensed.
Finally, the agency must deal with the second-order question of how to choose among potential
individual users of the frequency bands. In practice, as with U.S. AM radio, an agency may conflate
these inquiries. See infra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 3.
114. Cf. Litman, supra note 72.
115. For example, only a few years ago, the American electronic broadcast marketplace was
controlled by the three networks and by the major Hollywood studios, who produced the bulk of
television programming. While the networks have survived as key players, the major Hollywood
studios have almost entirely dropped off the list of companies doing business in the U.S. that earn the
greatest revenues from electronic mass media. As of 1989, the studios had been replaced by newcomers into the electronic marketplace whose position was made possible by new technology and by
a regulatory scheme allowing the exploitation of that technology: Time Warner (owner of HBO,
Cinemax, the former Warner Communications, and the nation's second-largest collection of cable
systems); Tele-Communications Inc. (the nation's largest cable system operator); Viacom (owner of
Showtime, MTV, and cable systems); and Turner Broadcasting (owner of TBS, CNN, and other
cable programming services). See BROADCASTING, June 4, 1990, at 48. None of those companies,
except for the individual constituents of Time Warner, even existed on the national scene twenty
years ago. Other companies earning over a billion dollars in 1989 electronic mass communications
revenues included the three networks; Sony (owner of Columbia Pictures, but drawing most of its
electronic mass media revenues from equipment and manufacturing); News Corp. (owner of Fox);
and Saatchi & Saatchi, an advertising company. Id.
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How should we evaluate the choices that the United States and Japan have made? Some yardsticks are relatively straightforward. It seems

reasonable to ask that a broadcast regulatory system, all other things
being equal, achieve its results speedily and cheaply; it should reach its
decisions in a manner that consumes a minimum of public and private
resources. Other yardsticks, however, are more controversial. It is hard
to evaluate mass media regulation without some consensus as to the goals
that communications policy should serve and the means by which those
goals might best be realized. A regulator must look to these basic philosophical issues when it decides, for example, whether to license a larger
or smaller number of broadcast speakers; whether to use clearly defined
standards for selecting those speakers, or vague and amorphous ones;
and whether to select speakers from a single, homogeneous sector of society, or from as diverse a set of individuals as it can.

United States constitutional philosophy emphasizes a right to individual self-expression" 6 that, in turn, supports a broadcast system in
which as many people as possible have the opportunity to engage in mass

communication on a meaningful level. United States philosophy stresses
the notion that mass communications provide a "marketplace of ideas"
in which important ideas can be threshed out, and through which individuals can decide for themselves what is true and right."' This ideology supports a broadcast system in which all, or most, important ideas
are discussed, and a wide range of viewpoints are presented. United
States philosophy, finally, stresses the role of free speech as fostering
political self-government." 8 This perspective supports a broadcast sys116. See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
(1966); Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978).
117. See Justice Holmes' famous pronouncement in Abrams v. United States: "[TIhe best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .. " 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 385 (1969). The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor has been attacked from both sides of the
political spectrum. Compare Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (marketplace of ideas imagery is misleading because it belittles the proper government role in remedying communicative "market imperfections"), with Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5
(marketplace of ideas imagery pernicious because it encourages regulators to regulate speech in the
name of correcting communicative market failures).
118. "[A] people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug 4, 1822), quoted in Note,
The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEx. L. REv. 505, 506 (1979).
The Supreme Court has frequently identified self-government as the central social goal the First
Amendment serves. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771, 776-77
(1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
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tern that incorporates sufficient diversity to supply the community with
all of the information and views that it needs in order to govern itself.
These elements of United States thought, if taken seriously, suggest
a broadcast regulatory system without artificial limitations on speakers,
with as wide a variety of speakers as possible, and without procedures
that allow the government hidden control over the media system.119 It is
appropriate, therefore, to judge the U.S. broadcast regulatory system by
those standards. In the licensing arena, one can argue, a regulator
should not artificially or arbitrarily limit the number of speakers who
could be licensed.12 0 The regulator should not award its licenses only

within a small group of favored applicants; rather, it should seek to ensure diversity among broadcast speakers. 21 It should base any licensing
choices on neutral criteria, and not bias the roster of broadcast speakers

in favor of supporters of the current regime.1 22 The thrust of United
States constitutional thinking suggests that broadcast speakers ought to

be chosen by means of objective criteria and procedures, rather than in(1971); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). See generally New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
119. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 1282-84.
120. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985)
(requiring trial on constitutionality of government limitation on number of cable systems operating
in a given area), a~fd on narrowergrounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986), on remand, 67 R.R.2d 366 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (holding limitation unconstitutional); Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d
306, 311 (1970) ("We are of the view that 60 different licensees are more desirable than 50, and even
that 51 are more desirable than 50."). But see Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133 (1990) (FCC "policies have openly sought, virtually
through the agency's entire life span, to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters
...to far below the quantity technically available"); see also Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258
F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (public interest in certain contexts might demand the licensing of fewer,
rather than more, broadcasters).
In general, under United States law, a communications regulator may not, without good and
sufficient reason, limit the number of individuals who will be allowed to speak. Any government
action limiting expression, even if designed to serve legitimate goals and neutral as to content, must
bear a special burden ofjustification under the first amendment. See, eg., Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
121. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997 (1990); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (traditional U.S. communications-policy goal of "diversity of
program and service viewpoints"); see also Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). From
the perspective of traditional U.S. broadcast regulation, such diversity is necessary if broadcast listeners are to "receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences ...." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
122. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (Commission
may not "choose among applicants upon the basis of their political ... views, or upon any other
capricious basis"); see also Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 A.B.F. REs.
J. 521; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71, 273-76, 291-92 (1964).
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formal, vague, or discretionary ones.' 2 3 In fact, U.S. broadcast regulation does not typically follow those rules,' 2 4 but it is surely legitimate to
measure the regulatory system against those standards.
By contrast, one cannot assume that other cultures bring the same
philosophical background to communications-policy issues. Japanese

culture may place less stress on the right to individual self-expression; it
tends to emphasize group rather than individual identity.'

Japanese

thinking does not necessarily place so great an emphasis on rational discussion in the marketplace of ideas as a route to truth; the Japanese are
said by some to discount verbal discourse as a means to truth in favor of
more intuitive connections.' 2 6 The notion of free speech as a tool of democratic self-government does not have as deep historical roots in Japanese
as in Anglo-American thought; indeed, freedom of expression did not
become an important or powerful part of Japanese constitutional think-

ing until after the Second World War.'2 7 Japanese communications
scholars and bureaucrats raise concerns, moreover, that in the United
123. The latter are seen as threatening first amendment values because they "intimidate...
[would-be speakers] into censoring their own speech," and because they undermine the transparent
decisionmaking that the first amendment is said to demand, "mak[ing] it difficult to distinguish...
between a licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power." City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-58 (1988).
124. Applying these criteria to broadcast licensing has been a special challenge for United States
constitutional thought. Compare Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043 (1987), at 3 (fairness
doctrine has unconstitutional chilling effect "because the process necessarily involves a vague standard, the application and meaning of which is hard to predict"), rev. denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 717 (1990), Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standardat
the FCC, 38 EMORY L.J. 715, 763 (1989), and Kalven, Broadcasting,Public Policy, and the First
Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 47-48 (1967), with Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) (establishing vague and unpredictable standards for broadcast allocation), and Spitzer, supra note 4, at 1040 (questioning applicability of Lakewood to broadcasting).
125. See F. HAIMAN, CITIZEN ACCESS TO THE MEDIA: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF
FOUR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 3 (1987). According to Professor Beer, the Japanese freedom of
speech system in general protects the freedom of expression of groups better than it protects that of
individuals. L. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW,

POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 120-21 (1984).
For a caveat on "culture," see infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
126. See E. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 135-36; see also Parker, Law, Language, and the
Individualin Japan and the United States, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 179 (1988).
127. See L. BEER, supra note 125, at 45.
The concept of free speech as a tool of democratic self-government can be traced in Anglo-American thought to the seventeenth-century Levellers and beyond. See L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS 91 (1985). In Japan, by contrast, the concept of human rights in the Western liberal
democratic sense was not introduced until the nineteenth century. L. BEER, supra note 125, at 10102. Early English thinking regarding freedom of expression, however, may have been significantly
less libertarian than is generally believed, see L. LEvY, supra, at 89-118, and the concept of Westernstyle human rights may not be younger in Japan than in many European countries.
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States are not the subject of much attention; for example, they are much
more concerned than their American counterparts about the damaging
or corrosive effects on society of too much information or speech, which
they sometimes characterize as information "pollution" or "overload." 12' 8 In certain ways, Japanese society can be characterized as more
sensitive to freedom of expression issues than that of the United States;
the spectrum of political discourse is broader, and the public commitment to a spectrum of political discourse ranging from socialism on the
left to extreme conservatism on the right is genuine. 129 Nevertheless,
freedom of speech philosophy in Japan springs from different sources,
and reflects different values, from those that influence freedom of speech
philosophy in the United States. 130
How, then, is one to evaluate the success or failure of each nation's
broadcast regulatory system? For my own part, I share the values that I
have identified as underlying United States freedom of speech and communications-policy philosophy; I believe that the goals of access and diversity should be fundamental to any mass communications regulatory
system. In evaluating the U.S. and Japanese broadcast regulatory systems, therefore, I have tried to remain cognizant of the value differences
that can color any evaluation. At the same time, where I consider it
appropriate, I do measure the two systems against an American yardstick, and approach the U.S. and the Japanese systems from the standpoint of regulatory efficiency and from a United States-influenced
constitutional perspective. That evaluation is especially valuable now,
given the call of some American reformers for U.S. regulation to adopt a
more "Japanese" approach;131 it is worth examining whether such a
strategy would advance American values more or less effectively than
does the current U.S. system.
128. See ECONOMIC

PLANNING AGENCY, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND HUMAN LIFE 37

(Mar. 31, 1983) (warning that the "information flood" could lead to "an increase in societal pathological phenomena"); Takagi, Mass Media in "Information Revolution" andSome Problems ofNew
Media, in INiORMATION AND Irs FUNCTIONS 359-60 (Univ. of Tokyo Inst. of Journalism and Communication Stud. ed. 1986, copy on file with author) (warning of "unbalanced flow of information"
and "social disintegration"); Bowes, Japan'sApproach to an Information Society: A CriticalPerspective, 2 KEIO COMM. REv. 39, 40-43 (1981) ("information pollution").
129. I am grateful to Frank Upham for this reminder.
130. See generally L. BEER, supra note 125, at 100-22.
131. See, e-g., supra notes 14-16, 61-72, and accompanying text. Professor Young has suggested
that Americans might profitably adapt certain administrative guidance techniques for resolving
small-scale land use and family-law disputes. Young, supra note 12, at 981-82.
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III.

BROADCAST LICENSING

I now turn to broadcast licensing in Japan and the United States.
For each of the two countries, I examine how regulators approach the
general issue of how to allocate the limited broadcast spectrum, and the
specific issue of selecting individual licensees for particular contested
broadcast authorizations. Both the United States and Japan resolve
these questions in a manner that to some degree epitomizes their respective regulatory systems: in looking at their answers to those questions,
one can see the regulatory system of each country revealed in miniature.
A.

BroadcastLicensing in the United States 3 2

In allocating the broadcast spectrum, U.S. regulators initially used a
somewhat bargaining-oriented approach: they made decisions both
through large industry conferences and through individual meetings with
politically powerful advocates for individual stations. In large part because of the pressures of judicial review, however, regulators came to
make allocation decisions though a more formal adjudicatory process. In
choosing between applicants for specific broadcast authorizations, the
Federal Communications Commission moved from an opaque decisionmaking process for distributing broadcast licenses to one intended to be
objective and transparent, shifting to a formal rationality model.
The system U.S. regulators created has not worked well in practice.
Its allocation policy decisions for both radio and television have been
sharply criticized, and its system for choosing between competing broadcast applicants is largely wasteful and pointless. The shift to a formal
rationality model, while consistent with American first amendment and
communications-policy philosophy, has not achieved good results.
1. Allocation Policy. At the time the Radio Act of 1927 went into
effect, there were well over 700 AM radio stations already broadcasting,
at frequencies and power levels of their own choosing. 3 3 The Federal
132. 1 offer here what is necessarily a brief and unbalanced survey of some aspects of United
States broadcasting law; I seek to offer only enough background for the reader to appreciate the
different paths that Japanese law has taken. For further discussion, see, eg., D. GINSBURG, M.
BOTEIN & M. DIRECTOR, REGULATION OF THE ELEcTRoNIC MASS MEDIA (2d ed. 1991)

[hereinafter D. GINSBURG]; V. Mosco, supra note 35; Robinson, supra note 35.
133. See Wollenberg, The FCC as Arbiter of "The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity".
in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 10, at 61, 66;

Caldwell, PracticeandProcedureBefore the FederalRadio Commission, 1 J. AIR L. 144, 151 (1930).
By 1930, available channels on the broadcast band were "taxed to, and in many cases beyond, their
capacity." Id. at 164.
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Radio Commission's 3 first task was to get large numbers of those stations off the air and to rearrange the rest, sharing new frequencies and
power levels, so as to make the most efficient use of the available spectrum. The Commission used bargaining to achieve some of its goals.
For example, it developed its crucial General Order 40135 through informal open conferences with representatives of all branches of the industry. 3 6 General Order 40 structured the broadcasting system by
prescribing the power levels available to stations on each frequency (and
hence the number of stations that could be accommodated on each frequency, and the distance their signals would reach).137 The Commission
resolved allocation of aircraft and ship-to-shore radio frequencies
138
similarly.
The Commission, however, did not resolve all of its problems
through consensual bargaining. In its early years, it commonly ordered
stations to shift their frequencies or to lower their power outputs without
any notice or discussion. 139 These orders, to be sure, were the result of
informal, bargaining-oriented contacts to some extent. The Commissioners had extensive off-record contacts with successful applicants and
14
would-be applicants, and with their Senators and Representatives. 0
Cases in which the Commission changed station assignments without notice typically involved action on behalf of a politically powerful re134. The Federal Radio Commission was established by the Radio Act of 1927; it was replaced
by the Federal Communications Commission, established by the Communications Act of 1934. I
refer to both in this discussion as "the Commission."
135. 1928 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 48 (as found in Supplemental Report for Period from July 1, 1928
to September 30, 1928). The Federal Radio Commission, in its first few years, rather than issuing
codified formal rules or regulations, issued a variety of "general orders" of widely varying content
and published those orders in its annual reports. See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 150-51.
136. Caldwell, supra note 133, at 152-53; see also Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting,1
AIR L. REv.331, 338 (1930); Siegel, A RealisticApproach to the Law of Communications, 8 AIR L.
REv. 81, 87 (1937).
137. The Commission allocated to each frequency channel a level of power at which licensees
were authorized to broadcast. It classified all stations as either clear channel, high power regional,
regional, or local. See eg., Courier Post Publishing Co. v. FCC, 104 F.2d 213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Present AM policy maintains the clear channel, regional, and local classifications. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.21-73.29 (1990).
138. Caldwell, supra note 133, at 152.
139. See id. at 173-75; see, eg., FederalCommunications Commission: Hearings on H.R. 8301
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1934)
(statement of Rev. John Harney), reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
Acr OF 1934, supra note 10, at 505; see also Cass, supra note 10, at 85.
140. Caldwell, supranote 133, at 182; see also Herring, Politicsand Radio Regulation, 13 HARV.
Bus. REv. 167, 170-71 (1935); 75 CONG. REc. 3688 (1932) (Rep. Horr) ("If any of you desire to
secure a wave length, take plenty of us on this side of the Chamber and plenty on the other side of
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quester, with or without the filing of a formal application. 14 ' The
Commission, however, did not seek to bargain with the targets of these
orders. It was not equipped to bargain with applicants that did not have
Senators or Representatives to speak for them; there were far too many
of them, they were located too far away, and the Commissioners had not
had prior contact with them. 4 2
The Commission thus followed the bargaining model to the extent
that it made decisions based on relative political power, but departed
from that model in that it did not seek to achieve consensus behind its
choices. Nor did it seek to follow formal-rationality procedures. Such
procedures might have interfered with the political commitments it had
made; moreover, the Commission took the position that judicial review
was not generally available to constrain its actions. 43
That state of affairs did not long endure. As of July 1, 1930, Congress amended the Radio Act, sharply expanding the class of persons
who could seek judicial review of Commission decisions relating to
broadcast licenses."* In so amending the Act, Congress helped usher in
a new age of expansive standing to seek judicial review of agency decithe Chamber, and then you will get your wave length."), reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934, supra note 10, at 791.
Senators and Representatives also engaged in on-record contacts by acting as applicants' representatives at hearings. Caldwell, supra note 133, at 169.
141. Caldwell, supra note 133, at 164-65, 167; Caldwell, Appeals from Decisions of the Federal
Radio Commission, 1 J. AiR L. 274, 285 n.45, 296-97 (1930).
142. But see 75 CONG. REC. 3687 (1932) (Commission sought to resolve some questions involving shared frequencies through bargaining among broadcasters), reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, supranote 10, at 790; Caldwell, The New Rules and
Regulationsofthe FederalRadioCommission, 2 J.RADIO L. 66, 82-83 & nn.23-24 (1932); Notes and
Comments, 1 . AIR L. 356, 359 (1930).
143. Section 16 of the Radio Act provided for review only of the Commission's action revoking
a license or refusing an application "for a construction permit, for a station license, or for the renewal or modification of an existing station license .... " See Caldwell, supra note 141, at 274 n.2;
Cass, supranote 10, at 82. The Commission took the position that when it renewed a station license
(which it was required to do for each station every three months) but did so subject to modifications
(such as a shift to a less desirable frequency, a decrease in power, or a requirement that the station
transmit only during certain hours of the day), its order was not subject to review because it did not
constitute an order refusing an application "for the renewal ...of an existing license." See Cass,
supra note 10, at 82-83; Caldwel, supra note 133, at 173.
144. Under the amendment, the class of persons entitled to review included any applicant whose
application for license, or renewal or modification of license, was refused by the Commission; any
licensee whose license was revoked, modified, or suspended by the Commission; and any other person "aggrieved... or adversely affected by any Commission action granting or refusing any such
application or revoking, modifying, or suspending a station license." Act of July 1, 1930, Pub. L.
No. 71-494, 46 Stat. 844. Essentially the same provision is still the law today; see 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)
(1990).
On the 1930 amendment, see generally Note, 1 AIR L. REv. 416 (1930).
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sions. The new language created review rights quite unheard of under
the then-dominant "legal right" test, 4 ' and ultimately formed the basis
for expansive review of agency action under the 1946 Administrative
Procedure Act. 146 More immediately, however, the 1930 amendment
made almost all Radio Commission licensing actions subject to judicial
review, and centralized that review in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.147 While initially deferential to the Commission on
substantive matters, 148 that court was steadfast in requiring formal process. It immediately ended the Commission's practice of modifying
licenses without prior hearing, 4 9 and indeed held that the Commission
145. See Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); see also, eg., Perkens v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-39
(1939).
The "legal right" test for standing is similar to the approach taken by contemporary Japanese
law. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
146. The language of the 1930 Radio Act amendment, carried over into the 1934 Communications Act, was construed by the Supreme Court in the influential case of FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The language was later incorporated into the standing language of the
APA, see S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1945). The APA was itself expansively interpreted in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
147. This court was renamed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under
the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
§ 11-308, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (1970).
148. See, eg., Radio Investment Co. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Beebe v. FRC, 61
F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. FRC, 55 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Riker v.
FRC, 55 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Reading Broadcasting v. FRC, 48 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1931);
KFKB Broadcasting v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Marquette Univ. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 406
(D.C. Cir. 1931); Ansley v. FRC, 46 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Havens & Martin, Inc. v. FRC, 45
F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Carrell v. FRC, 36 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1929); City of New York v. FRC,
36 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Technical Radio Lab. v. FRC, 36 F.2d I11 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
The court handed down three early decisions reversing the Commission based on the court's own
reweighing of the equities in the case. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1930); Richmond Development Corp. v. FRC, 35 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1929); General Electric
Co. v. FRC, 31 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1929). The court apparently abandoned that mode of review,
however, after the Radio Act's 1930 amendment, which provided in part that the reviewing court
was "limited to questions of law and that findings of facts by the Commission, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are arbitrary or capricious." Act of July 1, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-494, 46 Stat. 844. The
change in statutory language was in part a reaction to the holding in FRC v. General Electric Co.,
281 U.S. 464 (1930), that the Court of Appeals under old § 16 had been acting in an "administrative" (Art. I) and not a "judicial" (Art. III) capacity, and that consequently its decisions could not
be reviewed in the Supreme Court (or any other Art. III court).
149. See Westinghouse v. FRC, 47 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Courier-Journal Co. v. FRC, 46
F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 46 F.2d 612 (D.C.
Cir. 1931). All of these cases arose under pre-1930 law. In several other cases presenting similar
facts the Commission entered into settlements favorable to the licensee while appeals to the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia were pending. See Nordhaus, Judicial Control of the Federal
Radio Commission, 2 J. RADIO L. 447, 460 & nn.38-39 (1932).

1991]

BROADCASTING IN JAPAN AND THE US.

was required to grant a broadcaster a hearing before modifying another
station's license so as to increase substantially the interference to which
the first would be subject. 150 Finally, the court held, the Commission
could base its decisions only on the hearing evidence."'
Reinforcing this trend towards greater formal process were provisions of the old Radio Act and of the Communications Act requiring the
Commission to grant hearings before the denial of any application for a
station license or for the renewal or modification of a license, 52 and the
Commission's own regulations, first enacted in 1930, requiring hearings
before the grant of any application that would adversely affect the inter-

ests of another broadcaster or broadcast applicant.

53

In a series of 1938

cases, the Court of Appeals began to apply quite stringent hard-look
analysis to the reasoning underlying Commission license-related deci-

sions.15 4 Station owners disappointed by Commission decisions, moreover, were not shy about taking their disputes to court.'
The collective
force of these factors moved the Commission
to a notably more formal
56
posture in the process of license allocation.'
These procedural issues, however, left untouched the substantive
150. Journal Co. v. FRC, 48 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1931); see also FCC v. National Broadcasting
Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943) (Communications Act of 1934).
151. Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 46 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
During consideration of the Communications Act of 1934, the Commission unsuccessfully sought
to restore the old, restrictive, judicial review provisions. See A Bill to Providefor the Regulation of
Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio, andfor other Purpose" Hearings on S.
2910 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1934) (statement of E. 0. Sykes, Chairman, Federal Radio Commission), reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934, supra note 10, at 165-66.
152. See Radio Act of 1927 § 11, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166, repealed by ch. 652,
§ 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102 (1934); Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416,48 Stat. 1064, 47
U.S.C. §§ 308, 309(d),(e) (1990); see generally Caldwell, supra note 133, at 168-72.
153. See Loucks, Comment on ProceduralRules and Regulationsof the FederalRadio Commission, 1 J. AIR L. 620, 620 (1930); Caldwell, supra note 142, at 73-74.
154. See Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 564, (D.C. Cir. 1938) (agency conclusions
not adequately supported by factual findings); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) (same); Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (same; agency inadequately justified apparent policy determination); see also Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d 321, 32627 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (agency may not consider, in license-related decision, any evidence or argument
not introduced at the hearing itself), rev'd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
155. See 75 CONG. REc. 3686 (1932) (statement of Rep. Davis) (station owners "always appeal
if they feel aggrieved, and frequently, perhaps, when they are not aggrieved"), reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, supra note 10, at 789.
156. Compare Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (agency must
file statement of facts and reasons with or immediately after each order) with Caldwell, supra note
141, at 314 (FRC in 1930 did not enter any written opinion explaining its decisions unless and until
an appeal was taken).
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questions of how many broadcasters the agency should license, whether
it should license to the limits of technological availability, and what substantive factors should govern its decision in ruling on the application of
a single applicant for an open frequency. After the shakeout of the late
1920s, the Commission accepted applications from new would-be broadcasters in a variety of geographical locations and required each applicant
to specify the community it wished to serve and the frequency on which
it wished to broadcast. ' The Commission granted these applications if
it found them to be in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."1 8
It looked to factors including technical interference with other, alreadylicensed stations, 15 9 and whether the applicant was technically and financially capable of running its proposed station as a going concern.16° The
FCC also, however, denied some applications for new service or for
moves to new locations on the ground that there was no "need" for the
proposed new service, because the community in question already could
receive what the FCC deemed adequate broadcast programming.16 The
"need" analysis allowed the Commission to deny an application notwithstanding that spectrum was available in the short term, in the interest of
preserving spectrum for future applicants in some other location; 162 it did
157. See Chicago Fed'n of Labor v. FRC, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
158. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 9, 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166-67, repealed by ch.
652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102 (1934); Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416,48 Stat. 1064,

47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1990).
159.

See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRiGHT,THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFrH

ESTATE: REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA

45-46 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter T.

CARTER].

160. See, eg., Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n v. FCC, 94 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (applicant financially unqualified); Goss v. FRC, 67 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (insufficient showing that
applicant financially qualified combined with other factors led to denial of application).
The FRC and FCC were constrained as well by the requirements of the Davis Amendment, Pub.
L. No. 70-195, 45 Stat. 373 (1928), requiring them to equalize broadcast allocations among five
geographic zones. While the Davis Amendment had substantial Congressional support, it was opposed by the industry and by commentators, see 1 AIR. L. REv. 117 (1930), and it was later repealed
by Pub. L. No. 74-652, 49 Stat. 1475 (1936).
161. See, eg., Goss v. FRC, 67 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1933); F.P. Cerniglia, 4 F.C.C. 146 (1937);
see also Caldwell, The Standardof PublicInteres4 Convenienceor Necessity as Used in the Radio Act
of 1927, 1 AIR. L. REv. 295, 325 (1930).
162. The Commission was concerned, at least in part, that granting a station license in one area
limited the frequency assignments that would be available, without interference, in other areas;
granting a license in Monroe, Louisiana might limit the number of licenses available in New Orleans.
Similar concerns led the Federal Radio Commission to consider factors such as duplication of programs or types of service from station to station, and even whether a station provided relatively less
valuable public service because its programming was already available to the public on phonograph
records. I. POOL, supra note 4, at 123.
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so, however, in a subjective, ad hoe and opaque manner.1 63
Judicial review of the Commission's licensing decisions changed that
practice as well. In CourierPost Publishing Co. v. FCC,1 the D.C. Circuit reviewed a Commission decision denying an application for a broadcast station in Hannibal, Missouri (pop. 23,000), on the ground that
Hannibal received enough broadcast signals. The court reversed, emphasizing that while Hannibal received signals originating elsewhere, it had
no broadcast station of its own. In the wake of the CourierPost decision,
the Commission largely abandoned its old policy that a station license
should be denied where there was no need for new service, and adopted a
new policy licensing stations regardless of whether it considered there to
be need for the new service.16 5 The Commission thus came to treat AM
163. On other occasions, station owners argued to the Commission that it should deny applications for new licenses or for expanded service or applications to move a station from one community
to another, not because there was no need for the new service, but for a somewhat different reason:
because the new service would do economic damage to the existing broadcaster(s) in the locality.
The FCC never accepted that argument as the sole basis for denying an application; it generally
rejected it as unsupported by fact. See, eg., Red Oak Radio Corp., 1F.C.C. 163 (1934); WiW, Inc.,
2 F.C.C. 110, 112 (1935); see also Telegraph Herald, 4 F.C.C. 392 (1937) (claim rejected by the
Commission without discussion), rev'd sub nom. Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d
321 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rey'd, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), the Supreme Court held economic injury to existing broadcasters irrelevant to the licensing decision except insofar as it injured
the public interest. As the Commission read the Supreme Court's decision, the fact that granting a
new license might hurt or even bankrupt an existing station was irrelevant to the licensing process.
See, eg., Presque Isle Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 3, 8-10 (1940) (on rehearing); see also Telegraph
Herald, 8 F.C.C. 322 (1940) (on rehearing); Sentinel Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 140, 147 (1940);
United Theaters, 8 F.C.C. 489 (1941). The Commission cautioned that economic competition was
relevant to the extent that it meant that the new applicantwould not survive, for that suggested that
the applicant was not "financially qualified" within the meaning of FCC regulations. PresqueIsle,
supra, at 8.
In later years, the D.C. Circuit, which had been reversed by the Supreme Court in SandersBrothers (see 106 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd 309 U.S. 470 (1940)), once again took up the cudgel
with the Commission over the economic injury issue. See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258
F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("To license two stations where there is revenue only for one may
result in no good service at all"; Commission must deny license for a new station if the competitive
effect on the existing station would result in an overall loss of program service). The Commission,
however, has never rejected proposed new service on that ground. Policies Regarding Detrimental
Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, 3 F.C.C. Red. 638, 639 (1988)
(report and order).
164. 104 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
165. See F.W. Meyer, 7 F.C.C. 551, 558 (1939), in which the Commission granted a license for a
locally-oriented station in Denver, a city already blessed with five other radio broadcasters, four of
which were network-afmliated. The F. W. Meyer decision, responding to CourierPost, reversed a
ruling the Commission had made just six months earlier. The Commission declined to reach the
hypothetical case in which a protestant made a strong showing that a single area was getting "an
unduly large proportion of the limited broadcast channels," "to the prejudice of other districts where
there is a demand for facilities." Id.
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licensing largely on a first-come-first-served basis, limited only by objective qualifications 16 6 and the immediate availability of spectrum. In so
doing, it made the allocation process more transparent, and gave up dis-

cretionary or informal control over who could broadcast on open
frequencies.
The increasing transparency of the Commission's decisionmaking,
however, did not necessarily result in substantively successful decisions.
The first-come-first-served approach, coupled with initial FRC decisions
favoring influential would-be broadcasters in urban areas, saturated the
AM band in the most populated areas. As a result, some rural areas did
not receive any AM radio service at all, and more received no nighttime
service. 167 Moreover, the formal-rationality requirement of a hearing for
all affected broadcasters allowed entrenched broadcasters to delay new
16
stations with long and expensive litigation. 1

When the FCC licensed television, therefore, it changed its approach. After extensive fits and starts, it promulgated a complete Table

of Assignments for the United States, filling up the frequency band by
assigning at least one channel to each of 1,274 different communities.1 69
166. Some of those qualifications were mandated by law. See, eg., 47 U.S.C. § 310 (a) (1990)
(station license cannot be granted to representative of foreign government). Others, such as the
requirements of adequate capital and expertise, were developed by the Commission itself.
167. See V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 48; see also id. at 64 (FCC shoehorning additional AM
authorizations into a saturated AM band); H. ZUCKMAN, M. GAYNES, T. CARTER & J. DEE, MASS
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 386 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter H. ZUCKMAN].
168. In particular, an existing broadcaster was routinely positioned to argue that a new applicant would cause unacceptable frequency interference. See H. ZUCKMAN, supra note 167, at 386-87.
'169. Sixth Report and Order on Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148, 573-579 (1951); see D.
GINSBURG, supra note 73, at 165 (quoting Alexander, The Local Service Objective and FCC Broadcast Authorizations) (unpublished student note).
A broadcast applicant, the FCC explained, would be entitled to a license if it met objective qualifications and was applying for an open broadcast "slot" on the Table of Assignments. The Commission rejected plans that assigned at least four or five VHF channels to each of the major markets,
providing service to smaller communities primarily through the powerful metropolitan stations. Instead, animated by the same concern for localism expressed by the court in CourierPost, the regulators took the contrary approach of locating one or two assignments in almost every community in
the nation, no matter how small. The Commission allocated additional channels to large markets
only from the frequencies that were left over after the initial allocation to every community had been
completed. See Sixth Report & Order,supra, at 167-72; see also G. HESS, AN HISTORICAL STUDY
OF THE DUMONT TELEVISION NETwORK 155-68 (1960 & photo. reprint 1979). The FCC, in addition, rejected plans that called for "deintermixture," that is, for an approach under which VHF and
UHF stations would not be placed in competition with each other. Instead, the Commission ruled,
VHF and UHF stations should be intermixed in the same communities. Sixth Report and Order,
supra, at 205-09; HESS, supra, at 155-68; J. KxrrROSs, TELEVISION FREQUENCY ALLOCATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 234-47 (1960 & photo, reprint 1979).
This approach too has been sharply criticized. According to critics, the FCC's television allocation plan ignored the fact that many of the communities to which it made assignments could not
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The process by which the Table of Assignments was drawn up gave the
Commission the ability to make extensive policy choices as to where
broadcast licensees should be located, whether to favor large or small
communities, and so on. The Commission was thus able to assert the
control over broadcast allocation that it had not been able to assert in the
case of AM radio. Within the constraints set by its localism policy, however, the Commission made assignments in the Table to the limits of
spectrum availability; and it bound itself to look only to the Table and to
objective criteria in individual, non-comparative licensing decisions.
2. Dealing with Competing Applications. The other great problem
facing the Commission was that of competing applications. This problem arises when the agency is faced with two or more inconsistent appli-

cations, each of which would be granted if considered in isolation, but
which cannot all be granted: granting one requires denying the others.
The Commission early on, encouraged by the Court of Appeals, adopted
a policy that competing applications generally should be resolved by a
joint hearing at which all applicants could be heard.170 The Commission,
however, adhered to that policy inconsistently at best 17 ' until the
172
Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,
holding that comparative hearings are mandated by the Communications
Act. Where two applications are exclusive, the Court decreed, the parties are entitled to an initial joint hearing at which the Commission consupport a local station, and pursued what proved to be a chimerical "localism" while undervaluing
the broadcast diversity that other approaches might provide. In addition, critics argued, the FCC's
policy underestimated the difficulties of competition between UHF and VHF stations. See, ag., S.
BESEN, supra note 10, at 13 (FCC allocation policy "almost guaranteed that no more than three fullscale, advertiser-supported nationwide networks. . would arise"); V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 50-84
(FCC allocation and intermixture policies contributed to failure of FM radio and UHF television); J.
KrrRoss, supra, at 234-47.
170. The policy provided that the Commission should, "where such action will best conduce to
the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice, consolidate for hearing... any applications which by reasons of the privileges, terms, or conditions requested present conflicting claims."
Where the Commission did not consolidate such applications for hearing, it was to schedule separate
hearings on the same day. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331 n.5 (1945) (quoting 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.193, 1.194 (1945)); see also Caldwell, supra note 133, at 179. See Symons Broadcasting
Co. v. FRC, 64 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (Commission should in general consolidate hearings when
faced with inconsistent applications); see also Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir.
1937) (Commission need not hold comparative hearing when applications are not inconsistent);
Pittsburgh Radio Supply House v. FCC, 98 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (Commission need not hold
comparative hearing when one application is on its face irreconcilable with FCC rules).
171. Over the period 1941-45, the Commission granted 14 applications without hearings,
notwithstanding the pendency of inconsistent applications. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326
U.S. 327, 337-38 & n.1 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
172. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
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siders their applications on a level playing field. In the wake of the

Ashbacker ruling, the Commission consistently conducted formal comparative hearings whenever it had competing applications before it.

These hearings at first were not characterized by hard and fixed formal comparative criteria. Rather, the Commission retained extensive
control by making its comparative decisions on the basis of an opaque,

seat-of-the-pants, discretionary evaluation of a wide range of factors.
The courts did not seriously challenge that arrangement.1 73 A number of
events, however, contributed to the demise of the approach, including
allegations in the late 1950s that Commissioners had solicited and received bribes to vote certain ways in licensing proceedings. These allegations led to judicial remand of essentially every case decided during the
relevant period."7
The Commission in 1965 took steps to make its process less opaque,
less corrupt, and more rational. Under the 1965 Policy Statement on

Comparative BroadcastHearings,' which the FCC still follows to this
day,1 7 6 the agency compares competing applicants by considering the extent to which they already own interests in other media; the extent to
which they will participate full-time in station operations; their proposed
program service, if the differences are material and substantial; their past
broadcast record, if outside "the bounds of average performance"; until
recently, their character; 177 engineering considerations; and any other
7 8 Each of these considerations incorporates
matter it considers relevant.
19
a variety of sub-issues.
173. See, eg., Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356-59 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
174. See T. CARTER, supra note 159, at 105-06; B. SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE
COMMISSIONS 194-203, 252-53 (1959); Investigation ofRegulatory Commissions and Agencies. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
553-1934 (1958) (Miami channel 10 affair); id. at 4892-935, 5055-266, 5298-348, 5498-535, 5621-44
(Pittsburgh channel 4 affair); WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Massachusetts
Bay Telecasters v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 65-67 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
175. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
176. See, e.g., In re Geller, 102 F.C.C.2d 1443 (1985).
177. In 1986, the Commission deleted character, which essentially relates to whether the applicant has been found guilty of criminal or other bad acts, from the list of comparative criteria. Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986) (report, order and policy
statement). Character remains on the list of basic criteria. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1988); Character
Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 5 F.C.C. Red. 3252 (1990) (policy statement and order).
178. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-99 (1965)
(public notice).
179. The Commission has, for example, created a preference for minority ownership as a subissue of full-time owner participation in station operations. See generally Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997 (1990).
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657

The comparative process, however, does not work well, and has
been the target of widespread criticism. 18 0 It produces proceedings that
are formal, lengthy, and expensive, but of little value. The formal criteria
are not in fact helpful in distinguishing among the applicants, much less
in suggesting which should get the license.
Historically, a prospective applicant hires a highly skilled communications
attorney, well versed in the procedures of the Commission. This counsel
has a long history of Commission decisions to guide him and he puts together an application that meets all of the so-called criteria. Then follows a
tortuous and expensive hearing wherein each applicant attempts to tear
down his adversaries on every conceivable front, while individually presenting that which he thinks the Commission would like to hear. The examiner
then makes a reasoned decision which, at first blush, -generally makes a lot
of sense - but comes the oral argument and all of the losers concentrate
their fire on the "potential" winner and the Commission must thereupon
examine the claims and counterclaims, "weigh" the criteria and pick the
181
winner which... is a different winner in about 50 percent of the cases.
Lack of useful controlling standards has made awards random and
inconsistent, and proceedings long and unmanageable.18 2 Nor has anyone come up with formal criteria that would do a better job. Indeed, to
the extent that intelligent choices between competing applications are
necessarily subjective, a comparative proceeding governed by uniform,
clear and objective standards is bound to fail.18 3 Nor has the process
succeeded markedly in diversifying or democratizing broadcast ownership."' Indeed, in at least one notable context, the comparative hearing
process has operated overwhelmingly to protect the interests of existing
broadcasters. Where one applicant in a comparative hearing has been an
incumbent seeking license renewal and the remainder have been insurgents seeking to take the license away, the Commission has routinely
180. A recent administrative law casebook describes the process as having received "elaborate
scholarly attention, almost all critical." R. CAss & C. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 745 (1987).
181. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, supra note 178, at 405-06 (1965)
(Lee, Comm'r, concurring). Subsequent developments have not blunted the force of Commissioner
Lee's attack. See Random Selection Lottery, 4 F.C.C. Red. 2256, 2256 (1989) (notice of proposed
rulemaking) ("The adjudicatory framework used to make this comparative selection can be described most charitably as laborious, exceedingly time consuming, expensive, and often resuIt[ing] in
choices based on, at most, marginal differences.").
182. See generally H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 53-73 (1962);
Geller, The ComparativeRenewal Process in Television: Problems andSuggested Solutions, 61 VA. L.
REV. 471 (1975); Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationalityin ComparativeBroadcastLicensing
Proceedings,24 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971).
183. See S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 217; see also Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54
PROCEEDINGS, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.

1 (1960).

184. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3003, 3019-22 (1990).
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ruled in favor of the incumbent.1 8 5 More generally, the comparative
hearing process has failed to achieve diversity because it has effectively
excluded those without economic means. There is no surer way to ex-

clude most members of the public than to require payment of huge legal
fees merely for the opportunity to compete, in an essentially random pro-

cess, for a license, with no assurance of getting anything for one's money.
The process thus "produces nothing but a senseless waste of the appli186
cants' and the FCC's resources."'
The "woeful reality" of the comparative hearing process has led

competing broadcast license applicants commonly to resolve their differences through settlement rather than adjudication.' 87 Two-thirds of all
comparative hearing cases examined in one FCC study, involving appli-

cations for new radio or full-power television licenses, were terminated
by settlement, voluntary dismissal, or similar action before the rendering

of the administrative law judge's initial decision.'
The FCC recently took steps, however, that may reduce the number
of settlements in the comparative hearing process. From 1983 through
1990, there was no limit on the amount of money one applicant could
pay to another as part of a settlement agreement;' 89 the Commission con185. See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1084 (1983):
troubled by the fact that... an incumbent television licensee has never been
[Wle are still
denied renewal in a comparative challenge. American television viewers will be reassured, although a trifle baffled, to learn that even the worst television stations - those
which are, presumably, the ones picked out as vulnerable to challenge - are so good
that they never need replacing.
Id. at 510 (footnote omitted; italics in original). See also Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d
372, 439-42 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Central Florida Enterprises v.
FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
186. Robinson, supra note 35, at 239. The U.S. license allocation system does have good points.
As administered today, it is relatively (although not completely, see infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text) resistant to political influence, and it succeeds to some degree in limiting concentration
within the mass media. These goals, however, might be achieved through a less cumbersome system.
187. See Brotman, The PotentialRole of Mediation in Settling Comparative Broadcast Cases,
COM. LAW. 11 (Summer 1989).
188. Random Selection Lottery, supra note 181, at 2267 n.49 (1989) (studying 1982 cases). Another 17% of the cases were settled after the initial decision was issued. Compareid. with id. at 2266
n.12.
189. The policy was announced in Texas Television, Inc., 91 F.C.C.2d 1047, 1049 (1982), as an
interpretation of Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1095 (1982), amending 47 U.S.C. § 31 1(c). Prior
to that, settlement payments were limited to the legitimate and prudent expenses incurred by the
applicant in prosecuting its application. Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889 (1960) (formerly codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 311(c) and amended by Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1095 (1982)). See Settlement Agreements Among Applicants for Construction Permits, 6 F.C.C. Red. 85, 86 (1990) (report
and order), on reconsid, 69 R.R.2d 175 (1991).
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cluded in 1990 that this regulatory regime encouraged the filing of sham
applications, ified largely in the hope of later being withdrawn in exchange for a favorable settlement. 190 Under the FCC's new rules, settlements are limited to amounts that allow the withdrawing applicant to
recover the costs it incurred in pursuing its application.1 9 1 In addition,
the FCC will closely scrutinize mergers among competing applicants
during the comparative process, and has continued in effect rules that

make such mergers less attractive.' 92 The Commission hopes that the
new rules, by limiting hearings to serious applicants, will help make the
'193
comparative hearing process "work.
190. Settlement Agreements, supra note 189, at 85.
191. An applicant may receive no more than its "legitimate and prudent out-of-pocket expenses" in preparing, filing and advocating its application, and in negotiating the settlement. Id.
The Commission initially barred any payment where the settlement takes place after the start of the
trial phase of the hearing, but eliminated that prohibition on reconsideration. Settlement Agreements Among Applicants for Construction Permits, 69 R.R.2d 175, 176 (1991).
192. Settlement Agreements, 69 R.R.2d at 177; Comparative Hearing Process, 6 F.C.C. Red.
157, 158 (1990) (report and order); see also Daytona Broadcasting Co., 101 F.C.C.2d 1010 (1985), on
reconsid., 103 F.C.C.2d 931 (1986).
193. It is unclear as of this writing how large an effect the changes will have. It is worth noting
that the study described supra note 188 and accompanying text, evidencing high settlement rates in
comparative new hearing cases, was based on applications filed in 1982, before the removal of the
limit on the amount of permissible settlement payments.
There was for a time some movement to replace comparative hearings with lotteries. The Commission in 1983 adopted lottery procedures for low-power television license awards, and in 1984 for
cellular telephone awards. Random Selection Lotteries, 93 F.C.C.2d 952 (1983) (second report and
order), modified, 95 F.C.C.2d 432 (1984); Cellular Lottery Rulemaking, 98 F.C.C.2d 175 (1984)
(report and order). In January 1989, the Commission proposed using lotteries to choose among
competing applicants for new AM, FM, or full-power television stations. Random Selection Lottery,
supra note 181, at 2256. That proposal, however, met with nearly unanimous opposition from the
communications bar and from all segments of the industry. Few Choose to Follow FCC'sBouncing
Ball, BROADCASTING, June 19, 1989, at 50. Opponents argued that the plan was inconsistent with
the Commission's duty to select licensees on the basis of the public interest, convenience, and necessity; the Commission withdrew it in May 1990. Random Selection (Lottery), 5 F.C.C. Red. 4002
(1990) (order). It is hard to escape the feeling that the opposition of the communications bar to the
proposal was based at least in part on the economic value to the bar of the cumbersome and expensive hearing process. Newly appointed Commissioner Ervin Duggan, however, explained that for
him a lottery would mean that a broadcast license would be a mere "economic asset," rather than a
"sacred trust." Echoing the feelings of many communications lawyers, he stated: "I not only applaud the burial of the lottery idea, I would like to drive a stake through its vile and evil heart."
FCC Revamping Comparative Hearing Process, BROADCASTING, May 14, 1990, at 31.
In 1987, finally, the Commission attempted to avoid the comparative hearing process for the
selection of a mobile satellite service licensee by requiring all would-be applicants to enter into a
single joint-venture consortium that, the FCC explained, would apply for and be granted the single
license. Radio Frequencies in a Land Mobile Satellite Service, 2 F.C.C. Red 485 (1987), vacated,
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir 1991). The Commission reasoned that
comparative hearings would be costly and time-consuming, and that making a valid comparison
between applicants would be extremely difficult. See AeronauticalRadio, 928 F.2d at 436. The D.C.
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3. Conclusions. In the allocation process, the Commission's initial
approach was far from the formal-rationality ideal. The Commission resolved some issues through explicit bargaining; it resolved others by tilting towards the players with the greatest political influence; and it
dispensed with formal process in order to enforce the decisions it thus
made. Even in formal hearings, it maintained some control over broadcast allocation in part through opaque handling of the question of need
for broadcast service.
Judicial review, however, in large part nullified the Commission's
approach. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia asserted
extensive jurisdiction to review Commission decisionmaking, and imposed substantial hearing requirements on it. It limited the Commission's
decisionmaking to evidence introduced at those hearings and engaged in
sometimes quite exacting hard-look scrutiny. The agency responded in
the short term by importing greater formality into the allocation process
and declining to make AM allocation policy decisions in that adjudicatory license-application context. It responded in the long term, with regard to television allocation, by moving allocation policy decisions into
the context of Table of Assignments rulemaking.
The process of selecting among competing applicants for a single
frequency authorization, similarly, was dramatically shaped by the requirements of formal rationality. Although the courts initially seemed
willing to allow the Commission to maintain a somewhat informal approach to the substance of the selection, public perception of the Commission's proceedings as insufficiently transparent and fair led the agency
to seek to conform closely to the pure formal rationality model, using
adjudicatory processes to apply clear and objective rules to the licensee
selection decision. This approach was a natural response to corruption
and political bias but has not led the Commission to an efficient decisionmaking process.
From the perspective of American communications policy and first
Circuit, however, rejected the Commission's approach as inconsistent with the Communications

Act. "The comparative hearing process," it held, "is unquestionably the standard method for the
Commission to resolve mutually exclusive applications." Id. at 450. "At a minimum,... any...

departure from the statutorily prescribed and judicially recognized practice of resolving mutually
exclusive applications through comparative hearings must be premised on some truly compelling
grounds that are special to the particular proceeding" in question. Id. at 452. The record, the court
concluded, presented no such compelling grounds; the Commission's stated reasons for finding comparative hearings undesirable in the mobile satellite service area were equally present in all licensing
proceedings. Id. The FCC has reaffirmed its consortium requirement notwithstanding the Aeronautical Radio decision. See Mobile Satellite Service Licensing Procedures, 69 R.R.2d 828 (1991) (tentative decision).
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amendment theory, the FCC's move towards greater formality in license
allocation was a good one. United States constitutional law philosophy
favors objective criteria and procedures affecting the selection of first
amendment speakers over informal, discretionary, or bargaining-oriented
ones; formal-rationality standards are thus especially appropriate, and
bargaining especially inappropriate, in that area. The objective decisionmaking systems that the FCC has put in place, however, notwithstanding
their ideological purity, have worked relatively badly. The Commission's
first-come-first-served approach to AM allocation neglected the interests
of less populated areas, and its Table of Assignments for television allocation promoted local stations in rural areas at the expense of broadcast
diversity nationwide. Both of those flaws, moreover, seem relatively benign when compared to the expensive and largely pointless administrative exercise of the comparative hearing process.
B.

BroadcastLicensing in Japan

When the Occupation forces in Japan turned to reconstituting the
Japanese broadcast system after World War II, they concluded that the
existing monopoly broadcasting system should be dismantled, and replaced with a competitive system overseen by an independent government agency. MacArthur's staff drafted a new set of broadcasting
regulation laws based on the American model, establishing a formal system similar to the U.S. communications regime. The agency in charge of
regulating Japanese broadcasting pursuant to these laws after 1952 was
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). 194
MPT, notwithstanding that the formal law it was applying was
drafted according to an American model, constructed a system of broad194. MPT's predecessor, organized in 1885, was known as the Ministry of Communications,
and controlled the postal and telegraph systems, as well as maritime shipping and lighthouses. From
1891 through 1926, it added telephones, railroads, postal life insurance and banking, and civil aviation to its jurisdiction. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 187-88. The Ministry controlled radio broadcasting from the start of AM broadcasting in 1925 through the end of the Second World War. See
G. KAsZA, supra note 94, at 72-101, 252-65.
After the Second World War, the Occupation forces briefly experimented with an organization
separating a Ministry of Postal Affairs from a Ministry of Telecommunications (1949-50), and then
created an independent Radio Regulatory Commission (1950-52), modelled on the FCC. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 187-88. The Japanese government had strongly resisted establishment of the
Radio Regulatory Commission. Its legal experts saw independent agencies as inconsistent with the
basic forms of Japanese government, which were (and are) premised on a more hierarchical chain of
command. U.S. planners, however, were resolute, and turned a deaf ear to Japanese pleas regarding
"the peculiarities of Japanese government organization." Uchikawa, supra note 8, at 75. After the
dispatch of a private letter from General MacArthur to Prime Minister Yoshida and some further
skirmishing, the matter was sealed. The Radio Regulatory Commission Establishment Bill was
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cast regulation sharply different from that of the United States. Enforcing American-drafted statutes through pure bargaining-oriented
regulation, MPT developed broadcast allocation policies more restrictive
than those of the U.S., and mechanisms for choosing individual licensees
that bypass formal adjudicatory proceedings altogether. MPT chooses
individual licensee recipients through a process emphasizing compromise
between all politically influential applicants in the formation of a single
joint-venture licensee. That license selection process has had significant
consequences, one of which has been to confine media power almost
completely within the structure of the socially acceptable and politically

influential mainstream.
1. InitialChoices. In Japan, as in the United States, regulators had
to resolve basic questions of license allocation: Would the regulator

award licenses to the limits of spectrum availability? If not, what procedures would it use to exercise control over whether a frequency would be
made available, and what substantive criteria would it apply? Japanese
regulators were able to answer those questions on a clean slate; there
were no private broadcasters when Japan's 1950 broadcast regulatory
scheme went into effect.
Japanese regulators initially contemplated that broadcast diffusion

would be quite slow. MPT's first broadcast allocation policy1 95 was contained in its 1952 "TV Frequency Allocation Plan for the Three Major
passed in 1950 creating an independent agency for the regulation of Japanese broadcasting. Id. at
75-79.
Immediately after the 1952 effective date of the peace treaty between Japan and the United States
and the return of full sovereignty to Japan, the Yoshida Cabinet abolished the Commission and
transferred its functions to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Since 1952, a renamed
and (partly) reunited Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications has exercised authority over broadcasting, telecommunications, postal services, and postal banking and life insurance. See Hattori, The
Administrationof Radio Waves for Broadcastingin Japan, 25 STUD. BROADCASTING 41, 47 (1989);
Omori, BroadcastingLegislation in Japan, 25 STUD. BROADCASTING 7, 15-16 (1989); Uchikawa,
supra note 8, at 79-80; NHK, supra note 83, at 217, 407-08; NHK, THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN JAPAN 214, 233-34 (1967); Tadokoro, Japan, in BROADCASTING IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
(J. Lent ed. 1968).
195. MPT's predecessor, the Radio Regulatory Commission, see supra note 194, had begun
awarding AM radio licenses two years before, see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text. Japanese regulators, however, issued only 16 radio licenses before the start of television licensing in 1952,
and largely neglected radio after 1952. MPT still has not licensed radio to any substantial degree: by
the late 1980's there were only 47 commercial AM broadcasters in Japan, and 27 commercial FM
broadcasters. See Omori, supra note 194, at 7, 10; infra notes 241-42. The history of AM radio
licensing in Japan therefore provides a less useful illustration of its broadcast allocation system than
does its television licensing experience.
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Areas."1'96 The plan contemplated licensing only two commercial television stations in Tokyo19 7 and one each in the cities of Osaka and

1 99
Nagoya,1 98 far fewer than the spectrum technically could support.

MPT revised its table of assignments in 1956, but still contemplated slow
diffusion of television stations, broadcasting on four channels made available for civilian use. Television was to spread slowly from the three cities
where it was so far available to seven "main areas of the country," and
ultimately to other areas. 2 ° MPT bureaucrats opposed any more rapid
expansion, notwithstanding frequency availability, emphasizing that television was best brought along in an unhurried and steady manner.
A year later, however, the Ministry completely reversed course,
awarding forty-three new television licenses on eleven channels; it thus
increased the number of licensees over one thousand percent.20 1 Why
196. In 1950, the Prime Minister and the head of the then-Ministry of Telecommunications told
the Diet that commercial television was non-essential, an expensive luxury for the rebuilding economy, and that frequency allocation should wait until further technical research was completed. See
Yamamoto, The Growth of Television in Japan, 2 STUD. BROADCASTING 81, 116-17 (1964). NHK,
see supra note 6, did not plan to begin operational television service until 1953, and was pursuing its
expansion plans in an unhurried manner, most commercial radio broadcasters agreed that there was
no need to move into television for the time being. See NHK, supra note 83, at 214-16.
That applecart was upset by Matasaro Shoriki, a former president of the Yomiuri newspaper, who
wanted to establish a commercial TV station without further delay. Shoriki, with the support of the
major newspapers, submitted an application in 1951 to inaugurate Nippon Television (NTV) in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. The RRC, outside of the Ministry chain of command, agreed to the establishment of a Tokyo station. Its favorable response forced the hands of NHK and of other would-be
television broadcasters, causing them to submit hurried applications as well, and brought Japan into
the television age rather sooner than might otherwise have been the case. See id.; Nakajima, The
BroadcastingIndustry in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF BROADCASTING 32,33 (H. Eguchi
& H. Ichinohe eds. 1971); NHK, supra note 194, at 232.
197. MPT contemplated issuing one commercial TV license in Tokyo in addition to one already
issued by the RRC, see supra note 194.
198. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 54-57. The Ministry also approved one NHK station in
each city. See NHK, supra note 194, at 234.
199. The American-drafted Radio Act of 1950 might have been seen as a barrier to that approach. The statute directed MPT to license broadcast applicants if "it [was] possible to assign
frequency" and if the applications set out acceptable construction design, appeared to have adequate
financial basis, and satisfied further formal regulations promulgated by the Ministry. See Radio
Law, Art. 7 (Law No. 131 of May 2, 1950) as amended (translation by MPT); see also Nakasa,
Effects on the Change in TelecommunicationsPolicy, 14 STUD. BROADCASTING 63, 75 (1978). The
Ministry had promulgated no formal regulations meeting the requirements ofthat final provision. In
the absence of such regulations, the statute arguably required licensing to the limits of frequency
availability. The Ministry, however, interpreted the "possible to assign frequency" provision to give
it discretion to deny applications based on informal frequency allocation plans taking into account a
wide range of factors other than technical feasibility. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 47-48; M. ITO,
supra note 83, at 26.
200. NHK, supra note 194, at 240; Hattori, supra note 194, at 57-58.
201. See NHK, supra note 83, at 411.
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was MPT so initially cautious, and why did it undertake this sudden
shift? To understand Japan's allocation policy choices, one must first
understand its unique method of dealing with competing applications.
The question of how to resolve competing applications, in the Japanese
context, drove the broadcast allocation and licensing process from its
earliest moments.
2. Ipponka Chosei. In December 1950, the Radio Regulatory
Commission (RRC) 2°2 announced that it would grant two preliminary
commercial AM radio licenses in Tokyo, and one in each of thirteen
other cities.2 °3 Large numbers of applicants sought each of these scarce
authorizations. How was the regulator to select licensees? Language in
its regulations apparently provided for competitive selection: "When
there is a shortage of availability in frequencies assignable to the applying
broadcast stations... priority shall be given to the applicant whose plan
can be considered to contribute most to the public welfare." '2° Instead,
however, the RRC rejected the American approach of formal, competitive hearings, and substituted an approach of its own: ipponka chosei.
The phrase is commonly translated as "coordination" (my own reading
is "unification coordination"). 205 It means that when many different entities file applications for a single license, the regulator, instead of engaging in a competitive selection process, facilitates the creation of a joint
20 6
venture representing, to the extent possible, all influential applicants.
202. See supra note 194.
203. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 48-50.
204. See id. at 50-52.
205. Ipponka has also been translated in this context as "unification adjustment," see id. at 64,
and as "centralization," see Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 27. Chalmers Johnson has commented in a
related context that while chosei is generally translated as "coordination," the term "when used by
Japanese bureaucrats [is] invariably [a] euphemism for control." Johnson, supra note 81, at 212-13.
206. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 64; Komatsubara, New Broadcasting Technologies and the
Press in Japan, 25 STUD. BROADCASTING 77, 80 (1989); Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 23, 27, 38.
Ipponka dates back at least to the original Communications Ministry plans for radio in 1923-24.
The Ministry contemplated noncommercial private broadcasting supported by fees paid by radio
manufacturers and listeners. While the Wireless Telegraph Act of 1915 established a government
monopoly in all "wireless telephone and telegraph," Ministry officials chose to rely on a catch-all
provision in that statute allowing exceptions as "considered necessary by the competent Minister."
Nakajima, supra note 196, at 16-18 (citing Wireless Telegraph Act of 1915, Art. 2, cl.6).
Ministry officials felt that stations in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya should each originate their own
programming, rather than simply retransmitting national programming, because of the value of involving prominent persons in each area. Officials worried, though, that competing stations in a
single region would fragment revenues, spread capital and broadcasting expertise too thinly, and
pose problems of technical interference. They therefore supported establishment of exactly one enterprise in each area. See G. KASZA, supra note 94, at 74-79.
The Ministry therefore licensed broadcasters, created through an ipponka-like process, in each of
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The RRC, as a result, notwithstanding that it was established on an
American model,2 "7 did not follow the American approach to licensee
selection.20 8 It instead sought
to bring about voluntary mergers of plural applicants in each city by clarifying the prospects for commercial stations in areas where there were large
numbers of applicants. It was particularly intended for Tokyo and Osaka
as there were many applicants in each city. In the process of mergers of
applicants in Tokyo and Osaka, serious troubles developed between those of
opposing interests and there were cases in which political and financial
leaders had to intervene to adjust matters.' 9
In the end, the RRC approved two stations in Osaka rather than one,
because "no agreement could be reached among the applicants."21 0
Ipponka, rather than competitive selection, to this day remains the
dominant mode of selecting Japanese broadcast licensees. The key national players in the ipponka process today are Japan's five major media
groups, centered on Japan's five nationwide daily newspapers.2"' Each
nationwide newspaper is associated with a "key station" television stathe three cities between November 1924 and February 1925, and subjected them to extensive control.
Such independence as the broadcasters had, though, was short. They were merged into a unified
national monopoly broadcaster, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), modeled after the BBC, in August
1926. The Ministry had had second thoughts about local origination in each region: local stations
might not have adequate programming and technical expertise. A national monopoly, by contrast,
could more efficiently diffuse programming throughout the country. As war approached, the national broadcast monopoly became more and more an arm of the state, moving from a quasi-public
to a wholly state-controlled entity. By 1942, the Cabinet Information Bureau had adopted a policy
"to make all broadcast programs conform to state purposes." Id. at 79-88; see also Hattori, supra
note 194, at 42-43.
207. See supra note 194.
208. One could argue that the Japanese and U.S. approaches are in fact essentially similar, since
most comparative issues before the FCC in recent years have been resolved by settlement rather than
by the application of formal procedures. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. There are
crucial differences, however, between a system that unwittingly encourages settlement by making
adjudication risky and expensive, and a system that requires it. The D.C. Circuit has held that the
FCC generally may not, consistently with the Communications Act, require broadcast applicants to
resolve their differences via settlement. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); supra note 193. The FCC's recent reforms of the settlement process, see supra notes 18893 and accompanying text, seem predicated on the notion that settlement in comparative new hearing cases should primarily be a means of eliminating applicants who have no real chance of success,
so that the remaining issues can be settled through adjudication. Ipponka chose!, by denying that
adjudicatory procedures can or should determine the recipient of a broadcast license, fundamentally
rejects that U.S. approach. In contrast to the U.S. system, ipponka precludes the possibility that a
license can ever be awarded through formal application of comparative criteria.
209. NHK, supra note 194, at 213.
210. Hattori, supra note 194, at 48-50.
211. The Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei, and Nihon Keizai newspapers each has a morning
edition circulation of between two and nine million. See NIHON SHIMBUN KYoKAI (NSK), THE
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tion in Tokyo, which in turn serves as the hub of a nationwide television
network.21 2 When a new license is made available, these networks approach an assortment of former employees or shareholders, or former
employees or shareholders of related firms, to file applications on their
behalf with the relevant regional Telecommunication Administration Bureau. 213 Applications typically number in the hundreds; in Nagano prefecture recently, over 1300 applications were filed for a single license.
Not all of these applications, however, are legitimate. Almost all are
filed by camouflage entities acting as proxies for a few real parties in
interest, including the national media groups and leading local
businesses.2 14
MPT selects a person with a high degree of influence in the prefecture to "guide" the coordination process. 2 15 This person must be familJAPANESE PRESS 127-32 (1986); Tamura, The Information Environment around the JapanesePeople,
23 STUD.BROADCASTING 7, 13 (1987).
Each of the standard dailies other than the Nihon Keizai is affiliated with a tabloid "sports newspaper," featuring "a lower level of taste and intellect than the standard newspapers," see Nakasa,
Scandal vs. Social Responsibility: The Growing Criticism of Journalism in Japan, 23 STUD.BROADCASTING 27, 33 (1987), and a variety of other publications: weekly papers, weekly and monthly
magazines, and annuals. See Y. Kim, JAPANESE JOURNALISS AND THEIR WORLD 9 (1981). Each,
further, is engaged in a variety of outside businesses. See id. at 9-11; J. LEE, THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE JAPANESE PRESS 79-80 (1985); Nakajima, Revenue Resources of the Broadcasting
Industry in Japan, 7 STUD. BROADCASTING 31, 53 (1969); see also Chang, Vertical Integration of
Mass Media in Japan, 27 GAZETTE 181, 182 (1981).
212. The newspaper-key station associations are cemented by personal relationships and exchanges of personnel, limited cooperation in newsgathering, and complicated stock ownership structures. Japanese broadcast concentration regulations limit newspaper holdings in broadcast stations
to 10%. See NHK, supra note 83, at 239; Chang, supra note 211, at 183. The regulations, however,
seem more in the nature of tatemae than honne, concerned more with outward appearances than
inner reality. Thus the Yomiuri newspaper, itself family and employee owned, holds 10% of NTV
(officially Nippon TV Broadcasting) in Tokyo. But one of the Yomiuri's individual (family) owners
holds another 7% of NTV; Yomiuri TV (Osaka) holds another 7%; and additional smaller shares
are held by other companies, such as Nagoya Broadcasting and YomiuriLand, that belong to what
can loosely be termed the Yomiuri group. Similarly, while the Asahi newspaper, also family and
employee owned, holds only 10% of Asahi Broadcasting (Osaka), a number of individuals linked to
the newspaper hold major stakes in their personal capacities. This form of industrial organization is
common in Japanese business. See M. AoI, supra note 13, at 119-22 (discussion of "capital
keiretsu"). But see Shimizu 1991, supra note 6, at 4 (TBS, while formerly associated with the
Mainichi group, is now operated independently).
213. Translations of the names of Japanese government organs sometimes vary widely. This
English-language terminology for the regional Denki Tsushin Kanri Kyoku is taken from MPT/
JICA, Outline of Broadcastingin Japan 9 (Broadcasting Executives' Seminar, Mar. 15-29, 1987).
214. Networks are today significantly more cautious about the acquisition of new affiliates than
they were in the late 1960s, when competition for new affiliates was at its peak. Compareinfra note
280 with Yamamoto, supra note 196, at 81, 97-98, 122.
215. Two broadcasters told me that the first step in the process is self-coordination, in which the
various applicants attempt to reach agreement without any official intervention at all. In that pro-
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iar with the prefecture, credible with the applicants, and (in theory)
neutral among them. As a practical matter, according to broadcasters, if
the prefectural governor is a member of the ruling Liberal-Democratic
Party (LDP)21 6 then MPT will typically approach him first; 2 17 governors
who are members of the main opposition Socialist Party are not approached. If the governor belongs to an inconvenient political party, the

Ministry will typically approach the head of the local economic association or the head of an influential local company. 218 Alternatively, MPT

may bypass the governor if a Diet member with particular clout in communications matters represents part of the area in question.2 19
One veteran of the ipponka process explained to me that his first step
was to compare the contact telephone numbers listed on the various applications, and group together all those with identical numbers listed.
This practice eliminated some sham applications, filed in the hope of
gaining extra seats at the ipponka table, and began to narrow down the

applications to the important players. His task, he explained, was to lead
these players - most importantly, representatives of the key stations to an agreement acceptable to all regarding the shareholder and boardcess, they said, powerful local business leaders, as well as representatives of the national media
groups, have great influence. According to an MPT official, however, such self-coordination is unusual. For the most part, applicants view each other as opponents, and there is conflict among them.
Voluntary agreement, according to the official, is therefore rare.
216. Japan is equipped with a full complement of political parties, but a single one, the LDP,
has controlled the Diet since its creation through the merger of the Liberal and the Democratic
parties in 1955. The LDP is "a vague and amorphous amalgam of conservative economic and cultural values" supported electorally and financially by organized business and organized agriculture.
T. PEMPEL, supra note 13, at 35. While consistently excluding organized labor and labor ideologies,
it has absorbed a variety of interest groups as Japanese society has developed, and has been successful in defining itself as the political mainstream. Although the LDP "appeases the opposition parties
in order to maintain the pretense of a multi-party political system," Johnson, supra note 81, at 199,
and works within a political structure that allows the opposition parties something of a veto power
on important issues, it is on a day-to-day basis reasonably successful in blocking the labor-based
opposition parties and minor parties from meaningful participation in the processes of government.
As a result, political competition is carried on for the most part not between parties, but between
various factions within the LDP itself. See generally G. CumRTs, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS
(1988); T. PEMPEL, supra note 13, at 12-45; E. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 279-85; N. THAYER,
How THE CONSERVATIVES RULE JAPAN (1969).
217. See also Hattori, supra note 194, at 64 (ipponka conducted by "governor of the prefecture
concerned or selected leaders in local economic circles"); Komatsubara, supra note 206, at 80.
218. In Kanagawa prefecture, for example, LDP Governor Atsuda was tapped to guide the
ipponka process for TV Kanagawa, established in 1972. When FM Yokohama was established in
Kanagawa prefecture 13 years later, the Kanagawa governor was a member of the Socialist Party;
the chairman of the local economic association conducted the ipponka instead.
219. Diet member Shin Kanemaru, see infra note 239 and accompanying text, dominated the
ipponka process for the formation of TV Yamanashi.
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of-directors structure of the new venture.2 2 ° When the dust clears, the
ipponka leader is sometimes found at the top of the organizational chart
of the new entity.2 21
3. Allocation Policy. MPT's initial allocation plan for television, as
set out earlier, contemplated slow and steady diffusion for television.2 22
At first television would only be available in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.
It would spread from there to seven "main areas of the country," and
would ultimately be made available in other areas. That unhurried diffusion, MPT bureaucrats explained, would best serve the interests of the
nation.
Those plans changed in 1957 when Kakuei Tanaka, the most brilliant politician in postwar Japanese history and eventual Prime Minister,
became Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Tanaka was serving
in his first cabinet assignment. At thirty-nine, he was younger than most
of his subordinates in the career bureaucracy and knew little about
223
agency affairs. He nonetheless overruled the bureaucracy's decisions
220. In carrying out that task, the ipponka leader may ask the important players to meet informally, in advance of a formal meeting of all applicants. Reaching an acceptable compromise may be
difficult, as demonstrated by MPT's well-publicized but unsuccessful attempt to force a merger of
two companies seeking to enter Japan's international telecommunications market. See Spaeth, Telephone Systems in the United States and Japan, 27 CAL. W.L. REv. 121, 133-34 (1990); Sato &
Stevenson, Telecommunications in Japan: After Privatization and Liberalization, 24 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 31, 36 (1989); Two Firms No Closerto Accord on Joint Telecom Venture, Daily Yomiuri, July 28, 1987, at 4, col. 3.
MPT was similarly unsuccessful in trying to force a merger of two companies, one of which
sought to use technology developed and manufactured by the Motorola Corporation, seeking to
enter the Japanese cellular telephone market. See JapaneseBarriersSlow Motorola Mobile Phone,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1986, at DI, col. 1. MPT proved no match for Motorola's influence with U.S.
trade negotiators. See Trade Tempest Over Car Phones, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at D1, col. 3;
Japan to Give U.S. Increased Access in Key Trade Area, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1989, at Al, col. 6;
Japan Picks US. Design for Phones, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at Dl, col. 6.
Sometimes, companies file applications less out of a genuine interest in the new venture than out
of a desire to avoid losing ground to their competitors. In that situation, the applicants may be in no
hurry to reach an agreement. If no entity is licensed, that delay suits their interests as well or better
than if a successful compromise is reached on a joint venture. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 23,
38-39.
221. When TV Shinshu (Nagano prefecture) and TV Kanagawa were formed, MPT initially
approached the prefectural governors, who in turn delegated the task to their seconds-in-command.
In both cases, the person who conducted the ipponka ultimately became the president of the new
station. I do not believe that such a sequence of events is unusual.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
223. The structure of the Japanese bureaucracy is superficially similar to that of the British; a
Minister is appointed to head a department composed almost entirely of career bureaucrats. Most
scholars agree that through the early 1970s the career bureaucracy, rather than Diet members or
even Ministers, played the dominant role in government policymaking. See infra note 273; Johnson,
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and announced that the Ministry would immediately award forty-three
new television licenses on eleven channels.22 4
The new table of assignments produced an explosion in TV licensing, making licenses available in each prefecture and filling up the V-F
band.2 2 At least one station was allocated to each of twenty-eight or
twenty-nine prefectures outside major metropolitan areas; 226 two stations
were allocated to the Tokai (Nagoya) metropolitan area; and four were
allocated to each of the Kanto (Tokyo) and Kinki (Osaka) metropolitan
areas.
Increasing the number of licenses available necessitated selection or
creation, through ipponka chosei, of new licensees.2 27 In most prefectures, the process was relatively simple. A company had been formed a
few years earlier to receive the radio license allocated to the prefecture by
the RRC. It typically counted the most important companies and banks
of the local area as its major stockholders, and took one in five of its

directors from the prefectural newspaper.228

That company was

supra note 81, at 182; Johnson, Tanaka Kakue, StructuralCorruption,and the Advent of Machine
Politics in Japan, 12 J. JAPANESE STUD. 1, 23-24 (1986); G. CURTIS, supra note 216, at 109-10
(bureaucracy "particularly powerful in the 1950s and 1960s"); cf. Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note
13, at 516, 523 (Prime Minister Ikeda's 1970-74 success at imposing his own policies on a hesitant
Ministry of Finance "almost unprecedented in the postwar period"). But see Y. PARK, BUREAUCRATS AND MINISTERS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 92-94 (1986) (generally disputing "bureaucratic primacy" theories of Japanese government). Discussion of the complex
relationship between Japanese politicians and bureaucrats can be found, in addition to the sources
cited above, in M. AOKI, supranote 13; T. PEMPEL, supra note 13; N. THAYER, supranote 216. Cf
generally J. HACKER, THE COMPLETE YES MINISTER (J. Lynn & A. Jay eds. 1984) (British system).
224. See Y. PARK, supra note 223, at 25.
225. In fact, the agency reallocated spectrum to TV broadcast from other communications uses
in order to facilitate expanded TV licensing. See NHK, supra note 194, at 240-41.
226. There are 31 prefectures outside the "wide areas" of the major cities. Fukushima prefecture had no television station established until 1963 (I am not aware whether the delay lay in frequency allocation or elsewhere). Saga and Shimane prefectures were the two rural prefectures that
were considered too poor to support any broadcasting whatsoever. They did not receive broadcast
stations until 1969 (Saga) and 1970 (Shimane).
227. Indeed, this appears to have been one of the principal attractions of the plan. See infra
notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
228. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930s, there were about 1200 small local newspapers
in Japan. During the war years, however, the Japanese government forced their consolidation under
a "one prefecture-one prefectural newspaper" policy. In each prefecture, therefore, there was a prefectural newspaper ready to participate in the prefectural radio station. See G. KAszA, supra note
94, at 187-93; H. YAMANAKA, E. BUCK, H. KATO & J. LYLE, JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS STUDIES OF THE 1970s, at 60 (1986) (abstracting Uchikawa et al., Local Information Media in Postwar
Japan, 27 BULL. OF THE INSTITUTE OF JOURNALISM AND COMM. STUD. 131 (1979) (in Japanese))
[hereinafter H. YAMANAKA]; see also DENTSU, INC., FOUR MAJOR ADVERTISING MEDIA IN JAPAN

8 (April 1987).
On newspaper participation in broadcasting, see NHK, supra note 194, at 215, 340.
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awarded the new VHF license as well.22 9
In the large cities, however, competition was more keen. The major

newspapers, already heavily involved in radio broadcasting, 230 realized
that the award of television licenses presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Six new licenses were awarded in the cities of Tokyo, Osaka, and
Nagoya in 1958-59, and extensive coordination was required in the ip-

ponka process.231 The coordination did not always treat all applicants
equally; some ended up with greater stakes. Through that process,
Tanaka is said to have gained substantial influence over the regulated

companies and their newspaper sponsors.2 32 He is also said to have

raised extensive sums of money from would-be licensees.233

After the events of 1957-59, MPT did not license UHF television
(which had begun service in the United States in 1952)234 until the late
229. The radio licensees lobbied for the new television licenses invoking their expertise, their
ability to save money through combined operation, and the specter of destruction of the infant radio
industry through ruinous competition. See H. YAMANAKA, supranote 228; M. ITo, supra note 83,
at 84. Their receipt of the new television licenses was hardly in doubt. Because they incorporated
the most important members of the local power structure, it was futile in any prefecture to try to put
together a comparably prestigious, well-connected coalition.
230. See NHK, supra note 194, at 215.
231. See generally id. at 338-40 (MPT "assisted in unifying those [applicants] from big urban
areas where competition was keen"). In Osaka, for example, the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiurj, and
Sankei newspapers, together with the local Kobe and Kyoto newspapers, all sought to participate in
the three new television stations. The sole existing television station in the area was an AsahiMainichi newspaper joint venture. The Mainichi newspaper's Mainichi Broadcasting radio station
was awarded one new license. The other two licenses went to new entities now called Yomiuri TV
and Kansai TV.
232. See generally K. CALDER, CRISIS AND COMPENSATION: PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL
STABILIT1Y INJAPAN, 1949-1986, at 207-08 & n.92 (1988). Y. Kim, supranote 211, at 169, provides
one indication of Tanaka's own views of his relationship with the mass media after he became LDP
president: "Since I am thoroughly familiar with the internal affairs of newspapers, there is nothing I
cannot do. If I wanted, I could... suppress or do anything else I wanted to do.... It is easy to stop
a story in the newspaper. I won't telephone the mass media as Sato used to do. It has already been
arranged .... Don't pursue any trivial matters. If you don't cross a dangerous bridge, I will be safe.
So will you. If I think a particular reporter is dangerous, I can easily have him removed."
233. Tanaka went on to revolutionize Japanese politics, according to Professor Johnson,
through his understanding that "money was indeed the mother's milk of politics and that whoever
controlled the largest amounts of it in the political system, controlled the system." Johnson, supra
note 223, at 10-11. "[Ihe usual commission charged by the Tanaka machine to get the bureaucracy
to act-for example, to get a building permit out of the Ministry of Construction or to slow down the
implementation of some market opening scheme from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications-was three per cent of the value of the project." Id. at 25.
Professor Thayer, speaking more generally, quotes the Yomiuri newspaper political section for
the proposition that "through the use of the powers of government offices ... substantial political
funds can be gathered." N. THAYER, supra note 216, at 33-34. That statement, of course, could be
made about the United States as well.
234. See Sixth Report and Order, supra note 169, at 167. The first U.S. commercial UHF sta.
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1960s.235 The Ministry, which had been besieged for years by UHF applicants, finally established a new table of assignments in November 1967
allocating UHF frequencies for eighteen stations. It awarded licenses for
those stations by April 1968,236 and had approved over thirty new stations by the end of 1970. In so doing, it again drastically increased the
number of television licensees.2 37
In the establishment of each new station, it was (again) necessary to

sort out the participation of local capital as well as that of national news
interests. According to one industry analyst, the process was (again) valuable as a fund-raising device for the governing Sato faction. The pro-

cess, moreover, afforded opportunities for the exercise of local power.
The dominant figure in the UHF ipponka process in Yamanashi prefecture,23 for example, was Shin Kanemaru, then a Diet member, a close
associate of then-LDP President Tanaka, and a figure of growing influ-

ence in telecommunications matters. Kanemaru is now a managing director and the largest shareholder of the television station (TV
23 9
Yamanashi) established in that process.
MPT in 1970 did not come close to licensing to the limits of spectrum availability in the UHF band; many potential UHF frequency slots
remained unfilled. Throughout the next decade, residents of most prefectures outside the three huge metropolitan areas could receive the signals
tion went on the air in September 1952 as KPTV, Channel 27, in Portland, Oregon. E. KRAsNOW,
supra note 9, at 187.
235. The Ministry had begun to use the UHF band in the early 1960s for satellite stations
rebroadcasting VHF programming in areas with poor reception, and for experimental use. See
NHK, supra note 194, at 241-42; Nakajima, supra note 206, at 34.
The initial plan for conventional UHF service, announced by Minister Takeji Kobayashi apparently without extensive consultation, called for moving all television broadcasting to the UHF band
over a ten-year period. The VHF band would be shifted to safety, emergency, civil defense, and
similar uses. The policy stunned existing television broadcasters, and was ultimately dropped in the
face of industry recalcitrance. See Tadokoro, supra note 194, at 71; see also Nakasa, supra note 199,
at 63, 68; Nakajima, supra note 196, at 34, 62.
236. See NHK, supra note 83, at 358, 421-24.
237. This was a low-risk move from the perspective of existing broaddasters' financial health. In
1962, 29% of the entire nation's advertising was carried by its 45 broadcast companies. NHK, supra
note 194, at 341. From 1963 to 1967, commercial broadcasters' ratio of profit to total liabilities and
net worth ranged from 14-18%; comparable figures for other industries were 4-5%. Nakajima,
supra note 211, at 31, 42-43.
238. For the background to that ipponka process, see infra note 290.
239. He is also, as of this writing, head of the Takeshita faction (successor to the Tanaka faction
when the latter was reorganized in 1987), and thus a key political figure. He has been for some time
the most influential Diet member regarding MPT matters. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 204; infra
note 275.
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of only two commercial television stations,2" as well as only one commercial AM radio station24 ' and no commercial FM radio station.2 42
MPT regulators were reluctant to amend the allocation plan to permit
new stations, notwithstanding the financial success of existing broadcast
stations and notwithstanding frequency availability.2 4 3 MPT officials explained that the entry of additional stations might introduce a competi240.

This figure does not include two channels of NHK television programming. See supranote

6.
By comparison, in 1972, a majority of United States TV households could receive at least seven
television stations. Ross, The Winds ofDeregulation,EBU REV., May 1987, at 29, 30-31. Research
compiled by Professor Pool and others indicates that in 1975 United States television stations, taken
as a whole, supplied to the viewing audience roughly three times as many "words" of programming
per capita as Japanese television. See I. POOL, H. INOSE, N. TAKASAKI & R. HURWrrz, COMMUNICATIONS FLOWS: A CENSUS IN THE UNrED STATES AND JAPAN 86 (1984) [hereinafter 1. POOL

1984].
241. This figure does not include two stations of NHK AM radio programming, see supra note
6. Nor does it include relay and translator stations. Finally, I note that Japan's development of AM
radio was hindered by interference from stations in the USSR, the Koreas, and the PRC. See M.
ITO, supranote 83, at 83; NHK, supra note 83, at 358-59. Nonetheless, given that the United States
has roughly twice Japan's population, the mid-1980's difference between Japan's 47 commercial AM
broadcasters (utilizing 207 transmitting stations, including relay stations) and the United States'
4,710 is striking. Compare Omori, supra note 194, at 10, and FOREIGN PRESS CENTER/JAPAN,
JAPAN'S MASS MEDiA 46 (March 1986) with Cantor and Cantor, United States: A System of Minimum Regulation, in
PoLrrIcs
'CS OF BROADCASTING 162 (R. Kuhn ed. 1985).
242. They coulc receive, however, one channel of NHK FM broadcasting. See supra note 6.
The history of comniercial FM broadcasting in Japan has been troubled. NHK began experimental
FM broadcasting in 1957. See NHK, supra note 194, at 248. In 1968, MPT licensed four FM
stations, and MPT Minister Kobayashi announced that a major move into FM would be forthcoming over the next ten years. He declared that all local AM radio stations should convert to FM, with
high-power AM stations concentrated in the large cities to cover national or regional areas. The
plan, designed to counter AM radio's foreign interference problems, was later apparently abandoned. See Tadokoro, supra note 194, at 71; NHK, supra note 83, at 356-57, 423. As late as 1978,
however, a commentator wrote: "Nationwide establishment of [commercial FM] stations is still in
abeyance. This stems from the government's policy of, in the future, substituting FM broadcasting
for [AM] broadcasting. .. ." M. ITO, supra note 83, at 83; see id. at 90.
Recently, MPT instituted a channel plan contemplating at least one commercial FM station in
each prefecture. See Komatsubara, supra note 206, at 85. By the beginning of 1988, however, while
MPT had assigned FM frequencies to 41 of 47 prefectures, only 25 prefectures had a commercial

FM station in operation. MPT, 1987
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17.

243. Before licensing any new station, bureaucrats looked to what each prefecture could "support," examining, on a case-by-case basis: population; economic strength; number of households
owning television sets; total advertising revenues; and broadcast advertising revenues. These standards were formally approved by the Radio Regulatory Council in FMNaraRadio BroadcastingCo.
(RRC 1983), an unusual appeal of an MPT licensing decision. The Radio Regulatory Council, a
quasi-adjudicatory body with powers that are extensive on paper but rather less extensive in practice,
was created by the Yoshida Cabinet when it abolished the Radio Regulatory Commission in 1952.
See supra note 194. Radio Law chap. VII gives the Council authority over administrative appeals
from MPT determinations, but few such appeals are filed, presumably for fear of Ministry retaliation. See generally Nomura, System of Broadcasting in Japan and Its Characteristics, 1 STUD.
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tive ethic antithetical to public service broadcasting and might lower
profits that could otherwise be used to subsidize such broadcasting, thus
degrading public service and broadcast quality. 2'
In line with these concerns, MPT licensed, on average, only one or
two new UHF stations each year from the early 1970s through the mid1980s. From 1971 through 1977, the Ministry continued to concentrate
on Japan's three huge metropolitan areas, and largely fulfilled its own
fears. It created new independent stations, generally financially weak, in
prefectures on the fringes of major metropolitan areas.2 4 In 1978, however, MPT shifted its approach, authorizing additional network-affiliated
stations in prefectures outside of the major metropolitan areas. Those
stations have been successful.
In the 1980s, MPT shifted its approach once again to allow a more
rapid increase in station authorizations, although still limiting its awards
based on economic factors. In 1986, MPT announced as an aspirational
goal that four commercial stations should be available throughout Japan, 2' and announced guidelines for determining where new stations
would be allotted.24 The assignment of new channels, according to
MPT's new guidelines, is controlled by frequency availability, the finanBROADCASTING 65, 76-77 (1963); M. ITO, supra note 83, at 27, 41-42 (1978); Nakasa, supra note
199, at 67.
In this case, the would-be licensee had applied for an FM license in Nara prefecture. MPT denied
the application on the ground that no frequency had been allocated to the prefecture. Appellant,
arguing that MPT had erred in not allocating a frequency, then filed an administrative appeal with
the Minister, who was by law required to refer the matter to the Council for a recommendation.
MPT argued before the Council that it had examined Nara prefecture under the standards set out
above, and that the prefecture was if anything oversupplied with broadcast stations under those
criteria. The Council approved MPT's position in toto.
244. See Iyoda, Changes in the BroadcastingSystem and Their Impact on CommercialBroadcasters, 21 STUD. BROADCASTING 49, 53 (1985).
245. Most new television stations added by MPT during this period were allocated to prefectures that previously had received only metropolitan broadcasting. Unable to affiliate with networks
because their broadcast areas already include affiliates of each of the major networks, and unable to
broadcast significant amounts of independent programming because of the absence of an active syndication market, those stations take perhaps a quarter of their programming from would-be network
TV Tokyo Channel 12, and produce the bulk of the rest themselves. TV Kanagawa, for example,
produces about 75% of its own programming, heavily emphasizing music videos; amateur, scholastic, and professional baseball; and talk. The 11 independent stations, including TV Tokyo Channel
12, among them spend about ten billion yen each year on purchasing and producing programming;
comparable costs for a single key station are about five times that.
246. See MPT, supra note 242, at 17.
247. MPT first liberalized its allocation rules, and foreshadowed its general policy shift, in 1982.
In allocating broadcast frequencies, it stated, it would take as a basic policy goal the "audience's
equal opportunity to receive broadcasting." Quoted in Iyoda, supra note 244, at 54. One new television station was established in 1982, and three in 1983. Hattori, supra note 194, at 55.
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cial ability of the area to support new stations, and local demand for
additional broadcasting.24 8 On that basis, MPT accepted applications in
1986 for nine new television stations.
Japanese regulators, early on, adopted a table-of-assignments approach to control frequency allocation, rather than the ad hoe approach
characteristic of United States AM radio. This did not mean, however,
that they were adopting an objective system of license allocation, characterized by formal rationality; MPT assignment plans were informal, internal agency documents, largely unconstrained by procedural
requirements, and could be revised conveniently without formal
processes or explanation. 249 These revisions served as the vehicle for almost all of Japan's major broadcast policymaking. 250 MPT's discretion
was increased by its reluctance to award licenses to the limits of spectrum availability; notwithstanding marked shifts in MPT allocation approaches, MPT adhered to a policy of not granting licenses unless it felt
that economic conditions ensured new broadcasters' financial success.
4. Ipponka Explained. The narrative I have set out so far raises a
number of questions. Most importantly, why have Japanese regulators
chosen to select licensees via ipponka? MPT officials explained to me
that ipponka is necessary in part because it is difficult to select the one
applicant out of many who is most suitable and deserving of the license.2 5 1 More importantly, selection of only a single applicant will
make all the rest unhappy. Ipponka, they told me, is the natural and
inevitable result of the need for consensus in matters such as the distribution of valuable resources. It represents an attempt to conduct governmental allocation of scarce resources on the principle that, as one
Japanese communications scholar explained to me, "to fight each other is
not good behavior."
One might thus rely on "culture" in explaining ipponka: because
Japanese strive for harmony and seek to avoid conflict, they use the most
248. Hattoi, supra note 194, at 59-62.
249. See M. ITO, supra note 83, at 26; Hattori, supra note 194, at 54.
A 1988 amendment to the Broadcast Act required the Ministry, for the first time, to embody its
frequency allocation plans in formal ministerial ordinances. See Omori, supra note 194, at 27-28.
The amendment was part of the recommendations of the Commission on the Role of Broadcasting in

the New Media Age, see infra note 510 and accompanying text, which took the position that the
change would increase certainty, rationality, and fairness in the license award process.
250. See M. ITo, supra note 83, at 26.
251. See also Komatsubara, supra note 206, at 80 (selection of the one best candidate "would
take a long time").
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harmonious method of licensee selection.2" 2 Too much about Japanese
society, however - including much that is not true - can be explained
by a wave of the hand to "culture."2 3 Societies sometimes follow similar
approaches notwithstanding different cultures. The British, not generally thought of as exhibiting a culture of consensus, established a quasigovernmental BBC broadcasting monopoly on the "Japanese" theory
that
if they were prepared to license people, then you would have a very large
number of firms asking for permission probably, and .. you could not
acquiesce in all demands. And then you would have the difficulty of selecting firms which the Post Office thought were most suitable for the job, and,
whatever selection is made by the Post Office, the Post Office would be
bound to be accused of favouring certain firms. So that the solution of the
problem seemed to be to make all those firms get together to form one
Company for the purpose of doing the broadcasting.
The simple invocation of "culture" is hardly dispositive in explaining
why different societies follow similar approaches some times and different approaches others.25 5
The approach, further, is vulnerable to attack on other grounds.
Not all aspects of Japanese society reflect an overarching emphasis on
harmony,"' and it is in any event hardly clear whether ipponka
252. See, eg., Geller, supra note 6, at 28. More deeply in the "cultural" realm, one commentator has suggested that ipponka should be understood in light of Chie Nakane's thesis that Japanese

society is primarily structured not by horizontal relationships among peers, but by vertical relationships between high-status/patron ("oyabun") and low-status/client ("kobun") figures:
Mergers of competing interests under the guidance of mediating elders is a pervasive
form of conflict resolution in Japanese society. The mediating elders in this context
function as a symbolic oyabun figure to competing interests who are, in themselves, incapable of creating horizontal linkages and resolving conflicts, but can come together
under the common vertical linkage provided by the mediator.
R. Akhavan-Majid, Telecommunications Policy-making in Japan, 1970-1987: A Case Study in Japanese Policy-making Structures and Process (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, available in
Wayne State University Law Library).
253. See Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35
UCLA L. REv. 1,40 (1987) ("Like any other cultural tradition, the Japanese tradition is an unstable
set of conflicting and manipulable norms.").
254. 1- CoAsE, BRrrISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY 21 (1950) (quoting E.H.
Shaughnessy, Wireless Section, Post Office).
255. National culture is both meaningful and, when treated with appropriate caution, useful for
analysis. See L. BEER, supra note 125, at 100-22; Ramseyer, supranote 253, at 40 ("The point is not
that Japanese culture is irrelevant.") (emphasis in original); supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
It should not, however, be used as a talisman.
256. See, e.g., the techniques of the Buraku liberation movement, described in F. UPHAM, supra
note 87, at 78-123; see generally CONFLICT IN JAPAN (E. Krauss, T. Rohlen & P. Steinhoff eds.
1984). Professor Haley has strongly challenged reliance on Japanese "harmony" to explain differ-
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manifests true harmony or merely its veneer.25 7 The notion that ipponlca
reflects a pure commitment to "harmony" is as problematic as the notion
that United States allocation reflects a pure commitment to "fairness."
Each system in important respect shuts out certain classes of participants
and benefits others.
This Article's earlier discussion of administrative guidance,25 8 however, suggests another way of looking at the problem. Ipponka seems a
natural extension of the principles of administrative guidance to the licensing context. In the process of administrative guidance, the regulator
consults with selected interested parties in the hope of finding common
ground regarding the agency's ultimate action. In order to achieve anything resembling consensus, the regulator must limit the sphere from
which it draws those contacts, staying within the realm of government
and industry representatives who share more or less common interests.
The government selects people with whom it can do business, and attempts to achieve consensus within that group.
Ipponka reflects a similar approach. Here, too, the agency selects
the "serious" applicants - those it can or must do business with - and
seeks to achieve a consensus among them. That effort at consultation
and voluntary or imposed consensus serves the goals of the pure bargaining model, in that it discourages broadcast applicants from seeking to
challenge the agency's decisions through judicial or political channels.
The agency, by making concessions to include various industry members
in the joint-venture entity, can exert significant influence in that entity's
final makeup. The process further serves the goals of the bargaining
model in that the ultimate licensee, a creature of the local corporate and
national media power structures and of the Ministry as well, may be
more amenable to agency guidance than a less broad-based, more selfmade licensee.
One might argue that it would be more consistent with the bargaining model reflected in administrative guidance for the regulator informally to negotiate with each of the applicants, and to select the one that
seems, on the basis of its promises and makeup, to be most likely to fulfill
administrative goals if licensed. The argument is flawed in that it ignores
a crucial feature of both administrative guidance and the bargaining
model: The agency uses negotiation to deflect political and judicial
ences in U.S. and Japanese litigation rates. See Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978).

257.
258.

See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-105 and accompanying text.
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weapons that disappointed parties might otherwise bring to bear, and
thus maintains control of the process. Selecting one applicant and rejecting the others, even after consultation, would not achieve that goal.
25 9
MPT's role as the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications,
along with the practical consequences of ipponka in MPT's VHF and
UHF TV licensing, suggest a second way of looking at this question.
Japan has some 23,000 post offices, of which almost 18,000 are familyowned rural branch offices, usually with no more than two or three employees. MPT's predecessor began setting up these post offices through
the award of franchises to prominent local families over a century ago;
since 1875 they have not only delivered the mail but also served as
branch banks for the postal savings system.2 61 MPT gave its rural postmasters land tax exemptions, commissions on postage-stamp sales, and
bounties on their savings accounts above a certain amount. The postmasters got a reasonably lucrative business; MPT got partial control of
large sums of depositor savings and the allegiance of a local institution
uniquely situated to mobilize voters in the rural stronghold of the Liberal-Democratic Party.26 1
When Tanaka became MPT Minister in 1957, he emphasized and
exploited the existing post office symbiosis26 2 by tripling the number of
commissioned postmasters, adding about 2000 to the existing 1150, over
the course of one year. He thus continued the process of distributing
scarce and valuable resources - here, the right to participate in a monopoly delivery business and an administratively favored banking business - to prominent members of the local economic and social power
structure. In return, the regulatees helped turn out the vote for LDP
259. See supra note 194.
260. F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 81, at 168-70; Johnson, supra note 81, at 190-92. The Japanese postal savings system, essentially a savings bank run out of post office facilities, has assets
greater than any of Japan's (or the world's) commercial banks; it is highly popular because it offers
high interest rates, long banking hours, and, until recently, certain opportunities for tax evasion as
well. See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 81, at 167, 174, 180-82; Johnson, supra note 81, at 208-10.
261. See F. RosENBLUTr,
supranote 81, at 169, 172-73; Johnson, supranote 81, at 192. Butsee
D. WEsTNEY, IMITATION AND INNOVATION: THE TRANSFER OF WESTERN ORGANIZATIONAL

PATTERNS TO MEui JAPAN 122-23 (1987) (the new post office system, struggling in its early days,
actively recruited local notables in order to invest the new system with local recognition and prestige; it wooed them not with the promise of monetary rewards, but with the prestige of a "government position" as a postal official).
262. Even before Tanaka, MPT had benefitted from the postmasters' political clout. In 1950,
for example, the postmasters' support enabled MPT to beat back an attempt by the Ministry of
Finance to seize control of postal life insurance and pension funds. See F. RosENBLUTH, supranote
81, at 172-73.
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politicians, who provided political support for MPT.2 63

MPT's radio and television licensing followed this same model.2 64
In the broadcast context as well, the regulator had the task of distributing scarce and valuable resources. Through the distribution process, the
regulator singled out its licensees for governmental largesse and, due to
the debt thus created, gained political influence over them. The licensees,
members of the local business structure and thus predisposed to support
the business-oriented ruling party, were in a position to support politicians who could, in turn, provide the regulator support in its battles with
other elements of the bureaucracy. Through ipponka, MPT was able to
mobilize the entire political structure in this process, with a minimum of
playing favorites or creating unhappiness, and thus could maximize the
political benefits that would accrue.2 65

5. Allocation Policy Explained. The foregoing suggests some reasons why Japanese regulators have chosen to select licensees via ipponka.
How, though, should one explain MPT's varying approaches to license
allocation? Armed with the explanation of ipponka set out above, one
can usefully view the evolution of Japanese allocation policy as an uneasy
blend of what I will call "bureaucratic" and "political" components.
The original and short-lived 1956 MPT plan for broadcast allocation, apparently a creation of the career bureaucrats who made up the
Ministry staff,2 66 illustrates the bureaucratic component of Japanese allo263. F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 81, at 177-78. One MPT official stated in my presence, referring to the conflicts between MPT and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), see
infra notes 407-60 and accompanying text, "MITI has the money, but we have the votes." See also
C. Johnson, supra note 81, at 186, 190-91 (MPT, though scorned by MITI and Ministry of Finance
bureaucrats as not a true "policy ministry," is politically powerful; the post of MPT Minister is a
little-recognized but traditional way station on the road to the Prime Ministership); F. ROsENBLUTH, supra note 81, at 179-80 (noting the increasing political importance of the postal affairs
caucus and the office of MPT Minister).
264. The model, of course, is not confined to postal services and broadcasting. See N. THAYER,
supra note 216, at 70 (quoting Diet member Kenzo Kono on business regulation generally): "It's
like a game of paper, scissors, rock.... The businessmen have influence over the politicians, the
politicians control the bureaucracy, and the bureaucrats keep the businessmen in line. It's a natural
system of checks and balances."
265. Japanese licensee selection thus may be described in organizational sociology lingo as having taken the path it did because of a strong isomorphic pull from the existing post-office model,
combined with the utility of ipponka selection and market protection in facilitating and supporting
administrative guidance. See generally D. WESTNEY, supra note 261, at 218; DiMaggio & Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147, 151-52, 154-56 (1983).
266. See Y. PARK, supranote 223, at 25 (detailing Tanaka's rejection of the 1956 MPT plan for
delayed licensing of VHF stations).
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cation policy. The plan provided for slow diffusion of television "in consideration of the density of population, economic conditions and cultural
levels." 26 7 Under the bureaucratic component of allocation policy, license allocation is constrained not only by frequency availability, but
also by economic factors and time. Regulators grant licenses only if the
region, conservatively viewed, can "support" the new franchise. Substantial time must pass between the grant of one license and the grant of
the next. Allocation is controlled by a table of assignments, sharply
limited by economic factors, that nonetheless gradually expands over the
years.
Ipponka-based selection of licensees suggests some reasons for this
bureaucratic approach. Ipponka, seen as an extension of either administrative guidance or the post office model, arguably requires some limitation on the number of licensees. From the perspective of administrative
guidance, MPT must limit the number of licensees in order to preserve
for itself the threat of licensing competitors, the regulator's greatest
weapon in exerting administrative-guidance pressure on industry members.2 6 From the perspective of the post office model, MPT must limit
the number of licensees in order to protect licenses' profit-making potential and ensure their value.
Moreover, if a regulator loosens limits on entry into broadcasting
too far, it may find that a locality's powerful economic players have already been brought into broadcast license coalitions, and that support in
the established business community for a new one is less than overwhelming. In order to license new stations, regulators are then forced to
deal with persons on the fringes of the authority structure. At that point,
regulators may find that they are no longer dealing with people with
whom they can conveniently do business, and the consultation and consensus process breaks down. It is perhaps for these reasons that the ipponka process has worked awkwardly in MPT's most recent, post-1986,
television licensing, as the Ministry has attempted to expand the number
of television licensees. MPT officials have had to take a more interventionist approach, in some cases meeting directly with media representatives2 69 and issuing their own proposals for the shareholder structure of
267. NHK, supra note 194, at 240.
268. License revocation is another threat. That threat, however, is perhaps too drastic to be
useful on a day-to-day basis. MPT has never revoked a broadcast license. If it did, moreover, it
would be subject to political and judicial challenge.
269. In 1987, MPT officials invited the persons in charge of broadcast issues in all Tokyo-area
media companies to meet with MPT officers regarding the new Tokyo FM radio station, and di-
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the new ventures. ° In one prefecture, MPT announced its intention to
bypass the ipponka process entirely and choose an applicant through
competitive selection.27 1 The prospect of such failure gives the regulator
an additional incentive to limit the number of broadcast licensees.27 2
Bureaucratic incentives alone, however, do not provide a complete
picture of MPT's allocation policy. Analysis of the bureaucratic component assumes that bureaucrats control MPT: that while licensing incorporates "political" elements in that bureaucrats consider their political
position within government in deciding on license allocation, it is bureaucrats who are the ultimate decisionmakers. Political considerations,
however, can intrude into the licensing process in another manner: politicians can impose licensing decisions regardless of the wishes of the career
bureaucracy.273 The actual distribution of television licenses in 1957rected them to submit a joint selection for the managing director who was to represent their interests
in that station.
270. In Yamanashi prefecture, the ipponka process for a new FM station was peaceful, largely
because Yamanashi's two television stations, one of which is associated with the influential politician
Shin Kanemaru, accounted for almost all of the 35 applications. Stalled negotiations between the
two nonetheless led MPT at one point to issue its own draft allocating shares between the two
stations.
271. Yamagata prefecture has until recently been the home of an effective local media monopoly, with the newspaper Yamagata Shimbun playing a dominant role in both Yamagata Broadcasting (VHF) and TV Yamagata (UHF). When MPT announced allocation of a third television
frequency, the role that existing local media actors were to play was a key issue. Negotiations were
soon deadlocked, with a Miyazawa-faction Diet member supporting one camp and a Komoto-faction
Diet member supporting another. The prefectural government and local economic actors were unhelpful in guiding the process. MPT ultimately announced that it would examine applications on a
competitive basis and that any unification of applications was to take place immediately or not at all.
272. Limiting the number of broadcast licensees also protects existing broadcasters. A multitude of factors may cause regulators to wish to protect their charges; industry members provide
regulators with "information, views, and most important, love and affection." Robinson, supranote
35, at 189 n.43 (quoting former FPC Chairman Lee White). An MPT bureaucrat told me it would
constitute a failure on MPT's part should any broadcaster be forced by economic woes to relinquish
its license. Moreover, it may in fact be correct that protecting broadcasters' market positions in
some degree promotes the sort of programming regulators want to encourage. See generally Comanor & Mitchell, The Costs ofPlanning:The FCC and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & EcON. 177, 178-82
(1972). The very universality of these considerations, though, see S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 194,
makes them unhelpful in deciding why the Japanese system seems to place as great an emphasis on
licensee protection as it does.
273. It is widely believed that through the early 1970s decisionmaking power in most policy
areas in Japan was concentrated in the government bureaucracy. See sources cited supra note 223.
Bureaucrats had the advantages of subject-matter expertise, permanency, and ultimate control over
the policy implementation process; Diet members had none of those. LDP committees, according to
some scholars, were dominated by bureaucrats recently retired to Diet seats and supervising the
ministries they had just left. Committee meetings were occasions for bureaucrats to lecture Diet
members on the ministry's intended plans. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 201-02. Other analysts
assign politicians a more meaningful role in policymaking; decisionmaking, they say, was always an
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1959, thus, was not a bureaucratic creation at all; it was ordered by
Tanaka, a party politician.
The MPT Minister and influential Diet members contribute the
political component of allocation policy; under that component, the
number of licenses is determined on an ad hoc basis, with reference to
political factors. The political component is important because politicians' interests in allocation policy diverge from bureaucrats' interests.
In large respect, just as MPT bureaucrats have seen their role as one of
limiting the number of broadcast licensees, Japanese politicians have had
a simultaneous interest in increasingthe number of broadcast stations, at
least in their home districts. New broadcast stations are welcomed by
the electorate and are easier and cheaper to provide than new railway
lines. Voters in rural areas served by only one or two commercial television stations strongly favor new stations, providing additional television
programming at zero cost to them. The creation of new licenses may
give prominent local figures, shut out of earlier stations, opportunities to
participate in the new one.274 Getting a broadcast license for one's constituency affords a Diet member the opportunity to build political capital, demonstrate his political power, increase his connections, and
accumulate political credit. He may become a shareholder of the new
station; establishment of the station will likely pay off in campaign finance and conceivably, according to one analyst I spoke with, in editorial
support.
It should not be surprising that politicians play a substantial role in
license allocation. MPT has historically been viewed as subject to extensive political influence, in particular by the Tanaka faction of the
LDP.2 75 Nor should this be too surprising: Like the Ministry of Conintimate process involving both bureaucrats and party politicians. See N. THAYER, supra note 216,
at 226, 247; see generally Y. PARK, supra note 223.
Many scholars trace a shift in this structure beginning in the early 1970s. With the coming of
tight money and the need for ministries to fight among themselves for Diet allocations, together with
increased Diet-member expertise in policy areas, see Johnson, supra note 223, at 23-24; Y. PARK,
supranote 223, at 30-38, influence shifted to Diet members, acting through party policy organs, with
particular influence and expertise in given areas. These members have come to be known as zoku
(generally, though unfortunately, translated as "tribe") Diet members. See G. CURTIS, supra note
216, at 114-16.
274. MPT's award of a fourth television license in Fukushima prefecture largely stemmed, a
broadcaster told me, from the political ambitions of a Tanaka family member seeking a Diet seat in
that prefecture.
275. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 37-38. The Diet membership of the LDP is divided into
factions. The factions, which have no recognizable political views or ideology, provide the mechanism by which the LDP's (and thus the nation's) leadership is chosen. See G. CURTIS, supra note
216, at 86. The LDP factions began as highly personalized patron-client groupings, involving pow-
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struction and the Ministry of Transportation, MPT controls a significant
amount of governmental largesse.2 7 6 Further, it has jurisdiction over sectors of society valuable to the electoral base of the party and its factions.
Both of these factors make it a prime target for political colonization.27 7
Moreover, the informal, non-rule-bound nature of the license allocation
and selection process affords extensive opportunity for informal political
intervention in that process.2 78 Both the VHF licensing of the late 1950s
and the UHF licensing of the late 1960s provide illustrations.
An understanding of the bureaucratic and political components of
license allocation policymaking helps clarify many Japanese allocation
decisions. Bureaucratic influence apparently prevailed regarding the
original 1956 MPT allocation plan for television, emphasizing a slow increase in the number of television licensees, and MPT's unwillingness
throughout the 1970s to engage in any rapid expansion of broadcast licensing. Political influence better explains the sharp expansion of licensing under Tanaka in 1957-59.9 Why, though, did MPT decide in the
mid-1980s to systematically expand broadcast licensing? Political influences on license allocation policy in the past have tended to bring about
ad hoc increases in the number of stations, not systematic ones.2 80 Acerful leaders dispensing large sums of campaign funds to their Diet followers. Today, however, they
seem to a greater degree associations of convenience between new Diet candidates, who receive campaign and other organizational support, and the faction leadership.
The Tanaka faction, reorganized after Tanaka's death as the Takeshita faction, exercised disproportionate influence in a number of policy areas. Tanaka "was the last of an old school of political
bosses whose power derived from their ability to provide patronage to a large circle of followers." Id.
at 83. See generally id. at 80-88; E. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 279-83. Many of MPT's top
officials during Tanaka's tenure became longtime loyalists; some observers came to call MPT a
"Kakuei kingdom." See Y. PARK, supra note 223, at 155-56 & n.36. Professor Rosenbluth reports
that from 1957 to 1982, through twelve cabinets, the MPT Minister was a member of the Tanaka
faction. See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 81, at 178. Professor Park reports that from 1957 to 1979,
at least one and sometimes all of the top three political and career posts in MPT (minister, parliamentary vice minister, and administrative vice minister) were held by Tanaka confidants. See Y.
PARK, supra note 223, at 155-56. I was told as late as 1986 that a meeting with Shin Kanemaru,
then head of the Diet telecommunications zoku and a key Tanaka faction leader, was indispensable
for securing any broadcast license.
276. See Aberbach, Krauss, Muramatsu & Rockman, Comparing Japaneseand American Administrative Elites, 20 BRrr. J. POL. Scd. 461, 463 (1990) [hereinafter Aberbach].
277. "Colonization" involves formation of personal relationships between bureaucrats and
members of the various factions, cooptation of bureaucrats by the factions, and promotion within the
bureaucracy of officials sympathetic to the factions. See Y. PARK, supra note 223, at 59-63, 153-55.
278. The Department of Housing and Urban Development in the United States during the
1980s provides, perhaps, a good parallel.
279. On the 1967-70 UHF licensing, see infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
280. An academic I spoke to saw the station increase plan as a straightforward recognition that
television stations are institutional monopolies making unnecessarily large profits. That does not

1991]

BROADCASTING IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.

cording to MPT officials, the shift to a larger number of channels was
necessitated by the growing role of information in the lives of the people.
Japanese thinkers for the last two decades increasingly have seen their
society as transforming itself into a newjohoka shakai, or "information
society,"2 ' characterized by the easy availability of great amounts of information, together with universal, cheap, fast, efficient, and large-scale
information transmission.28 The johoka shakai promises an "information age" to follow the last "industrial age." As MPT officials put it, the
old conservative rules are insufficient for the new age.
The shift in MPT's attitude and behavior towards new stations,
though, seems quite drastic, and seems to go beyond what can be explained by a mere policy shift. MPT, after all, has even begun abandoning the ipponka procedural format.2 83 The change reflects an

institutional shift as well. As Section IV of this Article explains, MPT's
conflicts with other components of government, and its reactions to those
conflicts, in the course of developing its cable television policy led it to
recast its own role as that of a "policy agency," adopting a more global
and innovative outlook towards broadcasting issues; those same conflicts
led it to expand its client base in such a manner as to forge new links with
the electronics and other industries, and thus loosen its ties to the tradianswer, though, why MPT should suddenly have come to that realization in the mid-to-late 1980s;
broadcasters were no more profitable in that period than they had been previously, and were perhaps
less so. While commercial broadcasters' ratio of profit to total liabilities and net worth in 1986 was
almost three times the ratio for Japanese industries generally, see MPT, supra note 242, at 7, these
numbers may be misleading. Broadcasters operating VHF television stations appear to be substantially more profitable than UHF or radio-only broadcasters, and thus skew the figures. See MPT,
REPORT ON PRESENT STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN JAPAN: FISCAL 1986, at 64 (1986).
Local broadcasters tend to credit (or blame) the national media groups, who they see as pushing
for additional stations so as to increase their bargaining power and newspaper sales. Indeed, the
correlation between Japan's industry structure of four major television networks and a fifth minor
one, and MPT's current plan to put four television stations in every prefecture and a fifth in every
major city, seems striking. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 70. The national media groups, though,
appear uninterested in the new stations, and have to a large extent been hesitant to invest in them.
Only three of the five networks enthusiastically pursued the nine frequency slots MPT made available in 1986. One network, by contrast, filed applications in only two prefectures, and one filed in
none. There appears to be a feeling in at least some network boardrooms that the new stations will
indeed be unprofitable, at least initially, and that this is not the time to assume the burden of new
money-losing affiliates.
281. Johoka shakai might be most accurately translated as "information-ized society" or "informationalized society"; those readings, however, lose in euphony whatever they may gain in technical precision. See infra note 414.
282. See ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND HUMAN LIFE
(Mar. 31, 1983); Ito, The "JohokaShakai" Approach to The Study of Communication in Japan, 1
KEto COMM. REv. 13, 13-14 (1980); infra notes 414-15 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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tional broadcast media.2" 4 MPT's new role as a policy agency may well
have made it more sensitive to scholarly criticism of its limits on broadcast licensing; the loosening of its ties to the traditional media may have
blunted those clients' protests against the licensing of new competitors.
6. Some Consequencesof the JapaneseApproach. The Japanese approach to broadcast allocation has yielded some problematic results.
Most obviously, if one assumes that some broadcasters MPT chose not to
license would have flourished, then, for an extended period of time, Japanese listeners have received less broadcasting than they would have
otherwise. This is most obvious with regard to radio, for which MPT to
this day has made few station assignments.2 85
In an ideal world, one could compare the number of stations MPT
chose to license in each market with the number that the market might
have supported absent such policies, and thus determine the extent of
MPT's limitation on market entry. The question of how many broadcasters an area's economy can "support," however, is an enigmatic one.
Cross-national comparisons are unsatisfying; it is hard to know just what
to do with the fact, for example, that different countries spend vastly
different sums, per capita and as a percentage of GNP, on advertising.2 86
Do low advertising expenditures mean that an area can support little
over-the-air broadcasting, or would an increase in the number of broadcast stations stimulate greater advertising spending? While one cannot
determine precisely the extent to which MPT artificially limited the
number of broadcast stations, it seems clear that the Ministry deliberately chose to move slowly on license allocation. That limitation on the
number of licensees may have been necessary to the smooth functioning
of the ipponka-based system.2 87
A second consequence of the ipponka process is its tendency to centralize media power. In most prefectures, the RRC or MPT awarded the
prefecture's single radio license to an ipponka-createdconsortium led by
the prefectural newspaper, and MPT later awarded the single VHF television license to the radio licensee. These awards were quite natural,
given ipponka's internal logic. The obvious consortium to receive the
284. See infra text following note 475; text accompanying note 503.
285. See supra notes 241-42.
286. See DENTSU, INC., supra note 228, at 16. The United States spent more money in 1985 on
advertising, per capita and as a percentage of GNP, than any nation in the world: $397.11 per capita
and 2.39% of GNP. Japan, perhaps unsurprisingly given its export-oriented economy, spent rather
less: $106.13 per capita (# 12 in the world) and 0.98% of GNP (# 16). Id.
287. See supra text accompanying note 268.
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radio license was a coalition of the prefectural newspaper 288 and prominent local businesses; that coalition, once created, incorporated the most
important members of the local power structure and thus was a natural
candidate to receive the television license as well.289 Policies of limiting
the number of broadcast licensees checked the licensing of new radio or
television stations to compete with the existing ones. Mass communication, thus, was an effective monopoly in most areas until the licensing of
UHF in the late 1960s.2 90

This state of affairs persisted notwithstanding a 1959 MPT interpretive guideline entitled Measures to Prevent Concentrationof Mass Media,

prohibiting common ownership of a radio station, TV station, and newspaper in the same community, unless the diversity of information sources

in that community would forestall the possibility of local media monopoly. 291 MPT's enforcement of that prohibition has been unenthusiastic.
288. See supra note 228.
289. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. United States allocation was not immune
to this tendency, but the phenomenon manifested itself to a lesser extent. Newspapers received 50 of
the first 142 U.S. television construction permits awarded through 1952, and radio stations were
awarded many of the rest. See D. GINSBURG, supra note 132, at 199-200.
290. Cf. S. BREYER, supra note 35, at 194 (resource allocation agencies reinforce status quo
when they follow historical distribution patterns).
In Yamanashi prefecture, for example, the dominant newspaper is the local Yamanashi
Nichinichi, whose publicity materials today claim for it a 66% readership share. When Yamanashi
Broadcasting (YBS) was formed in 1954 and awarded a radio broadcast license, its major shareholders were the Yamanashi Nichinichi and its shareholders, as well as newspaper and broadcasting
interests from neighboring Shizuoka prefecture. When YBS was granted a television license in 1959,
the result was that the dominant newspaper, the only radio station, and the only television station in
the prefecture were in roughly the same hands, and were operated under common management as
part of the "YBS Group." That state of affairs persisted until the licensing of a UHF broadcaster in
1970.
291. See NSK, supra note 7, at 40-41; NHK, supra note 83, at 239. In accord with the 1988
revision of the Broadcast Law, MPT recently promulgated the 1959 guideline as a formal ministerial
ordinance. See Hattori, supra note 194, at 53-54.
For analogous United States authority, see Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) (barring creation of broadcast-newspaper combinations
and requiring divestiture in cases of local media monopoly), aff'd in part & rev'd in partsub nom.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aft'd in part &
rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding Commission's action in its entirety); Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970), on reconsideration, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971) (barring creation of radio-VHF television combinations, but not
requiring divestiture of existing combinations); see also Amendment of § 73.3555, 4 F.C.C. Red.
1741 (1989) (relaxing prohibition against common ownership of radio and TV combinations).
The text of the MPT guideline goes beyond United States law in that it purports to prohibit any
ownership or control by a single entity of broadcast stations in different communities, except for
parent-satellite combinations. See NSK, supra note 7; NHK, supra note 83. For analogous U.S.
law, see Multiple Ownership Proceeding, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), on reconsideration, 100 F.C.C.2d
74 (1985).
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Media groups have been able, through a variety of legal fictions, 292 to

operate radio, TV and newspaper outlets in a single community while
complying with the formal terms of the MPT guideline. MPT has made
no objection.29 3
A further possible consequence of ipponka allocation is blandness
and mainstream orientation in programming. Japanese broadcasters ap-

parently have engaged in remarkably little of what a regulator might consider objectionable on fairness doctrine grounds. 294 This is so
notwithstanding the fact that MPT's ability to enforce content restrictions295 either through administrative guidance or through formal procedures is limited, because the agency has relatively few sanctions to
impose on broadcasters: the threat of relicensing denial is not credible,2 96
292. See, e.g., supra note 212 (exchanges of personnel and interlocking stock ownership structures). In the United States, such fictions are addressed by the FCC's cross-interest and attribution
rules. See Re-examination of the Commission's Cross Interest Policy, 4 F.C.C. Red. 2208 (1988);
Corporate Ownership Reporting and Disclosure by Broadcast Licensees, 97 F.C.C.2d 997 (1984),
modified, 102 F.C.C.2d 1001 (1985).
293. Recent trends in Japanese broadcast thinking have favored relaxing concentration requirements. The influential 1987 report of the Commission on the Role of Broadcasting in the New
Media Age thus recommended rethinking existing concentration rules. The report specifically suggested allowing a Tokyo key station, or another local station, to invest in or to operate new licensees
as a way of ensuring the financial stability of new stations in localities that otherwise might be
deemed unable to support them. See Hattori, supranote 194, at 59-62; Hamada, Towarda Theory of
the "Open BroadcastingSystem", 25 STUD. BROADCASTING 89, 99-100, 104-05 (1989).
294. See, e.g., F. HAIMAN, supra note 125, at 4 (noting "blandness" of Japanese television in its
treatment of public affairs). But see infra text accompanying note 301.
295. The relevant provision of the Broadcast Law, numbered as it was prior to that statute's
1988 revision, is Article 44, applicable to private broadcasters via Article 51. Article 44 required
that broadcasters:
(1) Shall not disturb public security and good manners and morals;
(2) Shall be politically impartial;
(3) Shall broadcast news without distorting facts;
(4) As regards controversial issues, shall clarify the point of issue from all the angles
possible.
Article 44 further required that broadcasters provide "cultural programs or educational programs as
well as news programs and entertainment programs, maintaining harmony among broadcast programs." See Broadcast Law, Art. 44 (Law No. 132 of May 2, 1950), as amended (translation by

MP').
The 1988 revision reorganized and renumbered the statute, and exempted commercial radio
broadcasting from the "harmony" requirement, but made no other pertinent substantive change.
See Omori, supra note 194, at 28-29; Hasebe, The Characteristicsand Ideas of Japan'sBroadcasting
System, 25 STUD. BROADCASTING 117, 117-18 (1989); Hamada, supra note 293, at 99-100.
296. Given MPT's commitment to keeping each licensee in business and its refusal to allow
license transfer, nonrenewal would constitute an unprecedented and almost unthinkable step. MPT
has never instituted formal proceedings to enforce the Broadcast Law's content provisions; there is
some question as to whether the provisions are legally enforceable at all. See Shiono 1978, supra
note 7, at 11-12. But see Tadokoro, supranote 194, at 70 (broadcasters decide in favor of progovernment programming because "governmental 'impartiality' checks," and the need for license renewal,
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and the threat of licensing competitors is squandered once acted upon. 297
The answer may lie once again in the ipponka process: Ipponka helps
ensure that broadcast licensees (1) are drawn from the conventional
power structure, and thus are unlikely to have unusual views; and (2) are
joint ventures comprising a large number of individuals and organizations, so that even if one shareholder should have unusual views, those
views are unlikely to be reflected in station programming. 298 As a result,
there may be little occasion for content regulation after licensing.
The licensing of UHF television stations in the late 1960's provides
an exception to prove this rule. By 1967, two television networks, centered around Tokyo stations Nippon Television (NTV) and Tokyo
Broadcasting Service (TBS), had become firmly established,2 99 and commake broadcasters "uneasy"). Regulators did, in one case reported to me, strongly caution a television network in connection with staged footage in a report on delinquent female high school
students.
297. MPT, however, arguably has used the licensing of competitors as a weapon against uncooperative broadcasters at least once. See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
298. A single individual owns a majority of the shares of the one broadcaster whose programming was cited to me as evincing strong political (in this case, right-wing) views; he bought out the
other participants after the station started operation. MPT, I was told, has taken measures to prevent recurrence of that scenario, by requiring consent of the board of directors to any stock transfer
by a shareholder.
299. MPT's early thinking regarding networks had been that each station should program independently. A 1959 amendment to the Broadcast Law prohibited private broadcasters from entering
into "any arrangement relating to the supply of broadcast programs which includes any terms on
which broadcast programs are supplied by a particular person only." Broadcast Law, Art. 52-3
(Law No. 132 of May 2, 1950), as amended (translation by MPT); see NHK, supra note 83, at 24344. Because the law only banned 100% network control of affiliate programming, however, it had
little force.
The economic forces encouraging networking, by contrast, were overwhelming. The "key stations" in Tokyo and Osaka attracted crucial advertising from national sponsors by promising the
sponsors national coverage, signing up affiliates across the country, and promising those affiliates a
steady revenue stream. The movie companies refused to supply programming for television, and so
television stations had to produce their own; networking allowed the costs of producing a program
to be spread over many stations instead of just one. Local stations, similarly, were not equipped to
cover the news nationwide absent some sort of cooperative arrangement. See NHK, supra note 83,
at 259.
Because creative talent was concentrated in Tokyo and Osaka, program production came to be
centered there. Most news, similarly, originated in Tokyo, which made the Tokyo station first
among equals in any cooperative news arrangement. This fact was made plain when stations across
the nation were hurriedly opened in time to cover the 1959 wedding of then-Crown Prince Akihito
and Princess Michiko. Local stations wanting the footage had to sign news agreements with either
NTV or TBS, the only two stations designated to cover the event. See NHK, supra note 194, at 343;
NHK, supranote 83, at 196, 256-60; Yamamoto, supranote 196, at 105-06; M. ITO, supranote 83, at
91. Four months after the wedding, sixteen commercial stations formed Japan News Network
(JNN) as a result of their cooperative arrangement in wedding coverage. Shortly thereafter, other
groupings were formed. NHK, supra note 83, at 259-60.
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petition between the two was fierce. 3" At the same time, the Vietnam
War - a highly divisive issue in the Japan of the time - was at its
height. The government strongly supported United States involvement
in the war; the two major networks were running news coverage critical
of it. In May 1965, NTV broadcast part I of a three-part documentary
called "Actions of a Vietnamese Marine Battalion," featuring such footage as a South Vietnamese soldier beheading a suspected Viet Cong.
Government supporters - and a cabinet minister - were outraged;
parts II and III were never shown. In October 1967, TBS broadcast the
sympathetic report of a prominent Japanese newscaster from North Vietnam. A "mixture of government pressure and [broadcaster] self-control"
forced the newscaster's removal. 0 1
MPT ended the NTV-TBS duopoly in 1967 though its decision to
license UHF television. The new frequency allocation established, virtually overnight, the Fuji Television network, associated with the Sankei
newspaper, and boasting especially close links to the LDP. Fuji consisted of only six member stations before 1968. It built its network on the
new UHF stations; of the thirty-three stations established 1968-1970, by
my count, eleven of them are today Fuji sole affiliates and six more are
joint affiliates. 3°2 Fuji went from a minor to a major network overnight.
The Nippon Educational Television (NET) network, associated with the
Asahi newspaper, and later reorganized as Asahi TV, also made substantial gains, roughly doubling in size. TBS and NTV, by contrast, picked
up few new affiliates.3 °3
The fact that MPT struck a strong regulatory blow against NTV
and TBS during a period of intense government displeasure over those
networks' news coverage suggests that either the initial decision to license UHF, or the process of licensee coordination, or both, were influ300.

On the island of Kyushu, in western Japan, for example, TBS managed to sign up six out of

seven stations; NTV corralled four out of four on the neighboring island of Shikoku. Yamamoto,
supra note 196, at 97-98.

301. Tadokoro, supra note 194, at 68-69; see also NHK, supra note 83, at 315-17, 420-21.
302. In prefectures with fewer than four television stations, broadcasters are in a position to
choose their programs from among those of all four major networks, and need not be too closely tied
to any one. Commonly, broadcasters nonetheless form an affiliation with a single network, promising (among other things) to carry national news exclusively from that network; these are referred to
as "sole affiliates." A local station may form a looser affiliation with more than one network; these
are referred to as 'joint affiliates."
303. TBS, which today boasts twenty affiliates among stations established before 1968, was
largely uninterested in the new stations, considering UHF an inferior medium. It picked up four
UHF affiliates, in prefectures where the earlier VHF station had been affiliated with NTV. NTV, in
a similar position, also gained four new affiliates.
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enced by the political realities of the day. The analysis rests on a
coincidence of timing, and is hardly conclusive. As far as the decision to
allocate UHF frequencies to television origination is concerned, it may be
that the decision came when it did for unrelated reasons." 4 To my mind,
however, the coincidence is powerful. The least that can be said, I believe, is that MPT was aware in licensing UHF that the greatest opportu-

nities for new affiliates would fall to conservative Fuji/Sankei and to
NET, the stations that had not yet formed major networks. Further,
MPT was aware that it was imposing upon all of the networks the
knowledge that the content of their reporting might affect the license
allocation process.30 5
This story indicates that Japanese broadcasters have hardly been
uniformly pro-government. While the factors discussed above make Japanese broadcast stations more supportive of the status quo than they
would otherwise be, broadcasters have, in times of crisis, staked out

strong positions in the political opposition. The narrative further suggests that government officials have found weapons to retaliate against
the broadcast press when it has strayed from appropriate behavior; this
provides yet another factor reinforcing the natural tendencies of the ipponka-based system to mainstream reporting and views.

A final consequence of ipponka allocation worth considering is its
contribution to the interplay of political considerations in the licensing
process.3" 6 The 1957-59 VHF licensing under Tanaka 3 7 and the 1967-70
304. One MPT officer told me that UHF became technically feasible in Japan during the late
1960s and was licensed then for that reason. See also NHK, supra note 194, at 260 (MPT in early
1960's considered UHF licensing "a matter of urgent need for solving the shortage of broadcasting
frequencies"). A 1964 advisory commission report, on the other hand, advised MPT to refrain from
UHF licensing except for translator stations and in prefectures served by only one commercial station, until much more extensive technical development had taken place. Id.
A prominent broadcaster and veteran of the UHF licensing process told me that the key pressure
for change came neither from spectrum scarcity nor from Fuji's political connections, but rather
from the fact that Prime Minister Sato's brother-in-law was an executive vice-president of NET.
305. Whether MPT, through the ipponka process, encouraged new stations to include links to
Fuji, is a separate question. One broadcaster told me that network affiliation was generally not
considered in the ipponka process in 1968-1969; that issue, he said, was typically discussed only after
the station was formed. The shareholder list of that same broadcaster's station, however, contains a
prominent stake held by Fuji/Sankei, and no comparable stake held by any other media group. If
Fuji/Sankei gained that stake during the initial ipponka process, then any subsequent decision on
affiliation would likely been largely academic.
306. Japanese regulators have sometimes been sensitive to, and critical of, the role politics plays
in licensing. In 1965, three years after Tanaka left the Ministry, MPT submitted to the Diet a
legislative proposal designed in part to limit political influence in licensing by moving Japanese allocation policy closer to the formal rationality model. The bill proposed to limit the Minister's discretion regarding frequency allocation and license awards, and to transfer authority over frequency
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UHF licensing 30 8 each demonstrate that interplay. Japan, of course, is
not alone in having a broadcast licensing system marked by political considerations in the licensing and policymaking process. The same can easily be said of the United States, notwithstanding the demands of formal
rationality. 0 9 Individual members of Congress have extensive influence
over bureaucratic decisionmaking. 3 10 Politicians meet with regulators

privately to mark up agency regulations; they shape regulation through
meetings between political staff (in particular, congressional committee
staff) and agency personnel.3 11 Indeed, the political process has intruded
into licensing in rather more blatant ways: Professor Schwartz has observed that throughout the Eisenhower years, there was an almost per-

fect correlation between the FCC's treatment of license applications by
newspapers, and the applicants' editorial support of Eisenhower for the
3 12

Presidency.

The two systems, however, are different in important ways. Japanese regulation, centered on administrative guidance and the bargaining
allocation plans, broadcast license renewals, and other broadcasting-related matters to the quasiadjudicatory Radio Regulatory Council, which was to decide only after holding public hearings
according to statutory guidelines. See supra note 243. It also proposed statutory codification of the
multiple ownership rules described supra note 291 and accompanying text; instructions to broadcasters to present programming "contributory to the elevation of the younger generation"; and a restructuring of NHK funding. Omori, supranote 194, at 18; NHK, supra note 194, at 260-61. According
to a public official familiar with the proposed bill, then-Minister Kori Yuichi supported the proposal

out of a desire to increase his own credibility and that of the Ministry as a nonpolitical institution.
It was rare in 1960's Japan for important bills submitted by a Ministry to fail; this one did. See
Seki, supra note 100, at 168-69; T. PEMPEL, supra note 13, at 17. An MPT official involved in the
controversy speculated to me that the Cabinet declined to support the bill because its members were
not eager to see frequency and license issues removed from the political sphere. Other aspects of the
bill, however, in particular its proposal regarding NHK funding, likely also contributed to its
demise.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 224-33.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 299-305.
309. See generally L. PowE, supra note 4; Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655 (1959).
310. See, eg., E. KRAsNOW, supra note 9, at 88 (quoting statement that Senate Commerce
Committee chairman Warren Magnuson "doesn't have to ask for anything. The Commission does
what it thinks he wants it to do."); id. at 87-89.
311. Id. at 117.
312. See Schwartz, supranote 309. Another example of political influence was supplied in 1977
by Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, ranking Republican on the Senate communications subcommittee, supporting a controversial proposal for the FCC to "drop in" additional VHF TV authorizations at less than the normal geographic spacing. The Commission approved four drop-ins,
including one for Knoxville, Tennessee. Broadcasting magazine speculated that "the rule-making
was forced upon the FCC by the insistence of [Sen. Baker] that a V be dropped into Knoxville, Tenn.
The assumption is that the commission had to include some other markets to reduce the visibility of
the Knoxville accommodation." Quoted in E. KRASNOW, supra note 9, at 117-18.
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model, provides few checks against the exercise of political influence in
the regulatory process to the extent of the political actors' bargaining
power. Indeed, the crux of the system is that all parties with a voice in
the process be given an opportunity to exercise their bargaining power.
Political considerations can be suppressed only to the extent that politicians lack bargaining power, or bureaucrats consider direct negotiation
with politicians illegitimate.
Because procedures for making allocation policy and licensing decisions are informal and bargaining-oriented, there is extensive opportunity
for negotiation with political actors in the regulatory process. No external institution such as judicial review limits that negotiation. I argue in
Part IV that interbureaucratic competition extensively shapes regulatory
policy in Japan today, and plays a role comparable in some ways to the
role played in the United States by judicial review. That competition,
though, only increases the role of political actors in the regulatory
process.
The United States system also offers extensive opportunities for the
exercise of political bargaining power in the regulatory process. With
Congressional committees controlling the FCC's budget and statutory
authority, things could hardly be otherwise.3 13 Nor is political influence
on agency policymaking even controversial; the D.C. Circuit has dedared it "entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously to
represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agencies
engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking."3'1 4 The ideology of procedural fairness and rationality, however, has to some degree helped to
delegitimize political influence at least in resolving specific licensing
questions. The Eisenhower years described by Professor Schwartz were
followed by a period in which a stung Commission attempted to emphasize formal procedures and rules better to achieve fairness in license allocation. Whether those rules have in fact contributed to good
decisionmaking is another question.
313. See generally E. KRASNOW, supra note 9, at 87-132.
The fact that the FCC is an independent agency, while MPT is an executive department, suggests
that political considerations might play a less important role at the FCC. The head of the FCC is
not simultaneously a Cabinet member charged with carrying out the government's general program.
The primacy of Congress in the budget process, though, cuts in the other direction. Congress in the
United States plays a budgetary role that in Japan is played by other elements of the bureaucracy, in
particular the Ministry of Finance. Some of the political-bureaucratic interplay found in this country, therefore, is channeled into intra-bureaucratic interplay in Japan.
314. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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7. Conclusions. In Japan, the informal, bargaining-oriented system, together with the force of the post office model, allowed - perhaps
even mandated - an ipponka-basedlicense award process. That process
supports the positions of both the Ministry and the LDP within the political status quo. It limits the number of licensees, both because ipponka is
inherently self-limiting - as the important local players are all drawn
into broad-based license coalitions, one quickly runs out of suitable coalition members - and because licensee protection forms an important part
of the administrative guidance interplay. At the same time, however, the
informal nature of the license award process makes it highly vulnerable
to political pressure, including pressures to award additional licenses on
a politically motivated basis. Judicial review is unavailable to check any
of these on a fairness-oriented or doctrinal basis.
The effect of ipponka in Japan has been to place media power
squarely within the establishment consensus of the socially and politically acceptable, and to diffuse it through shared authority within that
class, perpetuating communications power through negotiation among
power-structure groups. Granting licenses only to "consensus," and thus
mainstream, licensees has to some degree obviated the need for content
control of their later broadcasts. Compared to the United States allocation system, ipponka is less wasteful. It is also even more cozy, safe, and
supportive of the status quo.
IV. NEw TECHNOLOGIES
Selecting among applicants wishing to speak via established media is
only part of the broadcast regulator's job. The government also superintends the attempts of upstart media to challenge the status quo, and to
force their own entry into the broadcast marketplace. Regulators devising policy affecting the competitive viability of new technology affect the
distribution of power among media outlets, and help determine which
media formats will succeed and which will fail. 31 5
In particular, in both the United States and Japan, the rise of cable
television as an alternative to over-the-air TV presented government officials with a series of important choices whether to foster the new medium
or to protect the old. In both the United States and Japan, officials responded to those choices in ways that shed light on their respective regulatory systems. I will discuss the American reaction briefly, and then
turn to how Japan answered the same questions.
315. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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Cable Television in the United States31 6

1. History of FCC Cable Regulation. The FCC's role in regulating
new forms of mass communications technology over the past half-century has been widely criticized. Its treatments of FM radio, UHF television, cable television, and subscription television have all been attacked
as too concerned with protecting old technology, rather than giving free
rein to new. 3 17 The Commission has been said to see new technologies

"not as a promise but as a problem": it is said to see new technologies as
a threat because they might become successful and imperil established
ones.

3 18

Why should this be? According to some commentators, the FCC is

unsympathetic to new technologies because it identifies too closely with
the needs of the established broadcasters it regulates, defining the public
interest so as to correspond to the profitability goals of existing market
participants. 1 9 According to another commentator, the FCC seeks to
preserve the status quo because any other course, in a complex and un-

certain world, would impose upon it decisional costs it is unwilling to
bear.32 According to others, the Commission is unsympathetic because
of its perception of the risks of change: the Commission has little to gain
in championing a new technology if it succeeds, and much to lose if it
316. As with broadcast regulation, my survey here is necessarily brief. The U.S. response to
cable has been described at length elsewhere; the literature is "vast, and much of it polemic."
Robinson, supra note 35, at 245 n.177. I do not pretend to improve on others' presentations; as
before, I hope only to give the reader sufficient background for an intelligent understanding of the
Japanese experience. For further discussion of cable regulation in the United States, see, e.g., V.
Mosco, supra note 9, at 85-104; R. BERNER, CONStRAINTS ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS: A
CASE STUDY OF REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1976); D. LEDUC, CABLE TELEVISION AND
THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973); Price, supra note 67; see also I. POOL, supranote 4,
at 151-88; Litman, supra note 72, at 326-32, 342-46.
317. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 35, at 191-92 (cable); V. Mosco, supranote 9, at 50-69 (FM
radio), 70-84 (UHF television), 85-104 (cable television), 105-18 (subscription television).
318. See Robinson, supra note 35, at 246 (cable).
319. This criticism has been levelled since the very beginning of American broadcast regulation.
See, eg., Herring, supra note 140, at 173; see also R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: STUDIES IN
THE REGULATION OF ECONOMIC Acrnvrry 21, 99-101 (1971) (regulatory agencies generally).
Some commentators, on the other hand, view the phenomenon as a triumph of the American administrative law system. For them, the FCC's initial suppression of cable TV illustrates how administrative law keeps an agency in compliance with the current balance of political power. MeCubbins,
Noll & Weingast, supra note 60, at 269.
320. See V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 37-44. According to Mosco, the Commission is often faced
with complex decisions, resting on a large number of variables, about which its information is limited. It simplifies its task by relying on old assumptions, structures of thought, and information
channels; it thus imposes on its choices a "unifying simplicity rooted in preserving the status quo."
Id. at 5.
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fails.32 ' According to yet another commentator, the FCC favors established media because its staff members seek to preserve power bases
322
rooted in their expertise concerning existing technology.
The history of FCC regulation of cable television bears out a somewhat more complex version of the thesis that the Commission sees innovation as a threat to be managed in the interests of protecting the
speakers it has already licensed. The Commission's initial actions towards cable seemed designed to retard cable's development. The regulatory goal, though, was not to suppress cable. It was to encourage its
development in a market niche separate from that served by over-the-air
television, so that cable could provide new services while not posing any
danger to broadcast television. That concept ultimately proved unsustainable. When confronted with the strictures of formal rationality, the
Commission could not justify its goal of keeping cable out of the larger
broadcast marketplace. Cable systems were able to appeal successfully to
the courts for relief from FCC-imposed burdens.
The Commission's first regulatory action with respect to the infant
cable television industry was to deny cable systems permission to carry
broadcast signals that might adversely affect local television.3 23 The
Commission expressed concern that "CATV service should be supplementary to and not cripple the local TV broadcast service or impede the
growth of TV broadcasting; '324 it announced a rule barring cable systems in the 100 largest television markets from carrying any non-local
broadcast signal, unless the Commission had found after hearing that
such carriage "would be consistent with the public interest," "particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast
service in the area., 325 The affected markets contained 90% of the na321. See E. KRAsNow, supranote 9, at 38. Sweeping change may pose unforeseen risks, it may
force the abandonment of time-tested assumptions and evaluative standards.
322. D. LEDuc, supra note 316, at 27-28.
323. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The Commission in 1959 had declined to assert regulatory
authority over cable access to microwave facilities. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403
(1959) (report and order). After the CarterMountain decision, however, the Commission quickly
found that "the likelihood or probability of [cable's] adverse impact upon potential and existing
service has become too substantial to be dismissed." It promulgated rules requiring cable systems to
transmit the signals of all local broadcast stations and forbidding them to duplicate local programming for a period of 15 days before or after the initial program transmission. Rules re MicrowaveServed CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-14 (1965) (first report and order).
324. FCC ANNUAL REPORT 80 (1965).
325. CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 (1966) (second report and order); see also United States v.

Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1968). The Commission did allow the continued
carriage of certain distant signals under a grandfather provision. 2 F.C.C.2d at 784-85.
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695

tion's television households; 326 the effect of the rule was to freeze cable's
growth in any but the smallest markets.32 7
There was little evidence that cable posed a threat to over-the-air
television.3 28 Nor did the Commission feel that such evidence was necessary; it acknowledged that it did not know, and could not find out,
whether cable would in fact do damage to broadcast TV. In the absence
of proof that "the impact of CATV competition upon the broadcasting
service would be negligible," however, it found restrictions on cable appropriate as "a potential equalization of the conditions under which
329
CATV and the broadcasting service compete.
It may be that the Commission was moved by the pleas of broadcasters that cable systems received a free ride because they - in contrast
to broadcasters - paid nothing for their programming. Broadcasters

and copyright owners at this time argued to Congress that cable retransmission of broadcast signals was copyright infringement. 33 0 The
Supreme Court, however, took a different view. In Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television,3 31 the Court held that the copyright law posed
no bar to cable retransmission of local broadcast programming. 332 The
Commission responded with a new interim rule barring systems operating within 35 miles of a top-100 market from carrying distant signals

without the permission of the originating station.333 The rule, which re326. V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 95. They ranged from New York [# 1], Los Angeles [#2], and
Chicago [#3], to Fargo (North Dakota) [#98], Monroe (Louisiana) [#99], and Columbia (South
Carolina) [# 100]. 47 C.F.R. § 76.51 (1990).
327. The hearing process was "largely unworkable." Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship
Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 650 (1979) (report) [hereinafter Economic Inquiry Report]. Over the next two years, the Commission completed only one
hearing, and then ruled against the applicant cable system. V. Mosco, supra note 9, at 96. The
Commission did grant over a hundred waivers of the hearing requirements in small markets. Id. at
96 n.7; Economic Inquiry Report, supra, at 650 n.48.
328. See Robinson, supra note 35, at 246-47.
329. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, supra note 323, at 700.
330. See Litman, supra note 72, at 327-28. Indeed, two months after the FCC promulgated its
1966 restriction on signal carriage, a New York court held that cable systems' retransmission of local
television signals was illegal absent permission from the copyright holders. United Artists Television,
Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
331. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
332. The Court held that cable retransmissions did not "perform" the copyrighted works within
the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1705 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976)). See 392 U.S. at 395-401. A week earlier, it had upheld the Commission's authority to restrict distant-signal importation. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
333. CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968) (notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of inquiry).
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lieved the Commission of the burden of conducting hearings in individual cases, was "a kind of jerry-built substitute" for the decision the
Supreme Court declined to hand down in Fortnightly.3 34 The retransmission consent requirement, as a practical matter, continued the cable
335
freeze.
All this, however, is not to say that the FCC saw its role as simply
one of suppressing cable. Industry members, academics, and analysts
predicted great possibilities for cable in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

Cable, it was thought by many, could revolutionize urban life: it could
regenerate local community, revitalize participatory democracy, and re-

vamp the educational system.336 And the Commissioners to a large extent shared those views. 337 They were eager to encourage - even force
-

cable into its projected role; but they were committed to the premise

that cable would flourish only in this niche, and that it would not emerge
as a competitor to broadcast TV.

In 1969, thus, the Commission adopted a rule requiring all cable
systems with more than 3500 subscribers to produce their own original
programming. 338 The new rules, the Commission explained, "recognize[d] the great potential of the cable industry to further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field of television
broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of
services.

339

The Commission, however, soon began to have second thoughts,
and never put its origination requirement into effect. 34° The National
334. BROADCASTING, Dec. 23, 1968, at 18.
335. Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 327, at 651; see infra note 401.
336. See Price, supra note 67, at 545-53.
337. It is important to remember that the onerous requirements placed on cable in the Commission's 1972 rules, see infra text accompanying note 346, including those relating to channel capacity,
two-way capability, access, and equipment, were imposed precisely because the Commissioners believed that cable could flourish and fulfill its promise while complying with those rules. See Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 287 (1972) (Burch, Chairman, concurring) (1972
rules "turn a corner in communications technology that holds the promise at least of a whole new
era of service to the American people"); Price, supra note 67, at 558 (FCC "savored the grand
potential of the solutions and did not wish to be delayed despite a lack of information").
338. CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201,223 (1969) (first report and order), rev'd sub nom. Midwest Video
Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
339. CATV, supra note 338, at 202.
340. The Commission first stayed the rule pending judicial review, 36 Fed. Reg. 10876 (1971).
It continued the stay after its authority to promulgate the rule was confirmed in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), and rescinded the rule in 1974 without ever having lifted
the stay. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974).
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Association of Broadcasters had opposed mandatory cable origination,
arguing that it positioned cable as a direct competitor, rather than in its
proper place as "a supplement to broadcast television service.... CATV,
still founded upon the carriage of broadcast signals, but now encouraged
to originate programs independently, will be a greater threat to the public's reception of 'free' programs .... "341
The Commission agreed. It consequently imposed stiff new restrictions on cable called "anti-siphoning" rules, which sharply limited cable
systems' ability to provide feature films, sports events, or series programming on pay channels. 342 That programming, the Commission reasoned,
was already adequately furnished by broadcast TV; it would disserve
cable's special role to allow cable programmers to compete in that arena.
In promulgating the rule, however, and prohibiting some categories of
cablecast programming, the Commission cut sharply against its own vision, just a few months old, of cable as originating its own programming.
Cable would have to find a niche somewhere else - perhaps in local
access, but in any event not in pay services offering programming to
which over-the-air TV had a prior claim.
In 1972, the Commission further developed its vision of the special
role that cable could play. As part of ongoing negotiations over the
terms of new copyright legislation among broadcasters, cable operators,
and program producers, the Commission managed to enforce a compromise relaxing existing restrictions on cable program carriage, while contemplating copyright payments by cable systems.3 43 The compromise in
significant respect favored the more politically potent broadcasters,
and embodied the Commission's vision of cable's special role: "[W]e are
affording cable the minimum number of distant signals necessary to promote its entry into some of the major television markets but ... ultimately, its success will depend on the provision of innovative
nonbroadcast services. ' 4
Under the new rules, cable systems continued to be required to
carry all local broadcast signals. They were allowed to carry a somewhat
greater number of distant broadcast signals. Their ability to carry new
341. CATV, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827-28 (1970) (memorandum opinion and order).
342. The Commission had already put such restrictions in place for subscription television,
which transmits scrambled signals over the air. Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 508-09,
556-73 (1968) (fourth report and order).
343. The compromise was in large part engineered by Clay Whitehead, director of the White
House Office of Telecommunications Policy. See Litman, supra note 72, at 330.
344. R. BERNER, supra note 316, at 39-50.
345. Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 337, at 167.
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programming, however, was constrained by a complex set of restrictions,
known as "syndicated exclusivity" rules, designed to ensure that cable
systems would not duplicate syndicated programming carried by local
broadcast stations. The Commission also adopted a set of "leapfrogging"
rules, designed to prevent the development of superstations by requiring
that distant signals carried by a cable system come from relatively nearby
markets. The Commission, moreover, continued in effect the antisiphoning rules restricting cable systems' ability to carry sports and feature
films from nonbroadcast sources.
At the same time, the Commission adopted a variety of rules calling
on cable systems to fulfill the Commission's own vision of cable service.
Cable systems in the top 100 markets were required to make channels
available to local persons or groups for public access, and to make available educational and government channels as well. New systems were
required to build in two-way capacity, and to make production facilities
available to the public. In this way cable was to achieve "the fundamental goals of a national communications structure... - the opening of
new outlets for local expression, the promotion of diversity in television
programming, the advancement of educational and instructional televi'346
sion, and increased informational services of local governments.
In 1977, the world changed. Home Box Office, a fledgling cable programming service, complained to the D.C. Circuit that the Commission's
antisiphoning rules could not stand up to hard look review. In Home
Box Office v. FCC,34 7 the court agreed. The Commission's starting point
for analysis, the court explained, had been "how cablecasting can best be
regulated to provide a beneficial supplement to over-the-air broadcasting
without at the same time undermining the continued operation of that
'free' television service." The Commission, however, had never explained why cable television should be only a supplement to over-the-air
broadcasting. "Such an artificial narrowing of the scope of the regulatory problem is itself arbitrary and capricious and is ground for
8
reversal.,

34

The Commission, the court noted, had sought to shield from marketplace intrusions the public's ability to receive current levels of broadcast programming; yet it had emphatically rejected just such
protectionism when it came to competition between broadcast stations.
That inconsistency went unexplained. Moreover, said the court, the
346. Id. at 181-85.
347. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
348. Id. at 36.
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Commission had no factual basis for its key conclusions. It had no adequate basis for concluding that the movement of feature films or ordinary
sports events from broadcast to cable would be regarded by the public as
an especially serious problem. It had no adequate basis for concluding
that such movement would in fact take place. It had no adequate basis
for concluding that cable firms would not resell their rights to feature
film and sports programming in areas not served by cable, nor for concluding that cable firms could not price their pay services relatively
cheaply once the Commission dropped its ban on advertising. The antisiphoning rules thus violated both the first amendment and the general
administrative-law principle of rationality; and in any event, they were
invalid because they appeared to be the product of negotiation and "compromise among the contending forces, rather than by exercise of the
[commissioners'] independent discretion in the public interest."34' 9
Home Box Office was the first blow struck by hard look review to
the Commission's cable regulatory scheme.3 50 The next came a year
later: the Eighth Circuit struck down the FCC's requirement that cable
systems provide mandatory public access as unsupported, beyond the
Commission's statutory authority, and probably unconstitutional as
well.3"' The Supreme Court affirmed on statutory grounds: the Commission's authority to regulate cable was measured by its organic statute,
352
and its access requirement was outside the statutory limits.
By this point, the Commission's entire regulatory scheme began to
unravel. Even before Home Box Office was handed down, the Commission had begun to question its regulatory regime.35 3 After that decision,
however, the process accelerated. In 1980, the Commission eliminated
its syndicated exclusivity rules and all of its restrictions on distant signal
349.

567 F.2d at 53; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.

350. The D.C. Circuit, during the same period, issued decisions attacking protectionism in the
FCC's regulation of long-distance telephone service. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561
F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Execunet 1), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.) (Execunet 11), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978). The
Execunet decisions led to FCC reconsideration whether to allow competition in long-distance telephone service, MTS & WATS Market Structure, 67 F.C.C.2d 757 (1978) (notice of inquiry and
proposed rulemaking), and thence to our current "open access" telephone system. See generally
NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1105-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
351. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
352. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
353. In 1975, for example, the FCC deleted most of its anti-leapfrogging rules. Leapfrogging
Rules - Cable Television, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1975) (report and order). In 1976, it issued a notice of
inquiry questioning the continued need for the syndicated exclusivity rules. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 61 F.C.C.2d 746 (1976) (notice of inquiry).
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importation. 35 4 The system has continued to disintegrate. 315
The history of U.S. cable should not be painted as the triumph of
searching, intelligent and public-spirited judicial review over shortsighted, recalcitrant agency bureaucrats. The regulators played a crucial
role in the changes that took place in cable regulation beginning in the
late 1970s; much of that change can be attributed to the appointment by
President Carter of FCC Chairman Charles Ferris 3 6 and to the rise of a
new deregulatory philosophy within the agency itself. Moreover, courts
are by no means ideal technical decisionmakers. Their decisions may be
free of protectionist sentiment, but they are also generally free of technical expertise. 3 7 Judicial review introduces a random factor into the policy process. That random factor, though, in U.S. cable regulation served
as an important catalyst to break down agency protectionism. The
FCC's cable regulatory process, initially more informally oriented, was
reshaped by the requirements of formal rationality. In that respect its
history parallels the history of license allocation.
2. Conclusions. The FCC's initial approach to cable appears to
have been client-oriented, an approach consistent with the bargaining
model. The Commission sought to preserve the market position of the
over-the-air broadcasters, its long-term clients and the mainstays, until
then, of the electronic mass communications system. Within that constraint, it attempted to react to cable innovatively; the situation disfavored cable firms because they were unable to break into the inner circle
and achieve equal status, in give-and-take with the Commission, with the
more established broadcasters. When cable achieved more political
354. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (report
and order), affid sub nom. Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1143 (1982). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, however, to some degree nullified the FCC's move by

imposing high royalty fees on the importation of broadcast signals not permitted under the FCC's
old, pre-1980, rules. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146 (1982), aff'd, National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copy-

right Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Commission has recently reimposed
syndicated exclusivity rules. Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 F.C.C.
Red. 5299 (1988) (report and order), on reh'g, 4 F.C.C. Red. 2711 (1989), rev. denied sub nom.

United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658, 76.92-76.97,
76.151-76.163 (1990).

355. The D.C. Circuit, for example, struck down the Commission's must-carry rules in Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); see also
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032

(1988).
356. See The Laissez FaireLegacy of CharlieFerris,BROADCASTING, Jan. 19, 1981, at 37.
357. Accord Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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power, the Commission reacted by attempting to resolve some of the differences between the competing groups in a consensual, bargaining format. 35 8 Home Box Office and later decisions provided coercive shocks
leading to the breakup of that system.
The Commission had itself helped bring those shocks about by seeking information from a variety of sources in the process leading up to the
1972 rulemaking. Hard look review meant that the new information
available to the Commission drastically confined "the limits of credibility
within which the political consensus of the industry participants could
form. ' 35 9 The Commission's old bargaining-influenced vision for cable
could not withstand strict rationality review. The collapse of that vision
helped propel the Commission into abandoning its old assumptions and
entering into a new, deregulated, world.
A look at the FCC's recent grappling with High Definition Television (HDTV), however, demonstrates that the bargaining model remains
important in U.S. policymaking for new technology. HDTV was
thought to require more frequency bandwidth than does conventional
television; for HDTV to be implemented in the U.S. as an over-the-air
medium, therefore, the FCC would either have to push many existing
broadcasters off the air, or authorize use of significant additional
bandwidth not currently being used to carry broadcast signals. The
Commission addressed the problem of how much new spectrum to authorize, how to distribute it, and to whom it should be distributed,
through a classic bargaining-model technique: it convened a shingikai3 °
private advisory committee, composed largely of existing broadcasters.3 61
The committee report, unsurprisingly, recommended that new spectrum
for HDTV be given to existing broadcasters (rather than to new entrants); the FCC has agreed. 362 That approach is characteristic of the
bargaining model as practiced in Japan and the United States.
358. That the parties were simultaneously negotiating the terms of new copyright legislation,
substantively inextricable from the issues before the Commission, was another important factor contributing towards the Commission's use of bargaining to determine its cable rules. See supra text
accompanying note 343.
359. Price, supra note 67, at 565.
360. See supra text accompanying note 92.
361. The committee also included "industry leaders representing... equipment manufacturers,
cable systems, and the communications bar." See Advanced Television Systems, 3 F.C.C. Red.
6520, 6522 (1988).
362. See id. at 6537-38. I owe thanks to Ron Ambrose for pointing this out to me.
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Cable Television in Japan
The Japanese response to cable television in some respects paralleled

the U.S. reaction, but with crucial variations. As in the United States,
Japanese regulators were reluctant to allow cable a market position from

which it could compete directly with over-the-air TV. The courts, however, played no significant role in the Japanese cable regulatory story;

rather, with the coming of cable, new players entered the game.
1. The Old Regime. Early cable systems in Japan, as in the United
States, were small and offered no programming of their own. They ex-

isted to retransmit local television signals in areas where it was difficult to
receive those signals over the air.3 63 As in the United States, those cable
systems did not threaten the broadcast status quo.

That situation, however, threatened to change in 1968, when a new
company called Nippon Cablevision Network (NCV) attempted to wire
part of the Shinjuku neighborhood in central Tokyo. Recently con-

structed tall buildings impeded television reception in Tokyo,36 and

NCV therefore proposed to retransmit broadcast signals by cable to

about 1400 Shinjuku residents. NCV's founder, with visionary dreams
and political connections, hoped to extend his service throughout central
Tokyo and beyond, and to conduct his own program production and
36 6
sales.
NCV's potential impact was revolutionary. If a cable system were
established in an affluent urban neighborhood such as Shinjuku, it would
363. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 25-26; Tadokoro, New Towns and an Advanced Cable
System, 14 STUD. BROADCASTING 87, 94 (1978). NHK began bearing part of the costs of these
systems in 1960 in order to help fulfill its statutory obligation to broadcast throughout the country.
See Tadokoro, supra; M. ITO, supranote 83, at 38. That support led to the construction of over 6000
local systems by the end of the decade. Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 25-26. As of 1980, only a small
proportion of systems with over 500 subscribers were owned by for-profit corporations. See Doi,
GovernmentRegulation and Copyright Aspects of Cable Television in Japan,29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
298, 303 (1982). It seems reasonable to assume the same of smaller ones. Many systems charged no
start-up or monthly fee.
364. A very few of the rural systems did offer some local origination, see Kobayashi, supra note
92, at 25-26, including at least two systems in areas with no over-the-air programming at all. These
two systems folded, however, after over-the-air broadcasting reached the areas some years later. See
Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95; H. YAMANAKA, supra note 228, at 233-34 (abstracting Yanai, A
Case Study of Cable Television in a Local Community, 10 BULL. OF THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
OF SEIKA U. 45 (1974) (in Japanese)).
Cable systems were also successful to some degree in importing distant signals into small cities
relatively unserved by broadcast. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 94-95.
365. Government earthquake safety rules limiting building height to about 100 feet had been
relaxed in 1963. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 26.
366. See generallyKobayashi, supra note 92, at 26-27; see also Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95.
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be easy for it to transmit programming, whether self-produced or
purchased, that was derived from somewhere other than over the air.
Moreover, its superior signal quality would make that programming especially attractive. NCV thus had the potential to break both conventional broadcasters' monopoly over TV programming and distribution,
and MPT's monopoly over legal control.
Unfortunately for NCV, a 1951 statute intended to regulate cable
music services, written before the invention of cable television, barred
"wired broadcast operators" from retransmitting radio programming
without the consent of the original broadcasters. Tokyo television broadcasters, including the quasi-public NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation), took the position that the statute barred
any cable TV retransmission of their signals absent their consent, which
they uniformly refused to grant. When NCV began service notwithstanding that refusal, MPT assumed the task of mediating the dispute via
administrative guidance.3 67
The upshot of that guidance was that NCV, NHK, and the Tokyo
commercial broadcasters all joined into a single Joint Operating Committee for the CATV Systems in Shinjuku District. That entity was to limit
itself to cable retransmission of television signals that could already be
received locally over the air; it was to provide no other programming. In
1970, the Committee was reorganized as Tokyo Cablevision, and expressed some renewed interest in local origination. Hamstrung by its
structure as a consensus-bound joint venture of competitors, however, it
took no innovative action.3 68
The Shinjuku incident is widely regarded in Japan today as a case in
which MPT cooperated with an industry-wide effort to suppress cable at
its inception.36 9 MPT bureaucrats were primarily responsive to existing
over-the-air broadcasters; those broadcasters were the pillars of the existing communications structure, and MPT was reluctant to undermine
that structure. Moreover, the politically influential media conglomerates
were heavily involved in conventional media, and had little to gain from
367. Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 26-27. NCV contended that under the statute it was entitled
to provide service for one month without consent, but the one-month period expired without further
developments. Id.
368. Id. at 27-28.
369. But see Tracy, Television and Cable Policy in Japan.An Essay, in CABLE TELEVISION AND
THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTING 196, 206 (R. Negrine ed. 1985) (suggesting that MPT in the
Shinjuku incident "impose[d] controls in the interests of an orderly supervision of the existing ecology of communications").
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overturning the old order.3 70
MPT had neither the imagination nor the boldness to let cable take
its own course; its regulators were not positioned to engage in creative
and powerful new thinking about the mass communications world. The
agency's most important duty since World War II had been the management of various post office services, 37 1 a task that, as discharged by MPT,
had not called for enterprise or innovation. 372 While MPT had supervised over-the-air broadcasting and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
(NTT), the telephone common carrier, those responsibilities had not required any thinking other than business-as-usual.3 73 Indeed, a bold step
to jettison the old communications order would have been unthinkable
so heavily on bargaining and
for MPT, whose decisionmaking depended
374
consensus among its broadcaster clients.
MPT did not protect the interests of existing broadcasters in every
context. At the same time as the Shinjuku incident, MPT was substantially increasing the number of broadcast competitors by licensing UHF
television.3 75 UHF licensing, however, was consistent with the bargaining model. Its proponents included important entities in the existing
broadcast status quo, including the newspapers and major media groups,
as well as a variety of politically powerful actors;376 moreover, the consequences of UHF licensing seemed predictable. Cable television did not
have support from any established actors, and its consequences for program origination and delivery seemed more unpredictably threatening.
So far, MPT's initial reaction to cable seems similar to the FCC's.
One way in which the two reactions differed, however, was in the means
each used to keep cable within appropriate limits. In the U.S., the FCC
relied heavily on formal mechanisms. At one point, it discouraged distant-signal retransmission by promulgating a formal rule banning such
retransmission except after a formal Commission hearing. 377 In Japan,
by contrast, the dominant regulatory mechanisms were informal. The
only written regulation was a provision of an earlier-enacted statute of
370. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 37-38.
371. See supra note 194.
372. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 189.
373. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 190 (NTT).
374. See supra text following note 258.
375. This was, moreover, the period of MPT's initial, quickly halted, move to license commercial FM. See supra note 242.
376. See supra notes 273-74, 302-04 and accompanying text.
377. See supra text accompanying note 325.
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unclear applicability."' 8 Instead of promulgating rules to end the confusion and clarify acceptable action, MPT achieved a repressive consensus
through a mechanism quite similar to ipponka: through negotiation, it
unified the opposing parties in a single joint-venture entity charged with
the provision of cable service. Since the most influential members of that
entity were unsympathetic to cable service, the consortium took no aggressive steps to advance cable.
After the Shinjuku incident, MPT sought to consolidate its administrative-guidance control over cable by utilizing ipponka to create, in each
of Japan's four largest urban areas, a nonprofit "Cable Vision Foundation" with participation by NHK, local TV stations, NTT, electric power
companies, electronics manufacturers, and banks.3 79 These foundations,
in theory, were to establish cable systems in their areas; under the law
governing nonprofit foundations, they were required to obtain permission
from the relevant governmental organ (here, MPT) for each of their activities. 380 This approach was well-designed to block any energetic or
innovative action. The interests of the foundations' various participants
were ill-defined and pointed in different directions. 3"' Each participant
a
was protected from any unilateral action by the others, but none was in
38 2
steps.
dramatic
any
take
to
body
unwieldy
entire
the
move
to
position
MPT, apparently content with the immobility of the cable foundations,
attempted to establish one in each of Japan's prefectures.38 3
MPT also sought to formalize its control by introducing new legislation with the stated goal of "establish[ing] order and mak[ing] both interests of CATV and conventional TV broadcasting harmonize. 383 MPT
proposed that all urban cable systems would have to be licensed by it,
and would be barred from retransmitting TV signals without the permission of the originating broadcasters. 3 5 Distant signal importation would
not be approved without special permission. No cable system, moreover,
could originate its own programming without an additional license.386
378. See Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 26.
379. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 27-28; Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95-96; M. ITO, supra
note 83, at 39. NCV was included in the Tokyo consortium. Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95-96.
380. Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95-96.
381. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 27-28, 38.
382. See id.; Nakasa, supra note 199, at 71-72.
383. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 90-91.
384. Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 29.
385. Id.; M. ITo, supra note 83, at 39.
386. Kobayashi, supranote 92, at 29-30. The bill as originally drafted by MPT had not required
formal Ministerial permission for a cable system to originate its own programming; the Cabinet
Legislative Bureau had apparently indicated to MFT that strict regulation would constitute an un-
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The bill would have given the Ministry direct control over almost all
a
aspects of urban cable, since it required permission both to establish
387
programming.
any
run
to
matter,
practical
a
as
and,
system
cable
As if to illustrate to MPT the disadvantages of seeking formal legal
controls, the bill was stymied in its initial Diet sessions. It ran into
strong opposition from the newspaper industry, which saw it as potentially restraining profitable information services, and from academics and
journalists. 8 8 Opponents argued that the Ministry should not be licensing program origination. Moreover, the newspaper industry insisted, the
Ministry should set up an independent body for cable licensing, should
explicitly exempt hard-copy transmission from government control,
should not describe cable as supplemental to broadcast, and should explicitly provide for interactive services. 389 The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI), representing the interests of its electronics

that MPT should be working to promote cable,
industry clients, urged
390
not to restrain it.

The bill ultimately succeeded in 1972, somewhat changed from its
earlier draft. The law as passed required an MPT license for all cable
systems with 500 or more subscribers, 39 1 and required MPT approval of
the fees to be charged subscribers. Retransmission of broadcast programming was still forbidden absent the consent of the originating broadcaster, 392 but the bill did not place any additional limitations on distant
constitutional abridgment of free speech. The licensing requirement for local origination, however,
was added at the insistence of LDP politicians. Id.
387. The bill did continue to allow a cable system to set up outside an urban area without a
license, so long as it limited itself to retransmitting local programming with the permission of the
local broadcasters; that, of course, was what cable systems had been doing for the past ten years or
so. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
388. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 29-30; see also Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 95-96.
389. Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 96-97.
390. Id. at 97.
391. Under Article 4 of the statute, the Minister must grant a cable permit, after consulting with
the prefecture concerned, if, among other things, the application plan is reasonable and practical,
and "[e]stablishment of the cable television broadcasting facilities is... needful and appropriate in
the light of natural, social and cultural conditions in that area." Cable Television Broadcast Law,
Art. 4 (Law No. 114 of July 1, 1972), as amended (translation by MPT).
392. The law did provide that MPT could designate zones of poor TV reception in which a
cable operator would be required to carry all local signals; in such a case, no retransmission consent
would be necessary. In addition, the law allowed either party to a retransmission consent dispute to
apply to MPT for conciliation. Cable Television Broadcast Law, Art. 13 (Law No. 114 of July 1,
1972), as amended (translation by MPT); see also Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 26.
Japan's copyright law, which had been drastically rewritten two years earlier, also impinged on
retransmission of TV signals without the permission of the originating broadcasters, but its effect
was not wholly clear. The Copyright Law (Law No. 48 of May 6, 1970), as amended (translation by
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signal retransmission as such. The new statute declined to require an
MPT license before a cable operator could originate programming; under
393
the law as passed, the operator merely had to "notify" the Ministry.
With MPT unwilling to upset the accepted telecommunications order by
legitimizing two-way and hard-copy cable transmission, the statute did
not address those issues at all; they were left for future resolution.39 a
Cable technology in the early 1970s was the source of great excitement, heralded as an information industry of the future.3 95 Japan was in
some ways fertile territory for cable. Japan's population was concentrated in a few major urban areas, and thus was relatively easy to reach
via cable. Poor reception was a problem in much of the country, whether
because of tall buildings or high mountains. Many prefectures were
served by fewer than four commercial TV stations. While U.S. cable operators had been limited to importing less-attractive independent stations
into areas already served by all three networks, cable operators in Japan
could offer consumers attractive and otherwise unavailable network
MPI) provides for three categories of rights in broadcast programming. First, the statutory authors
and/or maker of the programming have the right to transmit the work by cable. See Copyright Law
Arts. 15, 16, 23, 26, 29. Second, the performers featured in the programming can assert "neighboring rights" in its cable transmission, see id. Arts. 91-95, in general entitling organizations representing them to secondary use fees or other remuneration when the work is broadcast or otherwise
disseminated. Third, broadcasting organizations themselves can assert "neighboring rights" in the
cable retransmission of their broadcasts (except where such rebroadcast is required by law). Id. Art.
99. See generally S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 776-814
(2d ed. 1990).
In practice, both the first and second categories of rights in cable retransmission of broadcast
programming are governed by blanket contracts negotiated between the Association of CATV Operators and organizations representing the various rights holders. The scope of the third category the broadcasters' neighboring right - is unclear, and has never been tested since it was duplicated
by the retransmission consent requirement under the 1972 Cable Television Broadcast Law. The
relevant copyright law provision, while phrased in terms of an exclusive right to rebroadcast and
diffuse by wire, is part of a category of "neighboring" rights that in general give the rights holder
compensation but not complete control of the work's exploitation. Historically, broadcasters and
cable operators have tended to focus on the 1972 Cable Television Broadcast Law requirement when
it comes to broadcast retransmission rather than on the broadcasters' neighboring rights. Where a
broadcast station does grant retransmission consent to a cable system, the agreement typically recites
a copyright-law license as part of the boilerplate.
393. Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 26. That requirement may not be toothless; Japanese regulators are said to wield extensive power through their ability to accept or reject such "notifications."
See Johnson, supra note 81, at 213-14. But see supra note 81.
The law also imposed content controls on cable origination identical to those the Broadcast Law,
see supranote 107, imposes on over-the-air television. See Cable Television Broadcast Law, Art. 17;
Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 13; Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 98-99.
394. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 99; see also Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 29.
395. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 90-91; Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 24.
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Nonetheless, the practical obstacles to a new role for cable were
great. There was the problem of retransmission consent, drastically limiting cable operators' ability to run broadcast programming.3 97 There
was the problem of negotiating "pole attachment" rights to string or lay
the cables that would reach into individual homes, and of negotiating
construction permits with local authorities. 39 There was the problem of
programming: with broadcast television closed off, and no healthy domestic motion picture industry, 399 what were cable programmers going
to run? There was the problem of distributing programming to local
cable systems without the use of commercial communications satellites,
which did not yet exist in Japan. Finally, there was the basic problem of
demand: Given all of the foregoing, with two channels of NHK public
television plus one to four channels of commercial TV available throughout the country except in a few areas of poor reception, could cable programmers offer anything additional that consumers would want to
4o°
buy?
Many of these problems were intimately tied up with MPT's regulatory role; retransmission consent provides one example. In the United
States, the legal regime created by Congress, the FCC, and the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal allowing free retransmission of local signals and limited retransmission of distant broadcast signals was crucial to cable's development; it allowed cable the opportunity to grow through distantsignal retransmission while developing independent program sources
such as HBO." In Japan, however, MPT had secured passage of the
396. Some of these factors may have encouraged the Tokyu railway group to announce a major
cable TV system project in 1970. The project, however, was never built. See Tadokoro, supra note
363, at 92-93.
397. See infra text accompanying notes 404-06.
398. See Kobayashi, New Media in Japan Today, 21 STUD. BROADCASTING 7, 11-12 (1985);
Shiono, supra note 7, at 43; see also Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 96.
399. The Japanese movie industry was badly hurt by the advent of television, and never recovered: theater attendance dropped from 1.13 billion in 1958 to 373 million in 1965 to 160 million in
1985. See FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, FACTs AND FIGURES OF JAPAN 107-08 (1987); I. POOL, supra
note 240, at 91-93; Tadokoro, supra note 194, at 65 ("Ihe Japanese movie industry today is on the
brink of extinction as a mass medium."); M. ITO, supranote 83, at 10; Yamamoto, supranote 196, at
105-06.
400. See Nakasa, supra note 199, at 71-72; see also Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 9-11. The
problem was exacerbated by the absence of a significant TV syndication market. No such market
had grown up because there were not enough independent TV stations to support it.
401. The FCC briefly experimented with a retransmission consent system for the cable rebroadcast of distant TV signals. That experiment proved unworkable, see Economic InquiryReport, supra
note 327, at 9; it is "generally considered a failure." Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Red. 6562, 6565 (1989); supra text accompanying note 335. Only one cable
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Cable Television Broadcast Law, which required that the originating
broadcaster consent to cable retransmission of any broadcast signals.
That requirement in practice denied Japanese cable systems the opportunity to grow through distant-signal retransmission.' 2 Broadcasters commonly denied consent to distant signal retransmission; some cable
systems rebroadcast distant signals without permission notwithstanding
the law." 3 While the statute empowered MPT to further cable's development though administrative guidance in retransmission consent disputes, the Ministry, at least initially, was uninterested in doing so.
The matter of pole attachment provides another example. In the
United States, the government moved aggressively in the late 1970s
through passage of the Pole Attachment Act' to ensure that cable systems could install the necessary wiring at reasonable rates. While the
Act does not explicitly empower the FCC to require a recalcitrant utility
to enter into a pole attachment agreement," the FCC apparently used
temporary stays pursuant to its authority under the Act to prevent utilities from terminating such agreements." 6 In Japan, by contrast, the
system sought to obtain the required consents, and was largely unsuccessful. Thus, for example,
when the system sought to rebroadcast news programming containing materials supplied by the
NBC News Program Service, it was referred to NBC and received the following answer: "[We have
concluded that because of the nature of the material transmitted, as well as the manner of its transmission, we should not enter into arrangements to authorize other than affiliates to carry this service." Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 151-52 n.22 (1972). The FCC therefore
moved in 1972 to an approach better designed to allow limited distant-signal retransmission. See
supra text accompanying notes 343-46.
402. One might see a retransmission consent requirement as economically beneficial, creating a
market for broadcast rights and allowing broadcasters and program producers to exploit the full
value of their works. See generally Compulsory Copyright License, supra note 401. In Japan as in the
United States, see supranote 401, however, the retransmission consent requirement did not create a
working market. The key stations have consistently denied or vetoed distant-signal retransmission
consents in order to preserve good relations with their affiliates in the affected areas. Only a few
broadcasters, in particular Tokyo TV Channel 12, have attempted to negotiate a fee for their programming.
In any event, the Copyright Law already provided a framework for trading money for retransmission rights. See supra note 392. The effect of the Cable Television Broadcast Law retransmission
requirement, at least until recently, see infra text accompanying notes 463-65, was to stifle distantsignal retransmission altogether.
403. See Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 11-12. But see Shiono 1978, supra note 7, at 35 n. 9.
Broadcasters typically (although not invariably) granted consent to retransmission within the local
service area.
404. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988).
405. See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-52 n.6 (1987) (reserving the question
whether the Act so interpreted would be constitutional).
406. See Florida Power Corp. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 245
(1987).
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Ministry initially did not seek to intervene with utility companies and
other governmental units over the issue.
MPT's initial reaction to cable, in sum, did not fit the image of the
Japanese regulator constantly intervening through administrative guidance in order to promote new industries. MPT, at the outset, engaged
in administrative guidance only to suppress cable; it declined to take
available steps, such as involvement in retransmission consent or pole
attachment disputes, to advance cable. Again, the Japanese regulator's
behavior seems to some degree analogous to the FCC's early behavior.
In the United States, judicial intervention ultimately helped effect a
change in agency behavior, but that judicial intervention was the product
of a doctrine of formal rationality that had no place in Japanese administration. Without formal rationality ideology and stringent judicial review, no judicial check was available to shift MPT out of the usual
bargaining circles.
2. The Revolution. What outside force was available to lead MPT
to a shift in its behavior? In this case, a force presented itself rooted not
in formal rationality but in something more closely resembling politics:
interbureaucraticcompetition, summed up in the phrase tatewari gyosei.4 7 As the 1970s progressed, MPT found itself facing threats to its
authority on a variety of fronts, most importantly from the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). MITI's attack forced MPT to
jettison some of its old clients and approaches. As a result, MPT largely
abandoned its anti-innovation positions. It describes itself today, with
some degree of accuracy, as having an affirmative role in actively fostering all forms of new media. It sees a bright future for cable, and predicts
40% cable penetration by the end of the century." 8
MITI, the new player that helped change the rules of the telecommunications game, is the agency to which authors most often refer when
407. This phrase, which is usually translated "vertical administration," signifies competition
among bureaucratic units that feel loyalty only to those directly above and below them in the chain
of command, and not to agencies on the same "horizontal" level. See Y. PARK, supra note 223, at
114; Johnson, supra note 81, at 182-83, 187; Hanada, The Covergence of Broadcastingand Telecommunications in Japan, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN EUROPE 287-88 (D. Elixmann & K.
Neumann eds. 1990). Sectional competition among different government agencies has often characterized Japanese regulation. See Johnson, supra note 223, at 25-26; see also Aberbach, supra note
276, at 464; infra note 508.
408. MEPT, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN JAPAN: TOWARD A GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, FIsCAL 1987, at 38 (1988).
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they speak of regulation as the source of the Japanese "miracle." 4 9 In
contrast to MPT, which has been accurately described as "conservative,
monopolistic, domestic, bureaucratic, labour-intensive, inefficient and
driven by political as opposed to economic objectives," MITI is generally
regarded as "innovative, aggressive, internationally-focused, efficient,
capital-intensive and market-driven."41 0 MITI has an impressive record
of supervising Japanese industries' drive for international markets.4 11
MITI had long been involved in the promotion of Japan's computer
industry, 4 12 and had longstanding ties with the export-oriented firms
dominating Japan's telecommunications equipment industry.41 3 By the
end of the 1960s, some MITI officials had begun to see the agency's future in the high-tech industries of the coming information society;4 14 the
Ministry sponsored missions to the United States in 1967 and 1968 to
study management information systems and the information industry. 1 '
Telecommunications, however, belonged not to MITI but to MPT,
which historically supervised the telephone and telegraph networks pursuant to its authority under the Public Telecommunications Law.4 16
Under that law, Japan's only domestic telecommunications carrier was
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NT). No entity other than NTT
could offer telephone or data transmission services, using either NTT's
facilities or its own. 7 Moreover, no entity other than NTT could offer
value-added network (VAN) services.4 18 NTT, however, had never been
subjected to the press of competition, and had created an inefficient tele409. See C. JOHNSON, supra note 13. Professor Johnson describes MITI as "the governmental
sponsor and supervisor of high-speed economic growth." Johnson, supra note 81, at 183.
410. Davidson, supra note 18, at 148-49. "[]tis generally accepted that MITI is outstanding in
its aggressive policy-making. In contrast,... [MPT's policy orientation] had been rather conservative until the mid-60s, because its established telecommunication and broadcasting policies (1) had
been valid for a long time, and (2) had hardly clashed with those of other administrations."
Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 36.
411. See C. JoHNsON, supra note 13; for a more skeptical but still favorable appraisal, see D.
OKiMoTo, supra note 82.
412. See Yokoi, Agencies and Directionsof Japanese Policy, 6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y
258, 260-61 (1982).
413. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 149.
414. The term johoka shakai,or "information society," had been coined just a couple of years
before; the phrase was intended to be analogous to kogyoya shakaior "industrial society." See Ito,
supra note 282, at 13-14; supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
415. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 31.
416. See J. HILLS, DEREGULATING TELECOMS 108 (1986); Johnson, supra note 81, at 185-86.
417. See Tomita, Japan'sPolicy on Monopoly and Competition in Telecommunications, 8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 44, 45 (1984).
418. A VAN is formed by the combination of communication, as over the telephone lines, with
computer processing. By means of a VAN, data is communicated from one source to another and in
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communications network. Its system configuration and software were
unsophisticated, its financial and operating performance levels were low,
and it relied too heavily on analog rather than digital switching
equipment. 19
NTT was slow to enter the VAN market. In 1968, however, MPT
authorized NTT to offer a VAN service in which bank financial data
flowed through leased circuits to and from a central computer owned by
NTT.4 20 This was a welcome move to some segments of Japanese industry wishing to utilize VAN services, but it aroused strong reactions
among MITI's clients in the computer industry, who feared NTT domination of, or legal monopoly over, the future VAN market.4 21 Against
this background, MITI released a 1969 "Report on Information Processing and Information Industry Policies," urging that MPT's telecommunications doctrine was inadequate to the tasks of the new age, which
would require free and efficient use of telecommunications networks for
information processing. 2 2 The immediate controversy between MPT
and MITI over VAN services was mediated by the LDP's Policy Affairs
Research Council (PARC), the highest policy-making organ in the party.
It resulted in a 1971 amendment to the Public Telecommunications Law
slightly liberalizing the use of shared circuits, subject to MPT authority
over interconnection with the public network. 2 3 MPT and MITI had
fired the opening shots in a key jurisdictional battle for telecommunications leadership.
One front on which that battle was to be fought was the small city of
I-igashi-Ikoma, near the ancient capital of Nara, in the Osaka suburbs.
MITI in May of 1972 established the Visual Information System Development Association, headed by Toshiba Electric president Toshio Doko,
to develop a Highly Interactive Optical Visual Information System (HIsome manner processed in the transaction. A travel agency computer is part of a VAN, as is a Lexis
or Westlaw terminal.
419. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 149-50.
420. See Yokoi, supra note 412, at 262.
421. Id. at 262-63.
422. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 32; Nakasa, supra note 199, at 68.
423. See J. HILLS, supra note 415, at 109 (rendering PARC as "Policy Deliberation Council");
Nakasa, supranote 199, at 77-78. The PARC chairman and executive committee stand astride some
17 divisions, corresponding to ministries and Diet standing committees, and 32 commissions (as of
1987). PARC sections have no staff and rely on the bureaucracy for expert advice and drafting; their
independence in policy formulation is therefore limited. The PARC process nonetheless provides
important avenues for powerful zoku politicians, see supranote 273, to veto agency initiatives and to
mediate compromises between warring agencies. See G. CURTIS, supra note 216, at 113-14, 116; see
also Y. PARK, supra note 223, at 38, 91, 100-01, 137.
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OVIS) for a housing complex there.424 This demonstration project was,
in essence, an advanced interactive cable television plan. It ultimately
connected a TV studio and ten public buildings by fiberoptic cable with a
20" color TV, a keypad, a video camera, and a microphone in each of
156 participating households.42 5 For MITI, the HI-OVIS project was
4 26
intended to establish its pre-eminence in the telecommunications field.

MPT did not take this lying down. Within months of MITI's announcement of HI-OVIS, MPT announced plans for a demonstration
cable television project of its own. It established a Board of Investigation

on the Coaxial Cable Information System to plan a pilot project for cable
technology at Tama New Town, a development to be built near To-

kyo.427 MITI's interest thus led MPT to promote cable television, a medium it had previously hoped to restrain. 28 MPT's reaction, however,
reflected its status-quo-oriented approach. While MITI's HI-OVIS plan
required new research and technical development, MPT's Tama project
was intended to be an inexpensive and efficient system using off-the-shelf
technology.42 9
MPT took steps to bolster its position in other ways. It established a
Communications Policy division, 43' and began publishing a yearly Communications White Paper.4 31 It thus hoped to establish itself as a poli-

cymaking ministry, or seisaku kancho, rather than a mere "business
424. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 91-92; see also Dearing, Telecommunications Infrastructure Planningin Japan, 14 MEDIA ASIA 53, 56 (1987); Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 34-35. Toshiba
was part of one of Japan's largest manufacturing groups, but had been largely shut out of the telecommunications equipment business because it was not part of the "family" of companies within
which NTT did its purchasing. It thus had a substantial stake in an increased role for MITI in
telecommunications planning. See infra notes 448-49 and accompanying text.
425. See Ikeda, "Hi-Ovis" Seen by Users, 21 STUD. BROADCASTING 95, 95-96 (1985).
426. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 90.
427. Id. at 92.
428. See J. HILLS, supra note 416, at 112.
429. See Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 33-35. An MPT research panel report implicitly criticized MITI as "mixing dream with reality" by fostering "excessive expectations for enhanced types
of CATV [that] tend to neglect their technological difficulties, social needs and economic feasibilities." Id. at 33; see also Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 89-91.
While the Ministry of Finance forced MPT's Living Information System Development Division
and MITI's Visual Information System Development Division nominally to pool their efforts as a
single Living-Visual Information System Development Association, the two groups never engaged in
any joint efforts. See id. at 91-92; Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 34-35.
430. See Nakasa, supra note 199, at 68-70; see also Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 37. MITI had
established an Electronics Policy section about the same time. Johnson, supra note 81, at 197;
Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 37.
431. Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 36-37.
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ministry."4 32 Because the Tama project did not require new technology,
it began operation in 1976, sooner than HI-OVIS; it offered services including TV retransmission, TV origination, text news (screen and hard
copy), emergency information, a still photo library, interactive educational programming, and facsimile transmission.43 3
HI-OVIS took longer to get going. From 1972 to 1974, the project
supervisors conducted development, design and trial manufacture based
on a coaxial cable plan. In 1976, the planners decided to use fiberoptic
cable instead. Construction of the fiberoptic lines began in 1977, and the
project began operation in 1978. 434 Notwithstanding its higher level of
technical sophistication, HI-OVIS offered services similar to those at
435
Tama.
It is not clear, in retrospect, what either the Tama or Higashi-Ikoma
projects accomplished. None of the services offered by the demonstration projects seemed to provide enough consumer benefit to justify their
cost as a commercial proposition.4 36 The projects' benefits, rather, were
to the public image of their sponsoring agencies. MPT was by no means
a convert at this point to the cause of opening up new media; it was
providing little help to ordinary cable systems then in operation, and it
was holding back the development of teletext4 37 so as "not to cause confusion in the private broadcasting industry.""4 3 The Tama project, nonetheless, helped MPT establish its credentials as a policymaking ministry.
MPT continued to respond energetically to MITI's attack, establishing a new Communications Policy Bureau 439 to conduct policy and plan432. See Johnson,supranote 81, at 186; Dearing, supranote 424, at 56; cf.Aberbach, supranote
276, at 463 (comparing "political ministries," such as MPT, with the "highly prestigious 'economic
ministries,"' such as MITI).
433. See Tadokoro, supra note 363, at 102-07.
434. See Kawahata, Hi-OVIS Project, 16 STUD. BROADCASTING 115, 125-26 (1980); Shimizu,
Chronology ofEvents Involving New Media in Japan (1976-1984), 21 STUD. BROADCASTING 121, 123
(1985).
435. See Ikeda, supra note 425, at 96-97; see generally Kawahata, supra note 434.
436. See Dearing, supra note 424, at 56; Kobayashi, supranote 92, at 35; Tadokoro, supra note
363, at 108-09. MITI was said to have spent 30-40 million yen per household on HI-OVIS.
437. The term "teletext" covers transmission of text and graphics on the otherwise unused "vertical blanking interval" of a television signal. Teletext signals can be received on any television set
equipped with an appropriate decoder. See L. GROSS, THE NEW TELEVISION TECHNOLOGIES 16170 (2d ed. 1986).
438. Shiono 1978, supranote 7, at 22-23. The Ministry later came to encourage teletext, but the
business prospects of the industry have not been encouraging. See Teletext Enters Third Stage, NSK
News Bulletin, Dec. 1987, at 3-4; Expansion Plans In New Media Are Kept Realistic By Hikita,
Variety, Dec. 24, 1986, at 58, col. 1 (MPT insists broadcasters participate in teletext).
439. See Johnson, supranote 81, at 195; Yokoi, supranote 412, at 259 ("Bureau of Telecommunications Policy"). Professor Johnson states that the new bureau, established in 1980, was an expan-
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ning"0 for telecommunications, satellites, new media, and the
information society."' Both MPT and MITI soon announced separate
demonstration projects for versions of an Information Network System
(INS) intended to unite telephone, telegraph, data and facsimile services
with new video services, and to use fiberoptic transmission, fully digital
switching, satellites and computer technologies to transmit, store, and
process information for the new information age. 42 MITI announced
sion of the small NTT supervisory unit in the Ministry Secretariat, but it seems more plausible to me
that it was an upgrading of the Communications Policy unit created in 1970, see supra note 430 and
accompanying text.
440. Both MITI and MPT in 1981 received major shingikai reports, see supra text accompanying note 91, intended to articulate and publicize their telecommunications policymaking visions.
MITI, thus, commissioned a report on "Visions of 'Information Society' and Information Industries
in the 1980s," urgently calling for reform of the existing regulatory regime and active governmental
promotion of research and development, see Kobayashi, supra note 92, at 42-43; MPT commissioned a report on "Telecommunications Policy Goals in the 1980s" by its newly-established Round
Table Conference on Telecommunications Policy, and a report on new broadcast technologies by its
newly-established Study Committee on the Diversification of Broadcasting. See id. at 41-42; Goto,
JapaneseProjectfor DirectBroadcastingSatellite Service, 19 STUD. BROADcASTING 9, 25-26 (1983);
Shimizu, supra note 434, at 124.
MPT and MITI continued their shingikaiwar over the next few years. In 1983 MPT released the
report of the Committee for Study and Research on the Future Image of Telecommunication Systems, recommending a more competitive telecommunications structure and construction of INS, see
infra note 442 and accompanying text, using satellites and optical cable. See Shimizu, supra note
434, at 127-29. MITI released a report from the Information Industry Committee of the Industrial
Structure Council on the future development of new media, id., and announced new media policy as
its top policy priority for 1984. See Imai, Japan'sIndustrialPolicyfor High Technology Industry, in
JAPAN's HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDuSTRIES 137, 155, 167 (H. Patrick ed. 1986). Professor Imai's
article summarizes much of the Industrial Structure Council report.
441. In 1981, MPT proposed a new bill to regulate VANs. The bill would have partially opened
up the VAN business to companies other than NTT, addressing concerns of both companies that
wished to buy VAN services and companies that wished to provide them. At the same time, the
agency reserved for itself strict licensing and approval requirements over these new services, and
sharply limited the participation of foreign firms or their subsidiaries. See Johnson, supranote 81, at
211. MITI opposed the proposal, not wishing to cede control over computer-based services to MPT.
MITI gained ammunition from the deregulatory philosophy of the newly-created Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform (Rincho), see infra note 457 and accompanying text. MITI won
that round; the new bill failed. Johnson, supra note 81, at 211.
MPT was not beaten for long; it argued that it had to regulate foreign VANs as a matter of
national security, so as to save the Japanese telecommunications industry from IBM and AT&T. Id.
at 211-12. MITI, in contrast, argued for complete formal liberalization, relying on its traditional
guidance powers over the computer and electronics industries. Id. at 212; see also R. AkhavanMajid, supra note 251, at 56 (MITI sought to reduce formal regulation because it, to an even greater
extent than MPT, derived its power from administrative guidance rather than formal legal provisions). The immediate dispute, like the 1971 dispute over VAN liberalization, was resolved in the
PARC, see supra note 423; a compromise bill provisionally liberalized VANs for medium and small
enterprises. Johnson, supra note 81, at 212; Shimizu, supra note 434, at 125.
442. Thinking about INS was first introduced in Japan at the end of the 1970s by NTT visionaries who saw a potential revolution in information technology before them, and sought to reinvent
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its "New Media Community" and MPT its "Teletopia" plans; each was a
scheme for installing integrated digital telecommunications systems incorporating videotext,' 3 interactive cable, and other services at demonstration sites around the country.'
MPT, however, had the advantage
because it could design its projects to utilize NTT-developed INS and
videotext technology;' 5 MITI's systems were still on the drawing
board."'
In early 1984, MPT announced drafts of three telecommunications
laws revamping existing telecommunications regulation, and in particular allowing telecommunications services to be offered by companies
other than NTT.447 This represented a significant change in the status
the telecommunications network. See J.HILLS, supra note 416, at 110-11; Dearing, supra note 424,
at 54; Davidson, supra note 18, at 159; see also Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 21; see generally Y.
K1TAHARA, INFORMATION NETwoRK SYsTEM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE TwENTY-FIRST

CENTURY (1983). In 1984 NTT started a pilot INS project in the Mitaka and Musashino suburb3 of
Tokyo, offering services including videotext, digital facsimile, digital telephone service, message storage, videophone, teleshopping, teleconferencing, and "sketch-phone." See Kawaguchi & Kimura,
Telecommunications Situation in Japan: 1986-87, at 9-10 (report to IPTC 22nd AGM, June 8-12,
1987, Las Vegas, Nev., copy on file with author); Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 19-20.
INS technology is known outside Japan as Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). There
has been debate among telecommunications planners across the globe whether the benefits of the
technology justify its costs; some have stated that ISDN stands for "Innovations Subscribers Don't
Need."
443. The term "videotext" covers any interactive service in which textual material travels
through cables to the home screen; Sears Prodigy, for example, is a videotext service. See L. GROSS,
supra note 437, at 171-85.
444. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 225-26; Shimizu, supra note 434, at 126, 130; Kobayashi,
supra note 398, at 24.
445. NTT had begun experimental service in 1979 for a new videotext service it called CAPTAIN (Character and Pattern Telephone Access Information Network). The system was to provide
information, teleshopping, telebanking, and similar services through the phone lines to home terminals. CAPTAIN went into commercial operation in 1984 as a joint venture between NTT and a
large number of private companies, see Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 17-18; Shimizu, supra note
434, at 123, 129-30; R. Akhavan-Majid, supra note 252, at 127-28; it has not been an overwhelming
commercial success. See Moritani, Information Out of Formation, J. JAPANESE TRADE & INDUST.
10, 12 (May/June 1987); Kawaguchi & Kimura, supra note 442, at 10-12.
446. See Dearing, supra note 424, at 55-56; Johnson, supra note 81, at 226; R. Akhavan-Majid,
supra note 252, at 130.
MITI's New Media Communities plan was struck a serious blow by the Cabinet's 1986 decision
to award little direct public funding to either the MPT or MITI designs. See Johnson, supranote 81,
at 226-27. MPT, however, pressed along with its Teletopia plan. By 1988, MPT had designated 67
model cities and regions, and planned installation of over 250 media systems, including data communications systems, CAPTAIN, and interactive cable TV. See MPT, supra note 242, at 34-35; MPT,
supra note 408, at 6.
447. The new laws also provided that stock in government-owned NTF should gradually be
sold to the public, see infra text accompanying notes 457-59. I believe, though, that this NTT
"privatization" was much less important than the market opening that took place the same year.
Privatization, by itself, did not affect NTrs management or day-to-day operations. The crucial
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quo. The traditional rules had assigned NTT a monopoly in telecommunications services, benefitting NTT and the "family" of telecommunications suppliers who dealt with it, including NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and
Oki." In leading the move to an open market, MPT abandoned those
clients and moved to benefit and support a new group of companies, including large telecommunications users, computer and electronics firms
outside of the closed NTT supplier group, and would-be VAN providers,
that had not fared as well under traditional MPT regulation. 4 9
MPT, however, was moving from one client group to another,
rather than simply promoting market opening generally. Its new draft
rules were designed in large part to exclude two companies outside of its
circle of consensus: IBM and AT&T. The rules would have prohibited
any firm with more than a certain level of foreign stock ownership4 5

from acting as a "Class I" carrier, that is, from providing telecommunications services using facilities owned by it.4 51 Foreigners similarly
would have been prohibited from acting as special "Class II" carriers. A
Class II carrier was a carrier providing telecommunications services using facilities owned by another; the "special" classification swept in

larger and more sophisticated networks.452 All Class I and special Class
II carriers were to be licensed by the Ministry.
regulatory changes, rather, were those allowing companies other than NTT to own telecommunications facilities and provide telecommunications services, as well as those allowing NTT to expand
into new service areas. Those changes did not depend upon privatization.
448. See Yokoi, supranote 412, at 260; Johnson, supra note 81, at 189; Davidson, supranote 18,
at 152-53. Gregory also lists Iwasaki Electric. See G. GREGORY, JAPANESE ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY: ENTERPRISE AND INNOVAToN 356 (1985).

The franchise was a lucrative one for NTT family members. Itself supported by consumers and
shielded from competition, NTT had allowed its suppliers the highest returns of any major Japanese
industry. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 151.
449. See generally Cowhey, The InternationalTelecommunications Regime: the PoliticalRoots
of Regimes for High Technology, 44 INT'L ORG. 169, 195 (1990). Key electronics companies wellpositioned to benefit from telecommunications market-opening included Mitsubishi and Mitsui
(Toshiba) affiliates, none of whom were part of the NTT family. In 1984, NTT for the first time
placed significant orders with Toshiba, see G. GREGORY, supra note 448, at 356, perhaps in an
attempt to co-opt Toshiba's support. If so, it was too little, too late. Both groups of companies have
moved aggressively since 1984 to enter the telecommunications and satellite markets. See Davidson,
supra note 18, at 152-53; infra notes 496-98 and accompanying text.
450. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 213 (33 1/3%stock ownership); Muramatsu & Krauss, supra
note 13, at 545-46 (50%); J. HILLS, supra note 416, at 146-47 (same).
451. Only Class I carriers would be allowed to provide voice services. Davidson, supra note 18,
at 156-57; J. HILLS, supra note 416, at 146.
452. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 213 (under the MPT draft, special class II providers would
include those exceeding narrow technical specifications to be provided by the Ministry, or offering
any form of international service); Davidson, supra note 18, at 156-57 (those with more than 5000
lines and transmission speeds of more than 1200 bps); J. HILLS, supra note 416, at 146 (those "pro-
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MITI opposed the bill as written, and instead supported legislation
to remove all formal controls on VAN providers. The United States took
the position that MPT's draft amounted to a trade barrier and a GATT
violation; MPT accused MITI of selling out to foreign interests. Supporting MPT in this dispute was the influential Keidanren (Federation of
Economic Organizations), the unified public-policy voice of Japanese big
business.4" 3 Keidanren was usually aligned with MITI, but in this case it
saw its interests as lying with MPT. The dispute was finally decided via
compromise at the top levels of the LDP.4 54 MPT retained the power to
license Class I carriers, but special Class II carriers were to be required
only to register with the agency; both categories were opened, in varying
degrees, to foreign participation.4 5 MPT reserved the authority to approve the tariffs of Class I, although not Class II, carriers under traditional public utility standards, and to approve the interconnection of new
456 The bill, known as the TelecommunicaType I carriers with NTT.
tions Business Bill, was passed by the Diet in December of 1984.
At the same time, the Diet passed the NTT Corporation Law, providing for the sale of two-thirds of NTT's shares to the domestic public
over a five-year period. This step, initially advanced by MITI, was heavily supported by Rincho - the Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform, strongly linked to MIT145 7 - and by Keidanren. MPT
soon came to support privatization as well, realizing that the step, together with market opening, would help the agency to expand its client
base to include not only NTT and its family of telecommunications
equipment suppliers, but also new entrants into the telecommunications
vided on a wide scale serving many companies or unspecified individuals or the international

market").
453. See J. HIRSCHMEIER & T. Yui, supra note 86, at 326-27.
454. MPT also had the solid support of the PARC Communications section and of the Tanaka
faction, traditionally associated with MPT and the postal zoku. The PARC Commerce and Industry
Division, normally a reliable MITI ally, was split. See Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note 13, at 54546; Davidson, supra note 18, at 157.
455. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 213-15; Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note 13, at 545-46;
Davidson, supra note 18, at 156-57; J. HILLS, supra note 416, at 146-47.
456. See generally Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 32-33.
457. The head of Rincho was Toshio Doko. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 216. Doko was also
head of the Visual Information System Development Association that developed the HI-OVIS cable
television project for MITI, see supra text accompanying notes 424-26, as well as head of Toshiba
Electric, a company with much to gain from any downgrading of NTr's official status, see supra
notes 424 & 449. Rincho's official position was that privatization would provide the answer to the
inefficiency of both NTT and the Japan National Railways. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 194.
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field.4 58 MPT thus reorganized itself again in 1984; it retained its Broadcasting Bureau and Communications Policy Bureau (established in
1980), and added a new Telecommunications Bureau, to promote and
supervise the telecommunications industry.4 59 A top MPT official explained at a press conference that MPT had joined the ranks of "truly
'4
elite officialdom."
3. Cable Revisited. MPT's attitude towards cable seemed to
change markedly in the mid-1980s. MPT became more liberal regarding
cable licensing; it came to require less impressive showings than it had
previously regarding the applicant's capitalization, level of preparation,
and ability to realize its submitted plan." 1 MPT provided seed money
investment and special, development-oriented financing for cable systems
at low rates, allowed laid cable to be used as collateral, and supported
research into cable hardware issues, especially those related to satellite
transmission." 2

The agency also became more aggressive in exhorting broadcasters
to grant retransmission consent. It proposed, and saw enacted, a 1986
amendment of Art. 13 of the Cable Television Broadcast Law giving it
the power to permit rebroadcast notwithstanding the originating broadcaster's refusal to grant consent." 3 It issued its first formal adjudication
under new Art. 13 in 1987. The broadcaster, Sun TV (Kobe), had taken
the position that it would be willing to sell its programming at what it
458. Moreover, MPT might be able to keep control over some of the money to be raised from
the sale of NIT shares. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 217-18.
The more controversial question was whether NTT was to be broken up as well as privatized.
MPT opposed that step, and the parties agreed to defer decision. MPT ultimately came to advocate
NTT breakup; opposition from the Ministry of Finance, however, caused the government in 1990 to
defer any action indefinitely. See Breakup of Nippon Telephone is Delayed, N.Y. Times, April 2,
1990, at C4, col. 1; see also Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 39.
459. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 195; Omori, supra note 194, at 19-20; MPT/JICA, supra
note 213, at 9. Translations of the names of MPT units vary in English-language sources; I am here
using those used in MPT/JICA, supra note 213. For a recent MPT organizational chart, see MPT,
MINISTRY op POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2 (August 1988).
460. Johnson, supra note 81, at 197.
461. MPT had from the start required these showings even when an application was unopposed.
The agency was not about to allow an underfinanced or otherwise shaky system to lay cable and
collect fees, only to go bankrupt down the road.
462. Some of this is discussed in MPT, supra note 408, at 38; MPT, supranote 242, at 16-17; J.
Hamada, Deregulation and 'Soft Landing' Toward the New Media Age 3 (July 2, 1987, unpublished
paper on file with author).
463. The legislative history reflects MPT's assurances that it would not overuse its new power,
and that it would give due deference to broadcasters' views.
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deemed a reasonable price;4 61 San-in Cable TV asserted the right to rebroadcast without payment. Sun TV was financially weak, and MPT
might well have decided that it deserved special solicitude. MPT nonetheless ruled for San-in Cable. In a sweeping decision, it held that a
broadcast station could not refuse cable retransmission consent for finan-

cial reasons. 45
The agency fought off an attack from the Ministry of Construction
(MOC) that had threatened to stall the development of new cable systems. MOC, seeking to advance its own fiberoptic cable network to be
laid underground along highway rights-of-way,4 66 instructed local governments to deny construction permits to cable TV systems that sought
to string cable overhead (rather than underground), even if telephone
and electric wires were currently strung overhead. The cost of installing
new underground wiring made the establishment of new cable systems

prohibitively expensive. After extended protest from MPT, however,
MOC backed down."67
While cable penetration in Japan is still below 20%,468 it seems to be
on the rise. Five large "city-type ' " 9 cable systems were in operation as

of October 1987,470 eight more were in operation eight months later, and
an additional ten were authorized but not yet in operation.47

Satellite

464. TV Tokyo Channel 12, see supra note 243, had begun charging a fee for retransmission
around 1985.
465. The decision did not explicitly address Sun TV's Art. 99 rights under the copyright law, see
supra note 392. Industry members I spoke to, however, believed that it would be fruitless for Sun to
assert its Art. 99 rights at this point; the broadcaster would have to submit to guidance eventually.
466. MOC, after the 1984 telecommunications liberalization, had formed Teleway Japan in conjunction with 49 private firms including Toyota and Sumitomo, offering long-distance telephone
service along fiberoptic cable laid along the highway rights-of-way from Tokyo to Osaka. It began
offering service in 1986 for leased lines, and in 1987 for switched telephone service. See Dearing,

supra note 424, at 55-56.
467. See generallyDENTSU, INC., 1985 CABLE TV TREND IN JAPAN (Nov. 1985), at 3-4; MiN-

53 (1984).
468. As of March 1990, cable penetration represented 18.6% of NHK receiving contracts.
Shimizu 1991, supra note 6, at 6.
469. MPT defines a "city-type" or "urban-type" system as one with more than 10,000 subscribers, as least five cablecast channels, and two-way capability.
470. MPT, supra note 242, at 16-17. Eight cable systems in 1980, see Doi, supra note 363, at
303, and fifteen in 1986, could boast more than 10,000 terminals. None of the eight systems, however, had five cablecast channels or two-way capacity.
471. MPT, supra note 408, at 37. The new systems are commonly joint ventures of private
railway companies, media conglomerates, and other large capital ventures. See Kobayashi, supra
note 398, at 8-9. Railway companies including Tokyu, Odakyu, Keio, and Seibu are involved in
cable system construction; even the Japanese National Railway (at the time a government corporation, but later privatized and broken up) has gotten in on the act. See DENTsu, INC., supra note 467,
at 4-5. The private railways traditionally have had close and economically interdependent relationIsTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, WHITE PAPER ON CONSTRUCTION
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distribution of cable programming began in 1989,472 and existing media
conglomerates and advertising agencies have made major moves into the
cable programming business.4 7 One cable system is offering innovative
services: Lake City Cablevision, a large system in a rural area at the foot
of the Japan Alps, offers, in addition to conventional cable television,
station-to-station leased telecommunications circuits.4 74 The system is
also used for telemetering individual water usage and a medical support
system connecting central hospitals with homes for the aged.47
How should one explain MPT's policy shift? One answer might be
that MPT, as a consequence of its experience in the telecom wars, came
to view itself, and therefore to act, as a true "policy agency," putting
aside parochial concerns in favor of a more global outlook, setting aside
compromise and bargaining in favor of a pure policy orientation. MPT
surely realized that its world had irrevocably changed, and that it could
not simply regulate broadcasting as it had in the past. Telecommunications, thanks to plans such as those NTT had for INS, was now intimately tied in with computers and information processing; and mass
media, thanks to cable and videotext services, was now intimately tied in
with telecommunications.
Another part of the picture, however, is that MPT reacted to
MITI's pressure by expanding its client base. MPT fostered a close,
symbiotic regulatory and political relationship not merely with the existing broadcasting community, but with a broad cross-section of the big
business community, in particular the electronics industry. It maintained its traditional regulatory approach of consultation and bargaining
within a circle of influential players, but it expanded that circle to include
ships with the communities bordering their lines, investing in department stores and housing developments; they apparently view cable television as a natural outgrowth and as a common carrier
enterprise economically similar to the railroad business.
472. See Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 34; MPT, supra note 408, at 38; Komatsubara,
supra note 206, at 86-87.
473. Tokyo Broadcasting System is the driving force behind Premier, likely to be a dominant
force in Japan's cable programming. Other participants include Dentsu, Japan's largest advertising
agency, NHK Enterprises, Shochiku and Toho film studios, Viacom, HBO, Columbia Pictures,
Showtime, The Movie Channel, EMI, and Twentieth-Century Fox. See Two JapanesePaycablersin
Urge to Merge, Variety, Dec. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 5; DENTsu, INC., supra note 467, at 2.
Asahi Newspapers and TV Asahi, along with Dentsu, Hakuhodo advertising, and others, are key
investors in Eisei (Satellite) Channel. Asahi, Dentsu, and Tokyu advertising support JCTV (Nihon
Cable Television). DENTSu, INc., supranote 467, at App. 3. Dentsu is also involved in Japan Cable
Network, see id. at 1 & App. 1-2, and Japan Sports Channel. Hakuhodo and Tokyu advertising are
each lead investors in at least one other major program service, see id. at 1.
474. See Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 33-37.
475. See Suwa CATV NSK News Bulletin, Mar. 1987, at 8, col. 2.
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new players, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, that previously had enjoyed
little contact with the telecommunications world and had interests divergent from many of the old bargaining participants.
MPT's recent moves to expand postal service provide one small example of how the agency has moved away from its old clients in favor of
an innovative policy outlook better serving the needs of business. Among
its new services is the delivery of flyers and direct mail advertising to all
households in a given geographic area. MPT's plans to implement the
new service met with sharp protests from newspapers, whose agents deliver flyers as newspaper inserts, and previously had no competition for
that lucrative business. The agency, however, rebuffed media protests; it
explained that large users had expressed demand for the service, and that
it was the government's duty to respond to such needs.47 6
A more extensive example can be found in the development of
DBS.4 77 NHK and the National Space Development Agency first
launched an experimental direct broadcasting satellite in 1978,478 and another in 1984.4" 9 MPT had not been involved in this development; the
impetus had come from NHK, which was attracted by the new technology's potential to serve areas where the NHK signal could not otherwise
be received.4 80 The public broadcaster
on that basis bore 60% of the cost
4 81
of the 1978 and 1984 satellites.
476. See "Yutopia" Concept and Newspapers, NSK News Bulletin, June 1987, at 6-7; see also
MPT, supra note 242, at 10-12.
477. In a DBS (Direct Broadcast Satellite) system, television or other signals are beamed up
from earth stations and bounced off satellites directly to receivers in individual homes. See L.
GROSS, supra note 437, at 129-135.
478. See Goto, supra note 440, at 11. The World Administrative Radio Conference had allocated direct broadcasting frequencies the year before. Id. at 15; Shimizu, supra note 434, at 122.
479. See Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 12-13, 20-22.
480. "[Notwithstanding TV relay and cable installations,] there are still as many as 420,000
households in 2,200 remote areas, either in mountainous regions or distant off-shore islands, where
terrestrial TV reception is difficult or impossible. The primary objective of using the broadcasting
satellite, therefore, is to remedy this situation efficiently and economically." Ishii, supra note 6, at
80; see also Goto, supra note 440, at 29.
481. Ishii, supra note 6, at 80-81; Goto, supra note 440, at 14; Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 1213; R. Akhavan-Majid, supra note 252, at 140-41.
NHK in 1987 began filling one channel of the 1984 satellite with new material not otherwise
available to the consumer, including news and cultural and foreign sports events. See NHK Starts
24-HourBroadcasting,NSK News Bulletin, Sept. 1987, at 5-6; see also, e.g., Daily Yomiuri, Aug. 2,
1987, at 4, col. 7 (program listings); id.at 5, col. 7 (same). NHK heavily promoted its new programming, and found itself with a hit. By March 1988, over 200,000 households were receiving the new
programming on individual home dishes, and an even larger number were receiving the programming via cable, see infra note 505. By January 1990, the total number of households receiving the
programming exceeded two million. By March 1991, the figure exceeded three million. See Private
SatelliteBroadcastingStarted,NSK News Bulletin, Mar. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter NSK 1991]; Border.

BROADCASTING IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.

1991]

Once NHK took the lead on DBS, ensuring that the technology
would develop with or without MPT's encouragement, MPT in the early
1980s began thinking about commercial applications. Commercial
broadcasters took the view that neither they nor any other private entity
ought to participate in the new technology, which they saw as a direct
attack on the network-affiliate system: if programming could be distribthey asked, what need would there
uted to individual homes via satellite,
482
be for local broadcasters at all?
MPT nonetheless established the Study Committee on the Diversification of Broadcasting, including representatives of commercial broadcasters, NHK, and other media entities, as well as academics from the
fields of law, engineering and economics. 4 83 This committee generated a
compromise report two years later favoring commercial DBS.4 84 The
committee report rejected the operation of DBS channels by any narrowly-based private entity or entities; rather, it recommended that a joint
venture be formed to engage in satellite broadcasting. Commercial satellite broadcasting should develop gradually, starting with a single channel; it should fund itself on a pay-TV basis rather than through
advertising, so as to minimize the financial impact on over-the-air broadcasters.48 5 The commercial broadcasters agreed to participate in the consensus venture hoping that it might stall DBS as the Cable Vision
Foundations had stalled cable, and fearing the possibility that a genuinely competitive commercial DBS might start up without them.48 6
They expressed their willingness to take part on condition that existing
broadcasters hold a majority of the new venture's stock; that it not be
funded by advertising; and that it produce no programming of its own,
but rather purchase programming from member stations or from outside
sources.

4 87

In 1983, MPT solicited applications for a single commercial channel
on a DBS satellite then scheduled for a 1989 launch, and actively enline Between Satellite Broadcastand Communications in Dispute, NSK News Bulletin, Mar. 1990, at
7 [hereinafter NSK 1990]. NHK now offers a second satellite channel, see Shimizu 1991, supranote
6, at 4, and has begun limited HDTV broadcasting over DBS; see N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1990, at Cl,
col. 3; L. Johnson, supra note 6, at 11-12.
482. See Goto, supra note 440, at 25-26, 28-29; Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 26; R. AkhavanMajid, supra note 252, at 141-43.
483. See Goto, supra note 440, at 25-26.

484.
485.
486.
487.

See id. at 30-37.
See id.
See id. at 38-40.
See id. at 40-41.
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couraged participation by the major media groups.48 8 It requested
Yoshihiro Inayama, president of Keidanren (the big business trade association),4" 9 who was associated with five of the DBS applications, to take
charge of the ipponka. At the close of the ipponka process in 1984, businesses outside the traditional mass media held 63.8% of the shares of the
new entity, known as Japan Satellite Broadcasting. Broadcasters held
only 19%; other mass media entities (including newspapers, news agencies, movie companies, publishers, and advertising agencies) held
20.6%.490
As of early 1990, no commercial DBS had yet begun operation.
MPT, however, found it necessary to suppress the efforts of a renegade
outfit that wanted to begin commercial DBS outside of the MPT umbrella. Skyport Center was set up in 1989 as a Class II telecommunications carrier to engage in the business of, among other things,
distributing television programming to cable systems via private communications satellite. In early 1990, however, Skyport began marketing that
programming to individual households, offering to sell them the dishes
and descrambling equipment with which members of the public could
pull in its signal directly. NHK, Japan Satellite Broadcasting, and the
association of commercial broadcasters all reacted sharply. MPT called
in representatives of Skyport, of its constituent firms, and of the company
owning the satellite whose transponders Skyport proposed to use, and
told them that the service would violate applicable laws. Skyport backed
off. 9 ' Japan Satellite Broadcasting began its operation later that year.492
MPT, in promoting DBS, forced the creation of a service that commercial broadcasters had opposed and that other media entities had not
sought. Clearly, its approach was different from the one it displayed to488. See Shimizu, supra note 434, at 127, 128; Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 13; Expansion
Plans in New Media Are Kept Realistic by Hikita, Variety, Dec. 24, 1986, at 58, col. 1 (TBS vice
president Hikita states that TBS is participating in DBS "essentially to satisfy the government").
489. See supra text accompanying note 453.

490. See Kobayashi, supra note 398, at 13-14; R. Akhavan-Majid, supra note 252, at 143-45;
Shimizu 1986, supra note 6, at 19.

491. See NSK 1990, supra note 481, at 7; Shimizu 1991, supra note 6, at 6. Legislation proposed by MPT and adopted by the Diet in 1989 provided that before engaging in such transmission
the satellite carrier must obtain a broadcast license and all program providers must obtain MPT
approval; approvals for program providers are to be governed by the broadcast frequency allocation
plan. Hanada, supra note 407, at 290-92. U.S. law contains no comparable requirements.
MPT later agreed to license direct marketing of communications-satellite transmissions to home

dish owners. See TV Channels to Proliferate,Japan Times (weekly int'l ed.), Sept. 9-15, 1991, at 17,
col. 2.
492. See NSK 1991, supra note 480, at 1; Shimizu 1991, supra note 6, at 5. Its new DBS television channel, called WOWOW, primarily offers foreign movies.

1991]

BROADCASTING IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.

wards cable in the Shinjuku incident. MPT, however, did not abandon
bargaining-oriented regulation; rather, it included non-media businesses
within the bargaining circle, and shifted power to them. That shift is
demonstrated by its choice of the president of Keidanren to guide the
ipponka. Although MPT tilted away from its old clients, the pattern of
bargaining was largely the same: the agency proceeded via ipponka, used
the ipponka process to control entry into the market, and used its regulatory powers to stop an upstart from outside of the bargaining circle from
actually providing service.
Non-media firms are participating heavily in new media in Japan
today.49 3 MPT has developed a close relationship with the Electronics
Industry Association;49 4 that relationship is reflected in such bodies as
the Space Cable Net Promotion Council, established by MPT to work
out preferential financial and tax treatment for companies in the communications-satellite business. 4" The biggest winners in telecommunications liberalization, similarly, have been electronics companies shut out
under the old regime. Mitsui and AMitsubishi, excluded from the telecommunications equipment market before 1984,496 have moved aggressively
both into telephone service - forming joint ventures with electric
utilities in Japan's three largest metropolitan areas to offer local telephone service in competition with NT "9 7 and into satellite
communications.4 98

This expansion of entry, however, has not meant the end of old-style
regulatory approaches. Because MPT has maintained a fundamentally
bargaining-oriented approach, the changes it has allowed in the broad493. See Hamada,supra note 293, at 97-98.
494. One measure demonstrating that influence, I have been told, is MPT's increased success in
securing amakudari (literally, "descent from heaven") positions in the electronics industry for retiring MPT officials.
495. See MPT, supra note 408, at 38.
496. See supra notes 424 & 449.
497. These regional carriers offer a powerful alternative to NTT for local service, building on
their access to the existing power-distribution grid and to existing relationships within the business
community. See Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 33, 36. MPT, however, has not allowed them
to interconnect with NTT, or with each other to form an interregional network, commentators have
suggested that MPT views the electric utilities' ties to MITI as unshakable, and is unwilling to give
MITI that additional new line into the telecommunications market. See id. at 39-40.
498. Of the two new domestic satellite carriers, one (Japan Communications Satellite Co.) is a
joint venture of C. Itoh & Co. (a trading company), Mitsui, and Hughes Aircraft. The other (Space
Communications Corp.) is a project of the Mitsubishi Group, using a satellite built by Ford Aerospace. See Sato & Stevenson, supra note 220, at 33; Davidson, supra note 18, at 153, 156; Hanada,
supra note 407, at 302. Mitsui has also moved aggressively in recent years in the area of television
program production and distribution. See NBC Signs Two Deals with JapaneseFirms, BROADCASTING, Dec. 24, 1990, at 14 (NBC-Mitsui-TV Tokyo joint venture).
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casting system have been only incremental; it has stressed "harmonious
development" so that new technology and participants can coexist with
old.4 99 Intelecommunications, similarly, while MPT has licensed three
joint-venture companies to compete with NTT in providing long-distance
telephone service along the lucrative Tokyo-Osaka corridor, 5" it has
seen no value in encouraging competition among these enterprises. Service rates and charges for the three companies, approved by MPT, are
almost identical; the Japanese Fair Trade Commission has faulted MPT's
administrative guidance on the issue."'
With MPT enjoying a new role as a policy agency and new clients in
the electronics industries, and with its ties to the traditional broadcast
media loosened, the agency was able to push forward after 1985 with its
new plan to expand licensing of over-the-air television stations, seeking
four stations in each prefecture.50 2 The agency's shift, however, has by
no means been a complete one; it is still to some extent centered on the
goal of preserving the status quo. Indeed, MPT's goal of placing four
broadcast stations in each prefecture and five in the major cities seems
well suited to preserving the existing four-major-and-one-minor networks. The agency, at least through the 1980s, did not wholeheartedly
embrace industries such as DBS, which carry the threat of truly radical
50 3
change.
Moreover, the Ministry's new policies are not necessarily coherent;
the agency has not coordinated its station increase, DBS, cable, and telecommunications policies. 5" Increasing the number of broadcast stations, for example, undercut MPT's goal of promoting cable: MPT's
1986 new license authorizations were designed to leave only 19 prefectures served by fewer than four broadcast stations. On a nationwide ba499. Quoted in Hamada, supra note 462, at 4, and in Goto, supra note 440, at 29.
500. One was a purely private venture, linking some 200 participating companies headed by
Kyocera, Sony, and Mitsubishi; the others were the product of efforts led by the Ministry of Construction and the Japan National Railways (then a government corporation), respectively. See Dear.
ing, supra note 424, at 55-56; supra notes 466-67 and accompanying text.
501. See Sato & Stevenson, supranote 220, at 34; Three New TelecommunicationsCompanies to
Start Operation, NSK News Bulletin, Dec. 1986, at 8; R. Akhavan-Majid, supra note 252, at 86-90.

502. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
503. This stance may itself be changing. In one intriguing development, MPT has been discussing with NHK the possibility of phasing out one of its two terrestrial TV networks as its DBS
channels become self-supporting. See Shimizu 1991, supra note 6, at 11-12.
504. But see Tracey, supranote 369, at 211 (the activities of MPT, MITI and NHK during the
1970s and early 1980s were part of a unified and coherent plan reflecting "a clear sense of the new
information society.., and a recognition that the sea change of the information society will not just
be a drifting in with the tide of entertainment, fed by superficial consumer needs to be titillated and
beguiled by the frothy offerings of Hollywood and its ilk").

1991]

BROADCASTING IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.

sis, MPT sharply depressed the demand for importation of key-station
broadcast signals5"' that in prefectures such as Shizuoka and Nagano,
was cable's raison d'etre. Cable may yet play a key role as a distribution
vehicle for DBS,50 6 but that development would be the product of accident, not planning. Similarly, while MPT has supported both telecommunications deregulation and the development of a broadband,
fiberoptic, digitalized telecommunications network,50 7 deregulation undercut the protected position that would have helped NTT embark on
this large and expensive public-works project.5 "' Some of this lack of
coordination may be the product of infighting and sectionalism within
MPT;50 9 some may simply reflect the fact that the shift from status-quo

orientation to industrial policy does not necessarily carry true vision
along with it.
Thus, while MPT had originally charged its advisory Commission
on the Role of Broadcasting in the New Media Age with formulating a
radical revision of the old broadcast order, the committee's ultimate report, submitted in April 1987, largely ratified the status quo and contained nothing revolutionary. 10 MPT still has important choices before
505. See Weinberg, Cable Television and Copyright in the United States (paper presented to the
Copyright Law Society of Japan, June 5, 1987, copy on fie with author), at 12 (published in Japanese as Amerika Gasshukoku ni Okeru Yusen Terebijon to Chosakuken, 15 Chosakuken Kenkyu 23
(1988)).
506. See supra note 481. At the start of NHK's DBS broadcasting, almost all households receiving the signal did so via their cable systems rather than through individual satellite dishes. As
late as the end of March 1988, more than half of the 580,000 households receiving NHK DBS
programming still did so via cable. See MPT, supra note 408, at 10. Cable industry members with
whom I spoke in 1987, however, were worried by the prospect of NHK's requiring cable operators
to collect a special DBS subscription fee from all persons receiving DBS programming via cable.
507. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
508. See Dearing, supra note 424, at 54-56. But see Japan Times (weekly int'l ed.), Apr. 13-19,
1991, at 17, col. 1 (anticipating a nationwide fiberoptic network early in the 21st century); MPT,
supranote 407, at 8 ("it is necessary to develop a nation-wide digital network .... and development
is in full swing under government support"). MPT, similarly, has failed to reconcile its advocacy of
an NTT broadband network with its current refusal to allow NTT to make its network available to
third-party cable operators for the provision of cable TV services. See Hanada, supra note 407, at
293.
509. Tatewarigyosei,see supranote 407 and accompanying text, is not limited to battles between
ministries; battles between bureaus within a ministry can be every bit as fierce. See Y. PARK, supra
note 223, at 52, 114. There is considerable friction, for example, between MPT's Broadcast Administration and Communication Policy bureaus. The Communications Policy bureau in recent years
has sought to advance the position that the concept of "broadcasting" is no longer useful as a regulatory definition, and published an entire report on DBS without ever referring to the medium as
"broadcasting." The Broadcasting Administration bureau, in turn, seems to regard the future of
cable as outside its sphere of concern.
510. See Crux of ProposedRevision of BroadcastLaw, NSK News Bulletin, Mar. 1988, at 6-7.
The report recommended, in part, that MPT consider relaxing anticoncentration rules and the
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it; the electronic mass media in Japan hold the potential for tremendous

change following upon further development of DBS, cable, videotext, or
other telecommunications services. The story remains to be told how
well Japan's regulatory system will serve it.
4. Conclusions. Japan's use of the pure bargaining model in policymaking for telecommunications in general, and cable in particular,
yielded a story not all that different from the one produced in the United
States by formal-rationality checks on an otherwise largely bargainingoriented policymaking system. In Japan even more than in the U.S., the

agency began with a bargaining-oriented, client-based broadcast regulatory system. In both countries, that system was undermined by coercive
shocks from some outside source. In the U.S., those shocks were provided in considerable part by the courts; in Japan, they were provided by

a political threat from MITI. In the U.S., the regulator responded in
large part by expanding its client group to give previously powerless
cable operators seats at the bargaining table. In Japan, similarly, the reg-

ulator responded largely by expanding its client group within the context
of bargaining-oriented regulation to include parties, particularly elec-

tronics manufacturers, who previously had not had significant influence
before it.
The pure bargaining model, in cable policymaking as well as in

broadcast licensing, gave the Japanese regulator a seductive opportunity
to limit new entry. Limiting entry makes the regulator's job easier, giving it more administrative-guidance influence over industry members and
helping to foster a mutually beneficial relationship between regulator and
rule limiting most stations' broadcast areas to the prefectures in which they are located, in order to
facilitate the reception of a greater number of broadcast signals over the air in rural areas; that it
reconsider anticoncentration rules restricting investment in new media by conventional media entities; that it exempt broadcast programming other than television and AM radio from some traditional content controls; that it consider giving an expanded regulatory role to the Radio Regulatory
Council, see supra note 243; that it issue ministerial ordinances formalizing its license grant and
frequency allocation processes; and that it seek to promote research into digital broadcasting. See
Revision of the Broadcastandthe Radio Laws, NSK News Bulletin, June 1987, at 7-8; A. Kawaguchi
& S. Kimura, supra note 442, at 12-13; Hanada, supra note 407, at 288-89.
MPT in 1988 submitted to the Diet a set of minor revisions of existing law based on the report,
and secured quick passage on the representation that the revisions implicated no new policies. See
Revision of the Broadcastand Radio Laws; supra; Omori, supra note 194, at 25. The revisions required the agency to issue its license allocation plans, and its anticoncentration and cross-ownership
policies, as ministerial ordinances. The new law also exempted broadcasters, other than commercial
television or NHK, from certain content controls, and granted statutory recognition to subscription
broadcasting. See Crux ofProposedRevision ofBroadcastLaw, supra; Omori, supra note 194, at 2729; Hattori, supra note 194, at 59.
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regulatees. MPT's restrictions on entry in cable policymaking, however,
ultimately proved unworkable. The agency could not successfully exclude whole classes of influential large corporations, backed by the big
business community, from an important area of industrial policymaking.
The regulatory and political interplay, together with market forces in a
system characterized by disparate sources of bureaucratic power, made
that status quo unstable and eased entry to the system.
V.

REGULATORY MODELS REVISITED

"The system by which a country organizes its broadcasting system,"
one analyst has written, "contains to the outside observer a strange coded
version of that country's entire political culture."5 1 ' Comparing the Japanese and the United States approaches to broadcast regulation sheds
light not only on the legal cultures of the two countries, but also on the
appropriate role of bargaining-oriented regulation in the modem administrative state.
In the area of conventional broadcast licensing, the U.S. moved
from an informal system in which the Commission operated both by bargaining and by fiat to a more formal approach attempting to exclude all
subjective factors from the licensing process, focusing only on the
mechanically and objectively determined public interest. The Commission adopted substantive criteria purportedly susceptible to mechanical
application by a hearing examiner, after a formal fact-finding proceeding,
to govern choices among competing applicants for a single license authorization. That approach, however, did not succeed markedly at diversifying or democratizing broadcast ownership, and its unworkability has
imposed great administrative costs.
The pure bargaining-oriented Japanese approach to conventional licensing, however, has been even more troubling. It has artificially reduced opportunities to produce and receive broadcast speech, has
centralized media power, has helped promote blandness in broadcast
content, and has encouraged an active political role in the licensing process. While the U.S. approach has succeeded to only a small degree in
diversifying media control, the Japanese approach rejects the basic philosophy of diversity. The Japanese approach is designed to keep control
of broadcast licenses within the circle of the socially and politically
influential.
In the area of new technology policymaking, the bargaining orienta511. A. SMrrH, THE

SHADOw IN THE CAvE 257 (1973).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

tion of the U.S. approach initially led it to inhibit the innovation of cable
television; but the system recovered in large part through the mechanism
of a judicial system attempting to apply standards of administrative rationality. Policymaking in the U.S. was driven in part by the tension
between client bargaining and judicial application of formal-rationality
rules; newcomers into the communications field such as cable programmers and cable and satellite operators, shut out before the Commission,
could appeal to the courts to open new doors for them.
The Japanese regulatory system, more strongly bargaining-oriented,
also initially resisted new technology through its orientation to statusquo actors. That system recovered through competition between government organs in the market for clients and power; policymaking was
driven by the tension between MPT's desire to continue bargaining
within an existing client group and its need to look beyond that group in
order to cope with an interbureaucratic political threat. Arguably, interbureaucratic competition, as in Japan, is a more successful way of
pressuring a protectionist agency in general policymaking than is judicial
review, as in the United States. In comparison with U.S.-style judicial
review, interbureaucratic competition may yield pressure that is more
gradual and continuous, and less random and episodic; it has brought
Japan some media services, most prominently DBS, still undeveloped in
the United States. The two policymaking systems, though, used their
different mechanisms to reach roughly similar bottom lines regarding
cable television; in both countries, cable television policy ultimately
lurched forward through a combination of fortuitous, perhaps random,
factors.
Both the U.S. and Japan, thus, reacted to the regulatory problems
posed by broadcasting in internally consistent ways. With regard to both
license allocation and planning for new technology, the United States
experience has been marked by a powerful administrative formal-rationality overlay working significantly against an underlying bargaining-oriented approach. The interaction has often been haphazard, unclear and
wasteful. It has worked relatively badly in the case of conventional
broadcast licensing; in policymaking for new technology, by contrast, the
tension lent significant dynamism to the system.
Japan put in place an administrative-law structure that reinforces,
rather than undercuts, its bargaining-oriented regulation. Japan's pure
bargaining approach is much less costly in terms of administering the
regulatory system itself. Bargaining-oriented approaches, however, share
the disadvantage that they require bargaining within some group: the
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agency must not only define the ground rules of the bargaining, but it
must choose the interests that will be represented, and the individuals
who will speak for those interests. In making those choices, the agency
will narrow the confines of the group to those actors who are familiar to
it, who have other links with the agency, and who cannot safely be excluded without upsetting the system through appeals to other governmental entities. Those who are unfamiliar, who do not have such other
links, and who can, for the time being, safely be excluded, will be excluded. In the U.S., formal-rationality elements check that tendency of
bargaining-oriented regulation to limit the group of those with access to
regulatory decisionmaking. In Japan, however, those checks are unavailable; the system relies on purely political checks to open up the bargaining group.
The U.S. and Japanese approaches have yielded sharply different results in the area of license allocation. While the U.S. approach works
badly in this context, the Japanese approach seems even less tolerable,
suggesting that bargaining works particularly badly for broadcast license
allocation. Where a bargaining-oriented regulatory system excludes politically powerless outsider interests from license allocation, such interests simply lose; by definition they have no political clout, and they
continue to be excluded from the ruling consensus that defines who may
be awarded a broadcast license. Nor is it sufficient that new, politically
powerful actors can use political levers to force their inclusion in the
agency decisionmaking process. In the license allocation context, U.S.
freedom-of-speech and communications policy thinking require more:
they require that politically powerless actors be able to seat themselves at
the bargaining table and gain control of some of the resources that the
agency is distributing. Bargaining-oriented license allocation cannot provide that.
By contrast, the U.S. and Japanese approaches produced somewhat
similar results in the new-technology policymaking context. Bargainingoriented regulation may be relatively innocuous in general policymaking,
because of the ability of bad broad policymaking to correct itself. In a
dynamic regulatory situation, disadvantaged interests over time are able
to make themselves heard in some forum, whether it be the courts, the
legislature, or a competing agency. New technology carries with it its
own commercial momentum; where its beneficiaries are excluded from
the regulatory process, the regulatory system is not stable and is ultimately subject to pressures shifting it into a new shape. Thus, while the
regulatory structure at any given moment is likely to be repressive, ineffi-
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cient, and behind the times, those very factors will pressure it to greater
change. While regulation will not catch up with changing technology
and markets, neither will it be frozen in place. In Japan, even in the
absence of a judicial mechanism to check agency parochialism, electronics interests were too powerful to be locked out forever from MPT decisionmaking; the mechanism of interbureaucratic competition ultimately
gave them access to MPT's decisionmaking process.
Bargaining-oriented regulation, in sum, seems least problematic
when parties excluded from the bargaining can successfully turn to some
outside actor, such as the judiciary or a competing agency, with the
power to shock the agency into opening up the bargaining process. The
ability of an excluded party to open up the process in this way, however,
may be more or less important depending on the context. That ability
seems highly important, from a U.S. perspective, in the context of conventional broadcast licensing; the Japanese approach to conventional licensing, as a result, is disturbing. Political checks on MPT broadcast
licensing are available only where the agency seeks to deny a politically
powerful actor entree into the ipponka process. A process that merely
allows access for all politically powerful actors, though, does not seem
sufficient in the area of licensing speakers. Indeed, to strive deliberately
for such a result seems antithetical to the tenets of the American communications-policy system.
Bargaining-oriented regulation seems more acceptable in the context
of U.S. and Japanese regulatory policymaking to meet technological
change in the cable arena. Both the U.S. and the Japanese systems did
ultimately adapt to the new cable technology, albeit after significant lag
time. Shocks were provided by the courts in the U.S. and by MITI in
Japan; those shocks sharply undercut the cliquishness characterizing the
old regime. In the U.S., checks on the agency became available through
formal rationality: the courts were open to any petitioner capable of paying its legal fees and waiting out the judicial-review process. In Japan,
they were available through bargaining. MITI's own desire to aggrandize its jurisdiction and power gave it incentives to champion the cause
of any industry actor left out under the old system. Moreover, the class
of actors with a strong incentive to revolutionize the old electronic mass
communications regime included such powerful players as Mitsubishi
and Mitsui.
My cautions regarding the failure of bargaining in conventional
broadcast licensing, though, should be tempered by an awareness of the
failures of the U.S. formal-rationality approach. The U.S. system for
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choosing licensees, while avoiding some of the disadvantages of bargaining, has to a significant degree collapsed under its own weight. Its requirement that would-be licensees have inexhaustible supplies of time
and legal resources has lent the system exclusionary aspects. While judicial review is available to counteract agency cliquishness in the selection
process, there seems to be no working process on which judicial review
can act. The fact that both bargaining and formal rationality seem to
work so badly when it comes to license allocation raises a final question.
Are there other problems inherent in conventional broadcast licensing, so
that no regulatory style is equal to the task? The difficulty here may lie
in the bedrock task of having the government "choose" a broadcast licensee by any means involving the application of non-trivial standards.5 12 It
may be that such an enterprise will inevitably work badly; there may be
no criteria or processes by which the government can select broadcast
speakers that do not disserve first amendment or communications-policy
values. That, however, is another issue for another day.

512. Selection methods that do not involve the exercise of judgment or the application of nontrivial standards include lotteries and auctions. As to the likelihood of seeing either of those as a
major part of the U.S. broadcast regulatory system any time soon, see supra note 193.
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